Ep 239. - I Was Inside the U.S. State Department - Until Gaza Broke Me with Josh Paul
Josh Paul served as a director within the US State Department under Biden. He was the first to resign in protest against America's policy of supplying lethal arms to Israel. He now argues that what is happening in Gaza is a stain on humanity. Josh tells me Gaza represents an irreversible moment for the so-called rules-based order.
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Transcript - This is an AI generated transcript and may not reflect the actual conversation
Introduction
0:00
These are are bombs that are being dropped, paid for by our tax dollars from American airplanes. Tell me about
0:06
the nature of the weapons that were sent to Israel. So, the answer is no. Those are not designed for urban warfare. When
0:12
you talk about, for example, a 2,000lb bomb. Uh, it's intended for uh mass infantry targets. It's not intended for
0:20
use where there are crowds of civilians, let alone crowds of civilians in tents, not even buildings in many cases. Josh
0:26
Paul served as a director within the US State Department under Joe Biden. He was the first to resign in protest against
0:32
America's policy of supplying lethal arms to Israel. He now argues that what
0:38
is happening in Gaza is a stain on humanity. Josh tells me Gaza represents
0:43
an irreversible moment for the so-called rules-based order. That rules-based
0:48
order we've been selling you on doesn't actually apply to us. Doesn't apply to those we don't want it to apply to. the
0:53
system is sort of on autopilot. It runs on inertia that unless someone actually steps in, uh the system will continue to
1:00
do what the system does.
1:06
Josh Paul, welcome to the Thinking Muslim. It's wonderful to have you with us. Thank you. It's really good to be with you. Thank you so much. Well, look,
Resignation
1:13
Josh, you were working at the State Department under the Biden administration before you resigned over
1:19
Gaza. I think it was only 10 days after or or a couple of weeks after the um uh
1:24
the I don't know what we call it the onslaught on Gaza began. Um now
1:29
essentially you were responsible for signing off uh weapons to uh to to
1:35
various countries and Israel of course was uh was on the agenda at that time. Can you just talk us through uh uh and
1:43
explain to our viewers the events that led to your resignation please? Surely.
1:49
So I was one of those who was uh responsible for signing off on arms transfers around the world, major arms
1:55
transfers. Uh I had been in that position for about 11 and a half years. Okay. Uh and had always felt that there
2:02
was a privilege that came with being what they call a tenur civil servant, right? Uh someone that you know in the
2:09
position that where they can't fire you uh for expressing your opinions, for going against the grain.
2:16
um and had always used that privilege to speak up on matters of human rights not only in the context of Israel uh but
2:23
around the world. uh but I had long found it to be the case within the state department and across the US government
2:31
that there was a double standard that you could raise concerns and even uh to
2:36
some extent work to address those concerns when they came to the US uh defense relationship with any other
2:43
country uh but with Israel the conversation would be cut off particularly at the political levels
2:50
within the state department uh that people didn't want to have the conversation and for that and were
2:55
willing to uh in some cases bypass American laws. Uh certainly not apply
3:01
the same standards to Israel that were applied globally. So this was I guess an issue I'd been struggling with for some
3:08
time even prior to October of 2023. Um what happened in October of 23 was
3:17
first of all um you know after Hamas's attack on October 7th my I think
3:25
everyone was was shocked but my immediate reaction after that uh as soon
3:31
as October 8th was to send around an email to colleagues both in my bureau which is called political military
3:36
affairs uh but also in the part of the state department responsible for the Middle East and the human rights bureau
3:42
and some others uh to say this is not a moment to rush. This is a moment to
3:47
pause. Uh and I said that for two reasons. The first is that look um if
3:53
for decades our policy has been that we are going to provide Israel with arms and with the financing for those arms uh
4:01
in order to provide it with security, that policy has failed. So before we start throwing billions more dollars at
4:07
this, we should ask why that policy has failed. Uh and secondly uh that we know
4:13
what is coming. Uh we have seen repeated uh conflicts between Israel and Gaza in
4:21
which thousands of civilians have been killed. Uh we have every reason to think this will be far worse. Uh so let us
4:28
think about how the law applies here. Let us think about you know what the right answer is before we start providing weapons into a situation where
4:34
we know that they are going to be used to kill civilians. Um, that email was pretty much met with silence. I had a
4:41
couple of colleagues uh reach out and say, "We agree with you." Uh, or alternatively, uh, are you crazy? What
4:48
are you doing? Um, but um, no response from the policy level.
4:54
So, I continued to raise concerns. Uh, and in the meantime, the bombs began to fall and at the same time the requests
5:02
began to come in from Israel for more and more weapons. uh and this was a different process than the process that
5:08
I'd ever been part of in the state department. Normally it is a bottomup uh process. A country comes in and requests
5:15
weapons and you look at it through various policy lenses and it eventually the decision uh with sometimes caveats
5:24
uh filters up to the senior policy levels and then eventually they say okay or or or no. uh in this instance we were
5:31
getting direction from the senior levels of government from the white house from the secretary's office uh to say you
5:38
will approve every request that comes in and you will do so within the next few hours so the process was flipped on its
5:43
head um you know you mentioned it was 10 days into this phase of this conflict
5:50
but it was also three and a half thousand people who had been killed by the time I left or I resigned on October
5:55
17th um and so what led to my resignation was this this unwillingness
6:01
to even discuss the harms that we were doing and whether there was another way forward combined with the massive scale
6:07
and scope of the harm that was being done. Uh and finally combined with what I felt had been a a long track record of
6:14
both a double standard and a failed policy. I mean some would say that um when it comes to export licenses I mean
Arms export licences
6:20
the US has always acted in a in let's say morally dubious way. I mean, if we
6:25
just go back to say um um weapons exports to Saudi Arabia and and it's it
6:32
horrendous war on Yemen um you know, one can question uh whether um um moral
6:40
guidelines were ever obeyed by by the state department and and and the sort of process of signing off uh these
6:46
contracts. Now you argue that um even those those safeguards were or those
6:52
light safeguards maybe were um were turned on it its head and and uh the
6:58
process was completely expedited. So your position as a civil servant was was simply what to rubber stamp um the
7:04
approval of these exports. Well, that's what it became uh in the context of Israel. That hadn't always been the case
7:12
first of all even for Israel. Yeah. And second of all, you know, I think that
7:18
one of the things that uh anyone in the US government at almost any level has to recognize is that it is a a vast
7:25
enterprise and I think you have to be modest about what you can achieve. Yeah. And I had always felt including in the
7:31
context of the Saudiled coalition and its actions in Yemen uh that by being
7:36
there I could raise concerns and in fact there was a significant amount of debate and discussion within the US government.
7:43
uh arms transfers were delayed for months, sometimes over a year uh to that
7:49
coalition. The US set out on a path of trying to understand why there was so much civilian harm. Uh the Biden
7:56
administration, in fact, President Biden's very first off uh uh decision on coming into office, literally within 20
8:02
minutes of his swearing in, we were told to pause uh deliveries of airto ground munitions to the Saudi le coalition. Um,
8:10
and so there was I I I still disagree with many of the decisions that were made, but again, as a as one civil
8:16
servant amongst a vast bureaucracy, you're not going to agree with every decision that was made, but I felt that there was space to address some of these
8:24
issues, which is what was taken away, particularly in October of 2023 and
8:29
since then when it came to Israel. This is your brother Mazim Mufttar, the
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9:07
[Music] Now Josh, you left uh out of a sense of
State Dept colleagues
9:13
moral responsibility. um how many uh within the State
9:18
Department shared, you know, your perspective and and why didn't we see so more resignations um at that time and
9:27
and and certainly uh towards the end of the Biden administration where it was very evident that Israel had very few
9:33
restraints. So to the question of how many shared that concern and that perspective that I
9:40
had, I would say it is somewhere in the range of 80% really. Uh, I spent my very
9:45
last day in the office, which was October 18th of 2023, going around to all of my colleagues and to different
9:51
offices in the department to say goodbye and to explain why I was leaving. And in every single office that I went to,
9:58
people said, "We completely understand, we completely agree with you." Um, and I think that's, you know, that illustrates
10:04
the nature of the challenge that we face more broadly. uh which is when it comes to US relationships with Israel, it is
10:10
not a policy problem per se because people understand that the policies are you know putting it mildly flawed. It's
10:17
a political problem and it's the pressure people feel not to speak up. Um you know there have been or there were
10:23
under the Biden administration 14 uh people who resigned publicly and I think probably two or three times that number
10:29
who resigned uh privately you know without without making a public statement because of their objections to
10:34
this policy. uh I think there are a lot more than that who significantly
10:39
disagreed and and really either tried to fight against the policies within the system and I think depending on what
10:46
your job is and what your role is there is a very valid argument to stay and to fight. uh if for example you are working
10:52
on getting humanitarian assistance into Gaza uh I think it's absolutely the right decision to stay in and do
10:58
whatever you can and as we know the secretary of state Tony Blinken you know I think struggled with the state
11:05
department certainly for the first few months there were listening sessions there were town halls there were uh
11:10
letters from you know civil servants and diplomats uh there were in some cases open protests
11:17
um but at the end of the day the administration won out and made very clear they were not going to change the policy. And I think by the time you get
11:24
towards the end of the Biden administration, uh the sense was well, if you haven't already left, uh you're
11:31
just going to look like you're leaving a an administration that is going anyway. Uh so what is the point? Um
11:38
so again, I'm not going to pass judgment on anyone who decided to stay in. Uh I
11:45
think everyone makes their own decisions and for many of people those decisions might have been related to uh you know
11:52
here in the United States of course your health insurance is tied to your job right um so people with families people
11:58
who rely on the you know job for the health insurance that's a consideration uh for others and I spoke to others who
12:04
said yes this is terrible but I'm also responsible for Ukraine or Taiwan or any
12:10
of these other myriad global issues that the United States is involved in why should I sacrifice ice the good work I'm
12:15
doing on those places for this one thing. Again, that's not a perspective I
12:20
agree with and I think that this one thing actually weighs on the credibility
12:26
of the United States when it comes to any uh cause around the world. Uh but I I do understand at least that
12:32
perspective. So can you talk to that like what is it what's materially different about Gaza
12:38
uh to the other crises around the world? I mean what is most directly materially
12:44
different at least from from here in Washington DC is America's complicity. Uh these are are bombs that are being
12:52
dropped paid for by uh our tax dollars from American airplanes paid for by our
12:59
tax dollars. Uh and it is not just the provision of the arms. It is also of course the uh diplomatic credits and
13:08
political power that is being used to protect Israel's ability to continue to
13:13
carry out this onslaught to protect it from any form of accountability to press
13:18
other countries not to take steps that they feel are appropriate uh to intercede.
13:24
um and and you know the same pressures and powers that are now being used and applied within our own country to
13:31
repress free speech to shut down student protest. So I think that part first of all is is materially different. Um and
13:38
then I think you can also look at Palestine as uh an ind leading indicator
13:44
uh in so many other contexts. There is an intersectionality to the issues that arise from US support for Palestine. um
13:51
whether we are talking about uh concerns like maternal health, women's maternal
13:57
health and children's health around the world. How can the US speak credibly on those matters uh when we are complicit
14:02
in Gaza when you are talking about environmental issues and the fact that
14:08
Israel's war first of all in its first three months released the same amount of carbon emissions as 30 countries do in a
14:15
year. Uh but also the fact that 70% of Gaza's plant life at this point has been
14:21
extinguished. Uh you know we have satellite mapping that shows that. So how can you be credible on uh
14:27
environmental change and concerns when you are complicit in Gaza? The same
14:33
applies to uh social justice. The same applies to freedom of speech. Uh there
14:39
are so many points of intersectionality here where I think people are often
14:46
pressured to set Palestine aside and to continue to push forward on their agenda
14:51
but leave that out. Uh but I think you can't because if you do it becomes the
14:56
first domino that will tumble all the rest. Yeah. I mean tell me about the nature of the weapons that were sent to
Weapons sent to Israel
15:02
Israel and are being sent to Israel. I mean, you know, of course, these weapons are used in highly dense population
15:09
areas. Um, were they designed uh to to do that? So, it's a very broad ranging
15:17
question, of course, because the United States provides such a broad number and range of weapons to Israel. Uh, we're
15:23
talking about everything from bullets and firearms to fighter jets, uh, and
15:28
everything in between. Yeah. Um, so I think specifically when it comes to
15:34
a lot of the weapons that we've seen used in Gaza, the answer is no. Those are not designed for urban warfare. When
15:39
you talk about, for example, a 2,000lb bomb, uh this is the type of munition that can level an entire city block. Uh
15:46
it's intended for uh masked infantry targets or for hardened targets, for
15:51
example, on an air base where there might be a concrete shelter covering an aircraft. That's what that is intended for. It is not intended for use where
15:58
there are crowds of civilians, let alone crowds of civilians in tents, not even buildings in many cases. Um, and even
16:06
the US in its most intensive urban warfare of the last couple of decades, has used such weapons far far more
16:14
sparingly uh than Israel has done and with rules of engagement that are far
16:20
far more restrictive than those Israel has been using. Um, and then of course
16:25
it's not just about the weapons. It's also about the blockade of Gaza that started immediately. In fact, that has
16:30
been going on since at least 2007. Yeah. When it comes to food, medicine, uh,
16:36
building supplies, all of these things. Um, but but in any event, I think we can
16:41
agree that no, uh, this is not the purpose for which US arms were provided to Israel or are provided to any country
16:47
in the world under US law. I remember back in 2019, Anthony Blinken
US policy on Palestine
16:52
wrote a piece uh in foreign affairs about his uh his views on foreign policy
16:59
and uh every every other sentence was punctuated with human rights and democracy promotion. In fact, it uh Joe
17:07
Biden when he became president, he spoke a lot about making the world safer for democracy. And of course, a lot of that
17:13
was about China and and how China was subverting uh the rulesbased system. and we talked about the rulesbased order. So
17:20
on the one hand, you've got an administration that uh talks to and that
17:25
highlights these virtuous values, let's call them liberal values, but on the
17:31
other hand, you know, you've got this very blatant and very obvious betrayal, I suppose, of these values when it comes
17:38
to Gaza and and Palestine and Israel. I mean, how do you how do you square that circle? How do you weigh up uh the the
17:45
administration that's virtuous and the administration that allowed this slaughter to take place? Sure. And I I
17:52
think just before answering that specific question, the uh the challenge goes more broadly to across the Middle
17:58
East than just talking about uh Palestine and Gaza because we've put
18:03
ourselves into essentially a vicious cycle uh where the more Israel violates
18:10
international law, the more it causes suffering. uh the more I think people across the Middle East want to see a
18:16
shift and you know want to see support for the Palestinians uh and the more support therefore the United States
18:23
gives to regimes to repress uh those democratic urges. So in fact we're we're
18:28
working directly counter to our own stated goals not only in in Palestine but but more broadly in the region
18:33
because of our unconditional support to Israel. Um I think that there is a blind
18:40
spot and I think what it comes down to ultimately is that US policy on Israel and Palestine uh is not driven as it is
18:47
elsewhere for US policy across the world by foreign policy interests. It is driven by domestic politics really. Um
18:54
and again you know let's be fair in a democracy uh that is not unreasonable
19:00
that you know constituencies within a democracy should be able to express themselves and push their country to
19:06
express itself and to to direct its foreign policy in a way that reflects you know a a a more domestic set of
19:12
interests. But I think that's what's been driving a lot of this disconnect and has been holding the US back from
19:18
even being able to discuss some of the failings and hypocrisies of our policies because as soon as you do uh you get
19:26
accused of, you know, in many cases being anti-semitic even though the American Jewish community in many cases
19:31
has been at the forefront of protesting against uh US support to Israel and Israel's actions in Gaza. Um so I I
19:40
think that's one cause. I also think that in the case of some in the Biden administration, Tony Blinkin in
19:45
particular, there were uh and President Biden very direct emotional sympathies.
19:52
Uh in the case of Joe Biden, for example, you know, he was formed as a politician in the 70s and seemed to have
19:59
sort of been mentally locked in there when he talked about Israel. Always went back to his meetings with goldier, this
20:05
this prime minister of Israel who he adulated. Um, and you know, I think we can argue very much about whether she
20:12
was worthy of adulation, but it's certainly the case. I think that, you know, the Israel of Benjamin Netanyahu,
20:18
of of Ben of Smrich, uh, is is in many ways different to the Israel that that
20:24
existed, if ever it did, uh, in Biden's mind in the 70s. Um, but nevertheless,
20:30
he was locked into that. And I think what we saw in October of 2023 certainly initially was was less a
20:37
policy response than an emotional response. Uh and that's unfortunate because the job of the national security
20:43
of the apparatus of the United States is not to respond with emotion. Uh it is to respond with a clear analysis of what is
20:50
in America's interest. I mean how serious was the Biden administration when it came to uh pursuing uh
Ceasefire
20:57
diplomatic approaches to the crisis? I mean, I remember uh at at one point when internal democratic uh dissent was at a
21:06
where was at its peak uh the message was sent out that we're pushing for a ceasefire. And that then became sort of
21:13
the go-to excuse for why the Biden administration was pursuing not only a
21:18
sort of a military policy but also uh a a diplomatic side. Um from where you sat
21:25
from within the State Department and I appreciate you know that's wasn't your direct responsibility but from what you
21:31
could see was there a a genuine attempt to pursue a ceasefire? So there were, I
21:38
would say, um, on a few occasions, genuine attempts driven more out of the defense
21:45
department than the State Department to try and refine Israel's military planning to result in less harm. I I do
21:52
think that there are a couple of instances uh that you can point to where that was the case. But I I think there
21:58
was a desire to get to a ceasefire, but the problem was there was never a will
22:03
to use any of the leverage of the United States to press Israel. So, you know, I
22:08
I can understand in the first instance where you ask nicely and you press and they say no. Um but but when you are
22:16
hitting that wall every single time at some point I think it becomes disingenuous to say that you're actually
22:21
pushing pushing for a ceasefire when you are unwilling to suspend arms transfers. When you are unwilling to vote against
22:26
Israel at the United Nations when you are unwilling to you know take any of these sorts of steps when you are going out of your way in fact to protect uh
22:33
Prime Minister Netanyahu and now former minister of defense galant of Israel uh from any sort of accountability
22:40
um and so on and so forth. the the capability was there has always been
22:46
there for the United States to reign Israel in. Um so I think in the case of
22:51
certainly the Biden administration it was their you know their unwillingness to use any of that leverage that I think
22:57
puts the lie to any sort of credible effort to to lead to a ceasefire. So you
23:03
said earlier and I I just want to punctuate this point um because I'm going to come to Donald Trump and and maybe the similarities and differences
23:09
between the past administration and the present one. Um but you know from where I where I'm sitting and of course I'm
23:16
from London and you know I I I view this very much at a distance but it seemed to me that Blinken and Biden had ideology
23:23
when it came to Islam. there was very little it would use in terms of levers
23:28
because fundamentally it believed in in the the virtue of of Israel and and and
23:34
wasn't and they were not willing to to hold Israel back. I mean is that a is that a fair am I overstating the point
23:41
here? No, I I I think that's true. I also think that they felt that there would be a political cost in America uh
23:49
for doing so and were not willing to bear that political cost no matter how bad it got, no matter you know how many
23:56
Palestinians were killed uh were starved were um you know
24:02
tortured um at the end of the day uh there was I think yes an ideological
24:08
commitment and also a a complete political spinelessness.
24:13
um that ultimately rebounded on them in the form of the loss of Kla Harris in
24:18
the presidential election. it would not have taken very much uh to to move in a
24:25
slightly different direction to say slightly different things uh in a way that I think would have had a
24:30
significant positive political impact for them but they were you know I think not only ideological but also uh afraid
Kamala Harris
24:38
right and so you mentioned Camala Harris I mean um if she had become the
24:43
president would you have imagined or could you imagine there to be a different policy on Gaza today I think
24:49
it's very hard to say. Uh in speaking with her advisers both during the
24:55
campaign and since then I I think that there would not have been certainly any sort of strategic shift in the US Israel
25:03
relationship. I also think that um instead of being involved to the extent
25:08
of one strike mission on Iran's uh nuclear facilities, the US uh would have
25:13
joined Israel in a a much broader campaign under a Harris presidency. Uh
25:18
so I I can't say that we would necessarily be in a much better position. I I mean I've over the last
Dehumanisation of Palestinians
25:24
couple of weeks I've been here and I' I've traveled and met with a number of uh Palestinian Arab Muslim communities
25:31
and there is this sort of underlying view that when it comes to Palestinian lives uh it's not just a callousness
25:38
there is a there's a there's almost an assumption there that Palestinian lives are less lesser than say Ukrainian lives
25:46
right um I mean you know did you notice have you felt that when it comes to the
25:54
ideas of human rights and democracy promotion, the double standard is quite
25:59
it's quite deep because Palestinians are regarded as less human, I suppose. I
26:05
mean, at least that's the impression I get from speaking to to American Muslims. Yeah, I think I think there is no way to
26:12
avoid the racism that is at the heart of many of these policies and many of these decisions. And you see that, you know,
26:18
as you said, not only in the comparison of Palestinians to, you know, blonde hair, blue-eyed Ukrainian children.
26:24
Yeah. uh but also you know in the amount of verbiage that is paid that is spent
26:31
when you know an Israeli is hurt or killed uh you know or Joe Biden showing
26:36
clear emotion when it comes to harm that Israelis may suffer compared to a a
26:42
refusal to even talk about the harm that you know that is happening in far greater numbers to Palestinians. And I
26:49
think that that is rooted in first of all uh an American bigotry towards you
26:55
know the Arab and Muslim worlds and communities uh that we have seen you
27:00
know play out you know in our movie screens and in our stereotypes uh but which has also been encouraged I
27:07
think um you know by Israel's painting of itself as this western country uh
27:15
which it is not this democracy which it is not uh you fighting these you know
27:21
surrounded by enemies which it is not um much as it may try to make itself so um
27:27
so yes at the end of the day I think the dehumanization here is is very very relevant and inescapable can we turn to
Trump’s policy on Gaza
27:33
Donald Trump um because um we are trying to make a comparison you know what's uh
27:40
what's changed with Donald Trump and and in some senses I mean I I I sort of see
27:45
a schizophrenia in in his policy towards towards towards Gaza. I mean at the very start there was that ceasefire and you
27:52
know by all me you I know it was it was pre inauguration but it just seemed to
27:57
me that Donald Trump pushed that over the line and it was really uh his diplomacy or his diplomacy of his envoy
28:03
Steve Witoff and others that that push for that. And so you know that that was
28:08
pretty positive it seemed to me. And then, you know, we have the Donald Trump of the Gaza Riviera and, you know, the
28:14
the green light to BB2 to effectively bomb Iran and and other places. Like, how do you assess the Trump
28:20
administration and and how it views and and pursues its Gaza policy? So, I I
28:27
don't know that schizophrenia is the right word um because I think that assumes a a starting point that is not
28:35
necessarily there and then is an aberration from it. I think what you have I think you have to talk separately
28:40
about Donald Trump and his administration, right? And I think what you have in Donald Trump is someone who
28:46
is first of all unlike Joe Biden not an ideologue when it comes to anything who is you know very transactional. Yeah. Uh
28:54
who is always looking out for the art of the deal as he calls it uh and for you
28:59
know wins and for being on the winning side and therefore because it is not rooted in ideology or in policy uh is
29:08
you know has a tendency to step in unexpected directions. um you know
29:13
without warning in many cases and sometimes those are positive directions uh and sometimes they're not. Um, I
29:20
think separate from that, you have an administration and a government that is much more of of a continuity from the
29:27
Biden administration. And I think you have what you have actually is a uh a very deepseated
29:34
political challenge on both sides of the aisle uh in terms of this unconditional
29:39
support for Israel and the political pressures uh to maintain that unconditional support for for Israel
29:45
which are nonpartisan and which go deep into the bureaucracy. uh to the extent
29:50
that you know as as a senior uh Democratic uh staffer was saying to me a
29:56
couple of weeks ago um that you know the system is sort of on autopilot. It runs
30:02
on inertia when it comes to arms transfers to Israel for example. That's that's the specific example we were
30:08
talking about that unless someone actually steps in uh the system will continue to do what the system does
30:13
across administrations. Um, and so you might have Donald Trump at the top going
30:18
in one direction, going in another direction, listening to, you know, one voice one week and then hearing from
30:24
other voices another week and therefore shifting a bit. Um but but beneath him
30:29
the system continues to be um you know I think in many ways controlled by the
30:35
politics that are underpinning this in a way that no one individual even the president of the United States can
US public opinion on Israel
30:41
easily shift because of course there is a a conversation in in sort of political journals about the impact of the MAGA
30:49
sort of uh republicanism. this idea that um America now needs to resolve from the
30:55
world and and concentrate on itself and and so many of Trump's policies I'm thinking of the tariffs and and and you
31:02
know it's its view towards Europe and China and elsewhere you know reflects this new way of of doing politics right
31:10
um from from where I'm standing uh Israel remains an exception it seems to me and and you know policy may be
31:18
shifting in all sorts of ways in in other areas is but but there is this bipartisan support for Israel. There is
31:26
you know I think it's beginning to weaken and we can talk about that. Um but
31:32
you know at the same time I think there have been some examples under the Trump administration where there has not been
31:37
uh that Israeli exceptionalism. One example as you as you just mentioned tariffs is that Israel too was subject
31:43
to tariffs despite Netanyahu coming to Washington meeting with Trump uh in the White House. Uh you know there are a
31:49
couple of other examples. one can point to such as uh in the context of Syria where Israel Netanyahu had pressed Trump
31:56
not to lift sanctions, not to meet with Ashara uh and Trump did both. Um so I
32:03
think you know where there is that presidential level of attention there is that that variation or that variability
32:10
from the mean from the norm. Yeah. Uh but it is a very deeply baked norm. Um,
32:17
when it comes to the Republican party more broadly, well, first of all, when it comes to American society more
32:22
broadly, we've seen an incredible shift in public opinion uh on Israel and on Palestine in the last uh couple of years
32:29
uh to the extent that a clear majority of Americans uh no longer support unconditional US uh support for Israel,
32:36
no longer want to see us transferring lethal arms for use in Gaza, want to see a ceasefire. Um, and even in the
32:44
Republican side of the aisle, uh, or I should say within the Republican base, there have been significant shifts, you
32:50
know, just as on the Democratic side, more amongst the youth than any other demographic. Uh, but also because a lot
32:57
of Republicans, you know, some within the MAGA movement are isolationists and don't want to see us uh, getting pulled
33:03
into another conflict in the Middle East. Uh, some don't believe we should be providing, you know, US dollars to
33:09
foreign countries. Uh and Israel of course is the leading recipient and has been for decades of US foreign military
33:16
assistance. Um some are concerned by the threats we are seeing to our first
33:21
amendment freedoms, to our civil rights. Um where there is effort after effort to
33:26
pass laws prohibiting criticism of Israel. Um some are concerned about what
33:32
they see as foreign influence in our democracy. And so I think all of those play a role and and we are seeing a
33:39
shift. What it hasn't really done yet is translated uh on certainly on the Republican party but for both cases
33:45
really uh Democrats as well into the politics and particularly into the establishments of the party. Uh you have
33:52
bases in both cases that have going going in one direction and establishments that remain in many cases
33:57
beholden to donors uh or are you know of an age where they are unlikely to uh to
34:04
shift their perspective or are motivated by deeply held religious views in some cases. Um so so that shift has been hard
34:12
to to translate into politics but I think over time it it has to it will. So
34:17
I following on from that um um New York I've just come from New York and a
34:23
couple of days back you had the primary win of Mamani um in a city and he's very
34:29
pro Palestine and and has been uncompromising I suspect in his in his sort of uh activism for Palestine over
34:36
the years. Uh New York is seen to be one of the most pro-Israeli cities if that's a fair way to say it or at least a city
34:42
where there has always been a majority in favor of Israel. Yet in the Democratic party, you've had this shift
34:49
uh and an acceptance and from for more accounts, Mammdani has reached across the island and has, you know, a number
34:55
of Jewish voters, good number of Jewish voters have voted for him. Um and you know, speak to that. I mean, does that
35:01
indicate a a a shift in American public opinion? And um you know, is that is
35:09
Mandani in a way um a an accelerant to a type of democratic party that may shift
35:17
uh its position in in years to come? So let me start by saying that I am not an
35:24
expert on this but I think that you can draw a line uh of divergence to looking
35:30
at the American Jewish community compared to uh Israel uh that goes back you know at this point over 70 years and
35:37
the lessons that were taken away from the Holocaust whereas I think for Israel or at least Israel's government the
35:42
lesson that was taken was this idea of you know you have to squash any threat
35:48
and you have to be constantly strong uh and all this sort of thing. Whereas I think much of the American Jewish
35:54
community took the lesson of uh you have to build a a world that is diverse and
36:00
that is pluralistic uh and that is peaceful. Uh and I think that that is
36:06
something that a divergence that has accelerated in the last couple of years. Yeah. Where it is in many cases the
36:12
American Jewish community who have led many of the protests through organizations like if not now Jewish
36:17
voice of peace ter rabbis for ceasefire various others. Um, and I think that we
36:25
did see that in New York where, you know, not only um did a significant uh
36:30
proportion of New York's Jewish community, which is the largest in the world outside of Israel, vote for Minani, but his key political ally uh
36:39
was Brad Lander, uh a New York Jewish politician. Yeah. Um who partnered with
36:44
him and who they, you know, they crossendorsed uh in the in the uh electoral system that they have. Um
36:51
and so I think you know this suggestion first of all I think we are seeing that
36:56
breaking through now increasingly that you that to be critical of Israel or to
37:02
be pro Palestinian is not anti-semitic that there is a difference between a
37:07
political entity and particularly one that is committing atrocities war crimes genocide and a you know a faith
37:14
community with a uh history and a story that goes back thousands of years and
37:20
that has nothing to do with the actions of one specific government that claims to represent it but does not. Um and so
37:26
I think that Mamani's primary election is a really positive indicator but I
37:33
hesitate to say um that the final takeaways are available yet because of
37:38
course it was a primary victory and I think we will see um you know groups
37:44
including Apac and others uh now really sort of you know recognize the mistakes
37:50
they made and I think they did make a mistake by focusing uh this election on Mani's views on uh Israel and Palestine,
37:56
which turn out to be pretty popular views actually uh particularly when coming from someone uh who is so clearly
38:02
genuine, heartfelt and um reaching out to all faith communities. Uh but I think
38:09
that they will double down now and I think it is going to be a very ugly uh main election which is not coming until
38:15
November 4th. Yeah. um where I think there'll be all sorts of effort to both throw more mud of this type uh but also
38:23
to create divisions between communities and particularly uh I fear between the
38:29
uh pro Palestinian movement on the one hand and New York's African-American community. Um and I think we really need
38:36
to start building those bridges and strengthening those bridges because at the end of the day these issues such as
38:42
apartheid such as social justice cut across everyone. Uh but I think that
38:47
there will be significant efforts to try and be divisive around those issues. Josh you you are working on an an
Fighting the narrative
38:52
initiative to counterbalance I suppose this narrative in Washington on Palestine. Uh is that not an uphill
39:00
struggle? Yeah, of course it is. Um so the initiative you're talking about is
39:05
called a new policy. Uh it was launched about 9 months ago uh by myself and by
39:11
one of the other uh former US officials who resigned under the Biden administration uh a gentleman called
39:17
Tara Kabash who is a Palestinian American uh born and raised in Ohio uh
39:22
who was a political appointee who worked for the Biden campaign uh and then worked in the Department of Education on
39:30
student loans and educational access and affordability until he had to resign
39:35
because his own government uh his own leadership would not see his own
39:40
humanity or the humanity of his people and treated them indeed as not only you know secondass citizens but as you know
39:47
worthy of destruction and how can you continue to work for someone in that context. Yeah. And it was his and my
39:54
analysis both within government and since leaving that the problem we face again it's not a policy problem but a
39:59
political problem and in the American system if you want to overcome a political problem uh you need to
40:07
engage in restructuring the incentives for candidates for office uh and for
40:12
incumbents so that they can see that there is a clear benefit to shifting
40:18
their perspectives at the end of the day right the the main goal of every elected official is to get reelected. Uh and you
40:24
have to demonstrate that there are the votes there that they need to shift or
40:30
in some cases can safely shift because they already know in their heart that there is a need. Uh and in the American
40:36
system, you also have to provide the financing for the campaigns and the money, right? Uh uh that makes victory
40:41
possible while at the same time uh engaging with members of Congress uh
40:47
engaging with US government officials to prompt them to push them on legislation
40:53
and while helping the American public uh understand the issues and access these
40:59
issues in a way that is going to meet them where they are. So we are we are trying to communicate uh to all of these
41:06
different audiences why we believe that America is not acting in its own interests right now and is running
41:12
directly counter to its own values while at the same time bringing the energy and the momentum we've seen across the
41:18
country uh in the last couple of years into American politics in a way that the system is designed to respond to. I've
USA’s global image
41:24
noticed um especially in Europe uh there are commentators who today argue that uh
41:31
this moment what's happened in Gaza is actually a a substantial moment in in world politics and the global south in
41:39
particular have taken note of of the sort of duplicity let's say of of American foreign policy. I mean, do you
41:45
subscribe to the view that Gaza is a is that moment, you know, is a moment of
41:51
reckoning, I suppose, for for sort of for Washington? And has America's image
41:58
in the world been irreversibly tarnished? To all those questions, I think the answer is yes. Um, and here's
42:05
why. Uh I think prior to Gaza um and this goes to the way that the
42:12
Biden administration in particular framed uh how it thought about foreign policy. America was you know the
42:18
superpower the global superpower. Um and much of American foreign policy
42:24
certainly as I experienced it within government was premised on how do we
42:29
maintain uh that American global leadership. Uh so essentially we were we
42:34
are a status quo power. We don't want to see change. Um but it is that is that
42:40
may be a selling point within Washington. Let's stay on top. It's not a selling point around the world. There has to be an appeal to the rest of the
42:46
world of what does American leadership mean? And that appeal was based in
42:52
support for human rights, for democracy, um for you know individual rights, for
43:00
freedoms. And that is what made the American claim to leadership uh
43:06
different at least from those that are offered certainly by Russia and also by you know the people's republic of China
43:13
um whose template essentially is take all the benefits of capitalism but none
43:19
of the messiness none of the the you know complexity of democracy and that's a very appealing model and so you have
43:26
to have something to counter that and what the US has done through its complicity in Gaza uh is essentially
43:33
said, "No, no, no. We're just kidding. There's nothing actually that discriminates us apart from the fact that we are a military global
43:40
superpower. Uh you know, that rules-based order we've been selling you on doesn't actually apply to us. Doesn't
43:45
apply to those we don't want it apply to to apply to. Uh those rights and freedoms we've been talking about
43:52
doesn't actually apply if we don't want them to. Uh so the hypocrisy is is
43:58
absolutely vital. In fact, you know, even in how we see it play out in America where there is that repression
44:03
of free speech. Yeah. Because at the end of the day, it takes away any attraction
44:08
of the United States. Um, and I think this is, you know, something, you know, I've certainly struggled with because I
44:15
do believe in, you know, individual rights in a a liberal world order in
44:20
which there is a rules-based system. Um but you know freedoms that are available
44:28
or aspirations that should be obtainable to all people. Um but if the United States isn't selling that then you know
44:37
are we headed for a world in which all of that um you know fades away or or
44:44
are there others who can pick up the slack and who can stand up and where we have seen that at least when it comes to
44:49
the international rules space order is from the global south. It's been inspiring to see South Africa, a country
44:56
um that emerged from a brutal apartheid system, turn around and lead when it
45:02
comes to accountability and justice uh and and equally as inspiring, depressing
45:07
to see the United States uh try to shut that down. I note there when you talk about upholding the the liberal world
Europe’s role
45:14
order of the rulesbased order, uh you haven't mentioned Europe here. I mean, you know, um you're originally from
45:20
Britain, of course, and I know you're you're an American now, but um um um Europe's position on on Gaza has has
45:28
been failing as it's it's as problematic, I suspect, as as the America's position. I mean, how do you
45:34
how do you assess Europe in in this sort of global order? So, the reason I didn't
45:40
mention Europe is because I'm almost at the point of giving up. Um just one point of correction, I've always been an
45:46
American. Uh my my dad was English, my mom is American. Um but
45:52
it's been incredibly disappointing. I mean, look, first of all, this is always a problem Europe has because it's not like it is a cohesive hole. Uh and so at
46:00
any one time, you know, first of all, you have the UK now, you know, through Brexit process more removed, but then
46:05
you have, you know, Spain going in one direction, France going in another, Germany in yet another, and and you
46:10
know, probably the worst of all. Um so it's first of all difficult to speak about Europe as cohes I actually think
46:17
and have tried to make the case. I was actually um in Paris just a couple of
46:23
weeks ago uh and had the opportunity to meet with French government officials uh to say that look where the US is failing
46:31
this is where we need Europe to step in. Um you know where the US is clearly no longer an honest broker for example
46:38
between the Israelis and the Palestinians. um where the US has lost its moral compass. This is where we need Europe to
46:45
step up. Um but you know again because first of all it doesn't function as a cohesive hall
46:51
and also because you know each country's been pursuing its own self-interest uh or is tied down by its own domestic
46:58
politics uh and history. In the case of Germany um
47:03
it's just not demonstrated the capacity and the capability to to show up. Um
47:08
there was supposed to be a conference in New York a couple of weeks ago that France was one of the leading countries
47:15
on on recognition of Palestine. Um which was pulled down uh after the you know
47:23
Israel's after Israel strikes in Iran began. Uh I actually think that it was pulled down because France couldn't get
47:30
enough other major countries in Europe to join it uh in that recognition. Um,
47:35
so anyway, long story short, I think there is an important European role here. It's just not clear that they'll step up to it. One final question for
47:42
you, Josh. I mean, uh, we're here in Washington and, um, for some time there's been a conversation about
47:48
American decline. I mean, from what you feel in the air and is is this the last
47:54
days of the empire? It's still very early days for the Trump administration
47:59
and there has been already a significant amount of harm done to uh America's
48:06
reputation around the world but also to the structures of its diplomacy. Uh you know I was talking with a number of
48:12
colleagues from the State Department in the last couple of weeks uh all of whom are um
48:20
sort of bowing down and hoping not to lose their jobs but but who are also all describing um
48:28
a an environment right now where essentially everyone has the knives out
48:33
for each other. everyone is just looking out for themselves and is concerned about their little thief which is not
48:38
the state department I knew or worked in. Um and you know as the administration continues to try I mean
48:44
we've already seen it shut down a lot of America's foreign assistance and USAD and as it shuts down increasing parts of
48:51
the state department and other US government functions uh there will be lasting harm done that will be hard to
48:57
uh hard to rebuild. Um I don't you know right now much of America's global sway
49:03
comes down to our economy which I think will will continue to you know chug along. In fact is doing better than
49:09
Europe's economy for that matter. Uh and to our military presence and that is not going anywhere either uh even under a
49:15
Trump administration that would like to be um more more isolationist. Um but you
49:21
can't run on money and guns forever. um you at some point again have to have something to offer and that is what we
49:28
were losing under the Biden administration and are continuing to lose now. Actually, one very final
Impactful change
49:33
question, Josh. Um, you know, you made that decision 10 days into into this crisis and, uh, it must have had a
49:39
personal toll on you and, um, you probably had to move, you know, away
49:45
from the quite a secure, I mean, civil servant jobs everywhere are pretty secure. Um, to to a world where you're
49:51
you're now having to, you know, fight your corner, right? And you're you're having to, uh, make a case for for
49:57
Palestine and Palestinians. um you know from where you're sitting now I mean two
50:02
years almost two years you know into into the crisis um do you feel that the
50:10
impact you can have outside of the administration is more than the impact
50:15
you had within the administration yes 100% I you know I wouldn't have left
50:20
if I had felt that there was any impact on this I could have within the administration that's one of the things that made it easy in a way for me to
50:27
leave is that it was clear that there was nothing to be done. Uh but I think that first of all what we have seen
50:33
across this country is an incredible shift in the conversation and I'm I'm proud to have been a part of that shift
50:41
uh and to you know continue to drive what needs to follow now uh which is the political change and I think it's it's
50:47
possible uh I am actually ironically I think I'm more optimistic in the long
50:53
term than in the short term. uh you know in the short term there's of course the urgency right now of Gaza of the horrors
50:59
we see every single day and I don't know uh that the United States or that any
51:04
country is going to do what it will take to you know shut that off to to you know
51:11
bring humanitarian assistance into Gaza to rebuild to stop the Israeli aggression of the West Bank which we
51:16
haven't even talked about um and so on and so forth. But in when it comes to
51:21
America, I think that this shift will continue and that there really is an opportunity uh to bring people together
51:29
to drive a change um you know if if organizations and I've mentioned them
51:35
before but like Apac or like its democratic counterparts democratic majority for Israel uh can spend $und00
51:41
million or more in an election cycle to get America to act against its interests to get us to act against our values. Uh,
51:48
I think that if we organize and are coordinated, we can actually get America
51:53
to do the opposite and act in its interests and in accordance with its own values at a lot lower price. Um, and so
51:59
that's what we need to keep doing. Josh B. Thank you so much for your time today. Thank you so much. Thank you.
52:09
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52:14
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