Ep 240. - The Last Great Caliph: Abdul Hamid II - with Dr Yakoob Ahmed
Sultan Abdul Hamid II is a man vilified by some, lionized by others, yet rarely understood on his own terms. To his critics, he was the Red Sultan, a reactionary despot who clung to power as his empire unraveled. But to his defenders, he was the last bulwark against European imperialism, a caliph who dared to say no when so many bowed their heads. But who was Abdul Hamid II?
To help us unpack this complex figure, I’m joined by Dr. Yakoob Ahmed, a historian of the late Ottoman period whose work has brought fresh insight into the ideologies, pressures, and personalities that shaped the final century of the Caliphate.
You can find Dr Yakoob Ahmed here: Substack: https://yakoob.substack.com
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Transcript - This is an AI generated transcript and may not reflect the actual conversation.
Introduction
0:00
Who was Sultan Abdamid II? There's two things here that we need to understand about power. One is the
0:05
perception of power and then two is the reality of power. I understand that Sultan Abdah Hammed was famous and skilled at playing
0:12
European powers against each other. That was a fantastic thinker, a wonderful poet in the Ottoman Empire.
0:17
Each Sultan had to have some ability to be able to do some sort of handiwork. In a very popular sense, his stance towards
0:24
Zionism is often cited as one of his greatest achievements because it shows
0:29
um a particular level of steadfastness and stoicism. The empire didn't collapse
0:35
on his watch. It collapsed on the watch of the young Turks. And that's a really interesting conversation we should be having today perhaps.
0:41
To help us unpack this complex figure, I'm joined by Dr. Yakob Ahmed, a historian of the late Ottoman period,
0:48
whose work has brought fresh insight into the ideologies that shaped the final century of the Ottoman caliphate.
0:59
Dr. Yakub Ahmed, asalam allaykumah and welcome back to the thinking Muslim.
1:05
Thank you for having me back in the thinking Muslim. I just want to make this very clear. I'm not coming back to anyone else's podcast.
1:12
So, the last time we spoke, which was many, many months ago. That's right. Uh, you said you were hanging up your
1:18
podcast hat for a while. Yeah. Um, so, alhamdulillah, Jazak, we're very you've been very generous in returning
1:25
to to to our podcast. I appreciate that. Um, so today we're going to talk about Sultan Abdul Hamid
1:32
II. Yeah. Who was the Sultan uh between 1876 and
1:38
1909. So he was a uh the ruler of the Muslim world effectively the kiff
1:45
the amminin the the man in charge of vast terrains
1:50
of the the Muslim world. Of course some would regard him to be the last great Ottoman Sultan as well
1:57
which maybe we can talk about right. Um so Sultan Abdamid II was this extraordinary character but also in in
2:05
some respects many historians have suggested that he was quite a dark character and there are some sides to
2:10
him which were very authoritarian. So we're going to explore a lot of that today but I suppose the starting point
2:16
to this discussion is why like why is it that there is an interest in Sultan Abdi
2:21
today amongst Muslims amongst non-Muslims. What is it about Sultan Abdam II uh that makes him such an
2:28
interesting Sultan to study? Before I tell you why I think it's the case, you know what I'm going to do
Why study Abdul Hamid?
2:34
here. But why is he interesting to you? You're a Muslim. Yeah, that's this always happens uh uh
2:40
at the beginning of our podcast. See, I I think that in a sense he resonates with some of our insecurities today.
2:46
Whether that's Palestine, you know, Sultan Abdami, I'm sure we'll explore it, was resolute on Palestine and did not
2:52
want to hand it over or sell it to the Zionist regardless of economic problems. He presided over a uh a a terrain, an
3:00
empire, a sultterate uh which had its its own fair share of problems, right?
3:07
Um you know, you had outsiders, foreigners who were chipping away at the
3:12
Islamic Empire and uh in in a world where I suppose we're looking out for
3:18
historical precedents but also historical figures that can inspire us. He he does come across as someone who
3:24
one should seek inspiration from. Yeah, it's interesting because um this is a question I'm trying to um cross
3:32
myself in regards to the Muslim interest here and I think I've mentioned this to you before. I think there is something in
3:38
the way that Muslims write their history which is based around um the great men
3:45
but in particular good leadership right um and it starts with theam right so we
3:51
have we have um we we have the way that the s is written in regards to
3:57
documenting's life it's it's not just a a type of biography it's it's a it's a
4:03
life journey and story in the sense that um we are seeing um
4:09
one aspect of what we are seeing is is is what it means to be a leader and not
4:14
just a political leader, a leader in the household um an educational leader, a
4:20
spiritual leader, a religious leader and so forth. It's all encapsulated in this one person who is a prophetam chosen by
4:27
Yes. And that culture of writing throughout Islamic history has been very
4:33
strong. Yeah. And so you'll see that Muslims generally write about particular figures
4:39
who are not necessarily Khalifa all the time. Um so you'll have someone like um
4:45
I don't know Abuhanifh or you'll have Salahi or you will have you know Nuruin Zeni
4:53
you'll have people who are fighters people who are scholars people who are
4:58
you know sages and rulers of religious um orders and the people who are Khalifa
5:06
as well and there is something that Muslims are looking to to say that that resonates
5:11
with our sort of like civilizational outlook about how we see ourselves in the world. So we have a particular expectation and
5:18
and I think that resonates today more so because today we may argue that while we
5:24
have um clear cultures of rulership we
5:29
are lacking leadership and that's that's feel felt quite strong. So Abdul Ham II
5:35
then um resonates in one way because the question of Kilafa comes ac comes around
5:41
quite often and then as a Khalifa the idea is here was one that represented a
5:47
particular leadership style that um that if we had that back perhaps
5:55
um the Muslim situation would be different. So if we were to
6:01
analyze that and to the granular level, I think that's what we're looking for as Muslims, which is that this absence of a
6:09
collective culture of leadership representation in all facets of our life by the way and
6:16
um the current Muslim condition um then as you mentioned goes back into
6:22
historical past to see when did that come about next and Abdul Hamid himself is a quite uh
6:29
diversity figure regarding the way the historians have written about him, right? Um but most Muslims, not all, there are
6:37
um those who see him in a different life, but most Muslims would resonate with the fact that um he is considered
6:42
at least as the last true great caiff Yeah. of the Ottoman Empire. And so what it's telling us is it's a
6:50
it's an issue of leadership. It's an issue of his reign and it's an issue of what is
6:57
Yeah. I guess that's why um we are drawn towards him. Around the world, more than 250 million
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Turn your compassion into hope. Right. So, tell me about the basics, his
His background
8:05
background, uh who he was, how uh what was his
8:10
learning prior to becoming the Sultan. Um yeah,
8:16
Abdul Hamid the second subhan Allah is is an exceptional um
8:21
thinker, very astute, very methodical and very aware
8:27
politically of what's happening around the world. I mean he wasn't supposed to be Khalifa. Um it was fortuitous events if you want
8:32
to call it that or or circumstance if we call it that. So his uncle Sultan Abdaziz um is removed from power by a
8:40
particular military coup um and then is found dead either by murder or suicide
8:46
depending on what type of historian you are in regards to that his brother Murad
8:51
comes into power and was supposed to be the constitutional kaiff the first constitutional kaiff and loses his mind
8:57
so Abdul Hameid wasn't even in the picture he was not even being trained to be uh the kaiff in that context but
9:05
he was somebody who was exceptionally well-versed in Olumadin, somebody who
9:10
took interest in that. It was a fantastic thinker, a wonderful poet, a carpenter. And you know, so there is an
9:16
idea in the Ottoman period that um each sultan should be able to do something
9:22
with their hands. And this is really interesting um because I've read works of the Ottoman
9:28
period. Um I think it was alhamdulillah I could be mistaken but I think I
9:33
remember reading from him that one of the gifts that Allah tala has given in son is hands and there's a special um
9:38
unique connection with the hands and the soul in which we do so much of our handiwork um regarding the use of our
9:45
hands and the more people move away from the usage of their hands and it's interesting in this current technological age where less people are
9:54
um doing things with their hands in terms of craft and so forth and going into the technological field
10:00
in the Ottoman Empire. Each Sultan had to have some ability to be able to do some sort of handiwork. Um, and Abdul
10:07
Hammed was a wonderful craftsman. If you go to the Jildis mosque, which is his mosque, there are two columns made from
10:13
wood on each side which he had um built himself and put into the masid. There's
10:20
a te just further down 100 meters down called tees where the and the member are
10:27
made from wood and Abdham made them too. So he had um a wide skill set and I
10:32
guess the idea is and this is why it's important because people look at him as a sultan and we can we can also address
10:40
that question of the sultan because people look at the the word sultan as being quite negative because it sort of
10:47
gives them the impression that it's a reflection of being an authoritarian. But the word sultan actually means
10:54
somebody who's a representative. And it was way the Marxist thinker who had popularized the idea of sultanism
11:01
when speaking about the Ottomans. And he had created an umbrella term to basically place the Ottomans in what he
11:07
called oriental desperatism. Yeah. So everybody who was non-western was considered their political practices
11:13
and um you know strategies and and governmental styles were all one of the same which was these authoritarian like
11:19
despots right and Abdul Hamemed fell under that but there were a lot of checks and balances within the Ottoman structure and the Ottomans were very
11:26
careful about especially in the 19th century of the type of leader that would
11:32
represent their interest and Abdul Hammed um whether it was you know
11:37
because of Allah of Of course it was for but whether it was luck in the sense that um you know um he just happened to
11:45
be in the right place at the right time or whether the Ottomans had created a culture where multiple sultans could
11:51
lead um gets him in that position and and he is exceptional and just one last point
11:58
but he's part of a a governmental structure right and very few people talk about the Ottoman government so he's part of an
12:05
elite band of people who we call the amar um who help and support him to
12:12
facilitate this governmental style for sure. Right. Okay. So he wasn't alone in his
Structural leadership?
12:18
leadership rather he had a structure around him. He had a a group of so because he's been
12:26
around for 30 years. Yeah. Um you could say there are like two to
12:31
three phases in which Abdul Hamid's political sort of like um policies are
12:38
practiced. In the earlier part where he's trying to find his feet concerned about the different types of contestant
12:44
elites um he keeps himself close to a a small group of people. In the second
12:49
part of it where um a new generation has emerged and he's consolidated his reign a lot more. there he's surrounded by a
12:56
lot more of these loyalists and then the the latter part of his reign there are even those who are close to him who are
13:02
part of a particular educational background who are not satisfied with the direction the empire has taken and so they are more challenging to that so
13:09
and and that shows then that he's balancing that internal um power structure that exists within the Ottoman
13:15
Empire it's not as the point I was making a simple case of authoritarianism
13:20
right in that sense so um you talked about in your first in the answer to the first question that um
Coup of his brother
13:27
he comes along after uh one of his predecessors uh is overthrown by a a a
13:33
revol a coup. Yeah. Um uh so tell us about what were the demands of those who overthrew
13:41
uh his uh his brother and and um how did they uh and and what they expect from
13:48
Sultan Abdi? Because of course uh western commentators would suggest that the expectation was that he was going to
13:55
be a liberal reformer whatever that means in the context of of that time that he was going to be a liberal
14:00
reformer and they were quite disillusioned that he didn't turn out to be that that reformer so take me through
14:06
the demands of of those and who were they I mean he was a reformer
14:11
I think one of the things that gets taken out of the equation is that tradition has a transformative ability
14:17
the idea that tradition is always static So the whole period of the 19th century
14:22
is a period of reformation. So if you look at the emergence of the Wahhabi movement technically is is a movement of
14:28
reformation. The emergence of the sort of like reformist Salifist movement um that emerges in Biladam and Iraq and
14:35
Egypt. Once again that's another type of reformist movement in that sense. So there is reformism that's taking place
14:41
across the Muslim world in that sense. um the idea of liberal reformism in the way that we understand it today I don't
14:48
think anyone would have understood it in that way at that time let me break it down like this there was two different
14:55
types of camps a camp that believed that authority was invested in the khalifa in
15:01
the person himself and then there was a camp that believed in in investing the authority in the
15:06
kilafa as a system and the difference is is that the first one where is investing
15:12
authority in the khalifa Means the buck stops with a particular individual that individual can be held to account and
15:17
that individual so long as they are upright, pious and ethical in accordance
15:23
with Islam, then we should um obey that person um to the best of their ability.
15:29
Whereas the technocrats within the the governmental structure were saying um we
15:34
shouldn't leave it to that type of chance in the type of configuration we have which is a sultanic model. So we
15:40
should create a system in which we don't have that level of dependency on the caiff himself but have a constitution
15:46
which kind of creates the norms of of what the government ought to be. So they wanted a parliamentary system and the
15:53
parliamentary system was designed by and large not simply as a shorter council but for example matters to do with
16:00
taxation. It shouldn't be it shouldn't be left to to the kaiff alone to make
16:06
those decision that the parliament as a collective could come to the conclusion that these are the better policies for
16:12
taxation then send it to the kaiff him looking over it and then he has the power to veto or not. So what they
16:19
wanted was to make sure that the caiff didn't have absolute authority to the
16:25
point that he could take you to war and bring the destruction of the empire or he could economically bankrupt the
16:31
empire. So they wanted to create a more technical um state. So their idea was to
16:37
have a constitution which was in conformity with the Sharia and then the constitutional government
16:43
which the kaiff was a a participant of including the parliamentarians and amar
16:49
and then the kaiff in that particular type of matrix because it's not a straight hierarchy because they still
16:55
have the capacity. So for example Abdham could still pick who could be in the group of Amar and so forth but not have
17:01
total choice right but then there was another group who um who didn't like that idea so when Abdul
17:07
Hammed does come in making the demands that I will adhere to the constitutional governance because maybe that is the way
17:14
to go forward now that we are modernizing as an empire feels that um him it's not just him but
17:20
his close aids like um Jeff Pasha for example um they they think you know what this is
17:27
not working we've tried it but this is a bit of a mess and because they had got into war with Russia at the time and had
17:32
heavy losses and the parliament wasn't um capable of bringing out the type of solutions that Abdul Hamid was satisfied
17:38
with so he said you know what let's just scrap this for now and we'll go again another time um in doing so um Mdu Pasha who was of
17:48
the belief that a good stoic strong religious sultan is the way to go forward the idea that we have rather
17:56
than placing emphasis on a system that fundamentally the culture in Islam is
18:01
that it still holds individuals to account and that's a really interesting conversation we should be having today
18:07
perhaps because even today in our discourse like you'll have some commentators who will hold ardan to
18:13
account or MBS to account or particular Muslim leaders to account
18:18
because there is still a notion that the leader to some degree has a particular
18:24
level of agency and then if you read the works of so forth they will start talking to you about the system the structure and that
18:32
you remove one person but because the structure is the same another one will will replace them in the same manner and
18:37
I think what's needed here perhaps and this is where the Ottomans might be helpful in Abdhammed is how do we find a
18:43
balance here on the one hand we can have a particular or we can cultivate a particular sophisticated political
18:49
structure on the one hand that is technocratic and has the means of checks and balances is but at the same time
18:55
it's conducive to our culture of that there is an accountability of the person in charge not only in the eyes of the um
19:03
but also in the eyes of Allah and so that was the contestation here right okay um but but that contest
19:10
contestation led to the position of one ki so that's yeah absolutely
19:16
right okay so who were the people who were the ones behind so like mid pash the grand vis was one
19:22
of was another. Ah, so this was not some sort of western model. No, but the thing is is so in the
19:29
western discourse the argument is is that these people were influenced by the west, right? Um, but if you look
19:36
in more detail um I guess what they're reflecting
19:41
is how do you modernize an empire um and still hold it accountable to your
19:47
own ethics and values, right? And there's a debate that's been had in Ottoman studies about the notion of Ottoman modernity.
19:53
So Ottoman modernity is a concept that's been used
19:58
prior which is that it's just a reflection of a um imitation of the west
20:04
in insecurity by the Ottomans replicating western models and so forth. But if you read the works of maybe like
20:10
today Tahabman and so forth, the the Muslim philosopher from Morocco, you start to see that what he's making the
20:16
case is that a Musl an Islamic modernity um can be an alternative modernity. The idea that the world keeps moving
20:22
forward. The idea that Muslims are just going to remain static. It doesn't make sense. The Ottomans are also moving forward and they're trying to negotiate with the
20:29
changing world regarding colonialism, industrialization, and so forth. But how do you make that fit within an Islamic
20:35
remit? So contemporary constitutionalism is an interesting concept because you
20:42
know as somebody who does political science that it's considered as a western concept and there are Ottoman
20:47
historians like Hussein Yilmas for example who make the argument that the Ottomans had traditions of
20:52
constitutional checks and balances and that Ottoman constitutionalism in some ways is just a reflection of a
20:59
contemporary reflection of those sort of practices which is having checks and balances
21:06
Right. Today, if you were to ask Muslims politically um how do they feel about
21:11
constitutional theory, it would be an interesting conversation because what makes the Ottomans interesting perhaps
21:17
is that it's a constitutional kilaf. We don't have that type of um um I don't
21:24
think we've ever seen that apart from in the case of the because the only who did that we do have constitutions in Afghanistan.
21:31
um we had constitutions in other parts of the the state of Joh which is the southern um Malaysian state that looked
21:39
at the Ottomans and then said how could we reform our states in accordance to something that fits within the Islamic
21:45
model. So the tensions are and this is what's interesting I guess is that when you're trying to reform and change and
21:52
discursively transform the assumption is is that there's not going to be moments of tensions and violence that these are smooth
21:58
transitions. That's not always the case, especially at the high end of political power in the case of the Sultanate
22:04
because the concern that Abdul Hamid and his followers had was that this could really relegate the
22:10
office of the Sultanate to being something secondary and elevating the office of the parliament.
22:16
Right? And so his concern was how can we keep that in check? Um whereas the parliamentarians were making the
22:22
argument that we have no interest of overstepping our prerogatives regarding
22:27
the sultan but this is in the interest of the empire and that a more efficient system a more centralized system now
22:34
that we've got decentralization um means we need to try something different. Now, um, Abbert, we're
Challenges he faced
22:40
talking about late 19th century. Um, uh, there is a, you know, a a challenge that
22:47
the Ottoman Caliphate has from outside. Absolutely. And, um, this challenge comes in a form
22:53
of military uh, a military challenge from from European powers uh, who are in some
23:00
respects militarily superior, if that's the right word to use. uh but also there
23:05
are economic challenges that the empire faces. Just talk me through some of the
23:10
challenges uh such had to deal with when he came into to office.
23:16
So before I go to that I I wanted to talk about something which is is something which is of interest to me
23:21
about um declining empires perhaps and because the question is predicated on this notion of how Muslims feel about
23:27
the decline of the Ottoman Empire. something that I have to deal with a lot. And what you see in the Ottoman case is um there are discussions within
23:36
the circles of the Ottoman elites about whether the empire is in a state of decline or not.
23:42
And what you see in the works of Muslim thinkers at the time is quite interesting because there's a recognition that there's two form two
23:48
types of civilizational decline. One is a material decline and one is a moral
23:54
decline. M the material decline is that there could be moments in a civilization or nations
24:00
or states history in which they at some given point fell behind technologically
24:07
in regards to another empire and that could be for various reasons and so as a result of that um while that
24:12
is unacceptable because there's an expectations that Muslims ought to be competent but it can happen because that's just
24:18
the nature of human beings you you can't maintaining that continuum is is difficult um ask supporters of
24:26
Manchester City, right? You win the league four years in a row and then sudden collapse, right? So then what you see is
24:34
is there's a concern. That's one. The second concern which the ama had primarily was about the moral decline.
24:41
The idea that when you go down a particular moral decline,
24:46
yeah, even if you are materially superior, if your decadence is so extreme that you
24:55
can't reverse that back, right? And so why is this important? Because the material decline is understood that you
25:01
lost your dunya, you lost your worldly gains. Yeah. But you'd like to believe at least in terms of your the end of the the
25:08
world, you tried your best and it didn't work out. But if you morally decline,
25:13
like let's just look at Western civilization in Israelis today. You don't only lose your duny the world,
25:19
you lose your you lose both. And so Ottoman thinkers were really concerned when diagnosing their reality that is
25:26
this a material decline or is this a moral decline? Right. And they are having these debates
25:33
amongst themselves. So the reformist Salafist movement in particular made the argument this is a material decline.
25:38
There's a scientific loss that's taking place. Europe has scientifically excelled ahead of us. And then you've
25:44
got the the Nachibandi movement who are saying no we just need to reset the morality in people that people are not
25:50
doing the basics right and so on. In the end the empire collapses. Now why is this important? because it
25:57
tells you the sort of like um thought process that the Ottomans are in in regards to their reformation and how
26:02
they see themselves because they do consider themselves as an alternative civilization to the world that they're
26:09
in. They see themselves they are they do not see themselves as colonizing powers. You see Walter Molo for example who's a
26:17
decolonial thinker. He says the problem that western writers have had regarding the Ottomans
26:22
is the Ottomans were not colonized nor were they colonizers and they were part of the western block and the western
26:29
world didn't know where to place them. On the one hand they didn't want to place them amongst themselves because
26:35
they were primarily different because they were Muslim. Yeah. But at the same time they couldn't lump them with the rest of the Muslim world
26:41
because they hadn't been colonized and they only exist in power. And this is where the Ottomans are
26:46
interesting which is until the end they are trying to hold that position and
26:51
Abdul Hamid's policies now go into this question which some people say once again the long- winded answer
26:58
but he tried to address these two matters. The first one was to find the
27:03
balance on the one hand of material success but not to the point that you lose your ethics and moral values.
27:09
Right? To what degree can we um materially
27:15
compete with the west but not to the point that we are subjugating our peoples to a particular
27:23
form of harm where we dehumanize them in a way that they are no longer human. And
27:28
so that was the challenge he had. So one of the major strategies he used was education that he tried to create. The
27:36
challenge he had was the madrasa system. what to do with it. We are now in a world where there is an
27:43
expectation that the m among some Muslim thinkers that the mad system which is the Muslim religious educational system
27:50
cannot cater for every subject area. It's just not possible. So there was one group of thinkers who
27:56
said why don't we extend the mus system out add other subjects to it and you
28:02
know make this a like exceptional educational system. Another group of
28:07
people said, "Well, why don't we separate them out? Why don't we leave the mad alone purely for in those
28:12
subject areas and yet on the other hand have a new educational system where it's
28:17
separate, but we still give them the basic Islamic training of what it means to be a good Muslim." Um what's
28:23
interesting here however is Abdul Hamid by doing that this is what many people
28:29
sometimes miss is he created an education system where he took the agency away from the family
28:35
and gave the agency to the state in the sense of now he's deciding what people are learning and what they're not
28:41
learning right in that sense and and what type of education they ought to have and prior to that there was a
28:46
particular level of decentralization in regards to learning and knowledge production but those are one the things
28:52
he did. But he opened up many schools, universities um and invested heavily on
28:58
infrastructure um and he invested heavily on um science
29:05
and technology because he did believe that there was a Islamic way of doing this. Now um I understand that um again
First official caliph?
29:13
western commentators would would suggest that or historians would suggest that he was the first sultan to overtly use the
29:21
term kaiff khalifa. Um and that reflected his panislamism
29:27
this idea that um you know he was the khif over all of the Muslim world or large parts of the
29:33
Muslim world rather than just a particular group within the Muslim world. Uh how much do you buy into that
29:40
that idea of of being the first official caiff? Yeah. No, I don't buy into it at all. Um
29:47
first because it's there is an assumption that previous Ottoman Sultan consider themselves kaiffs which is just
29:53
not true. You see that in the case of Gench Osman in the 17th century um Sultan Ahmed so
30:00
the wonderful blue Sultan Ahmed mosque Sultan Ahmed consider himself caiff.
30:05
What happens is we call it the long 19th century in historical writing, right? I
30:11
think it was Hobs who used the word long 19th century. I could be wrong. Somebody can correct me in the comments. They always do that. Anyway, and um the long
30:19
19th century is this idea that from the end of the 18th century up until 1924,
30:26
it tries to encapsulate all of it. So in 1774 um the Ottomans um in the Crimea
30:34
um are defeated by the Russians and they sign a treaty called the treaty of Kukar
30:40
in which the terms are considered unfavorable in the sense that the Russians are given um conditions to more
30:47
or less annex the Crimea um move around in uh the um the Black Sea
30:56
and have some level of agency over Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. Now, the Ottomans when you look
31:03
at the the documentation from the Ottoman side, um the paperwork looks a little bit different. And I think here
31:10
is interesting in terms of how the Ottomans saw themselves in these terms and how the Russians thought these terms
31:16
are unique, but that's another conversation. But so in 1774, the
31:21
Russians also signed a document recognizing as the Ottomans as the global kiphate. um which was unprecedented and
31:28
never before had a a power um recognize the Ottomans as a caliphate and the and
31:34
the Russians had did that in writing and in doing so the idea that hope was for the Ottomans at least because the Crimea
31:41
was the first lo loss of Muslim territory. Yeah. Today when we look at Crimea, we're looking at the war between Ukraine
31:46
and Russia and it's devoid of the Muslim imagination and that was a a Muslim territory at one point in the Ottoman
31:52
Empire. And um so by the Russians recognizing the Ottomans were a global
31:57
kaleid, it actually resonated with the Ottomans because the hope was that in the future
32:05
because what the Ottomans could also do is choose the chief MUI from Istanbul for the Crimea
32:11
and the Kaiff's name is still saying in Jama and so forth that they would go back one day and the Muslims the
32:18
structure would still be there. They never went back. It never happened. But what it did do going forward um when we
32:25
see the case of Salim the third um Mahm II Abdul Majid the first and even Abdul
32:30
Aiz is the notion of the Ottomans being a global kipid and having some level of spiritual agency over Muslims around the
32:37
world became important and they actually execute Abdul Hamid where he is unique
32:42
is he executed policies regarding this type of rhetoric for Muslims in the
32:48
Asian subcontinent parts of Russia um Africa, North Africa and so on and so
32:54
so these were lands which were not formerly part of yeah they were not part of the Ottoman Empire and this is it creates a even a a
33:01
um a debate within the Ottoman domains about is this the jurisdiction of the Khalifa
33:07
because there's an expectation that the if you're going to make such a claim that when Muslims are suffering in other
33:12
parts of the world you you need to do something about it. Um but I guess what Abdul Hammed was trying to do to some
33:18
degree is to maintain the idea or the maintenance of the idea of the because
33:24
at the same time the British were already promoting ideas that the
33:30
Ottomans were illegitimate as a kiphate and the Wahhabis
33:36
um during the reign of Sultan Salim III and Mahmud II had rejected the Ottomans as a kiphate because they didn't see
33:42
them consider them as Muslims. And then there were certain uh reformist Salifist thinkers who while not outwardly and
33:51
aggressively critiquing the Ottomans but did give some credence to the idea that the Khalifa has to be from the Quraysh
33:58
and that Abdul Hamid and the Ottomans are not that. So the concern Abdul Hamemed has now is one to maintain the
34:05
integrity of the empire but two these internal voices um these multiple voices and I'm not saying you know that these
34:12
peoples and actors are inclusion but collectively they create a particular
34:18
type of pressure which Abdul Hammed recognizes and so he then emphasizes even further on uh the supremacy of his
34:26
kaiff fate and him being kiff so that the Ottomans were not challenged. I mean they even put it in the constitution. So in the constitution
34:33
it was written that the the Ottomans are the only ones who can be kiff and that Istanul and this is really interesting
34:39
that Istanul should remain the capital of the ka until the end of time. Mhm. And the reason being and I think a lot
34:45
of people maybe don't look at these things and I've only come to this type of exposure because I'm a historian. For
34:51
the Ottomans there are particular um ideas Quranic ideas and hadith ideas
34:56
that matter to them. The notion of bilad which includes beet maktas they saw that
35:03
as one type of hemisphere one type of ecosystem Egypt um the hij including Yemen
35:10
Mesopotamia today's Iraq and biladum and they they believed from Islamic
35:16
evidences that these areas which are mentioned in Islam historically continuously have a particular
35:23
geographical and religious importance. And so because Fatir was considered as
35:30
the Sultan who conquered Constantinople. Yeah. They considered that that was not only
35:35
some sort of like great boon but it was a sacred event. And so that was a boon
35:41
given to them by Allah until the end of time. And so in a strange way became
35:46
part of the sacred imagination and Abdul Hamid was the caiff who was residing in.
35:52
So why is this interesting? because it tells you a particular understanding of the Ottoman thinking of the historical
35:57
kiphate which is that there is a particular geographical space which exists regarding their integrity. So Bal
36:05
Maktus was important Makkah and Medina were important. They're not going anywhere. They're geographically located somewhere and it's the job of the
36:11
Khalifa to protect a including these spaces. So um it's really intriguing how
36:16
how they internalize these things. Um today people may reject that but I'm
36:22
just explaining to you how Ottoman themselves you see this in the works of for example Zadin Dagastani and Jevd
36:28
Pasha um and even Fad Pasha who was not very outwardly religious in this way he
36:33
was a grand via but also making these types of claims. So when we think about uh Sultan Abhameed II um you know I
His stance on Zionism
36:41
think in a very popular sense um his stance towards Zionism
36:48
uh is uh is often cited as one of his greatest achievements. So the Zionist
36:53
the state is in uh is in economic turmoil or at least it's in in great amounts of debt
36:59
and the Zionist movement uh approach him uh in return for uh Palestine
37:05
they would pay off uh the debts of the Ottoman Empire and you know he very firmly rejects uh that proposal.
37:14
um like how at the time how uh momentous was this uh this conversation and what
37:23
lay behind I suppose you know he his his steadfastness when it comes to Palestine
37:28
it's difficult to know how momentous it was at the time I mean to what degree were people privy to the political
37:34
decisions that being made in the in the palace it's difficult to know sure
37:40
I mean this I don't this is not a slight on Abdhammed here I any Ottoman caiff would have rejected those positions.
37:45
This is unthinkable in the Ottoman context. The idea of giving up uh you
37:51
know um Palestine Beth Maktas to to to anyone let alone the Zionists um would
37:56
have been unimaginable even the young Turks in that sense. But I think
38:02
the point you made about the the empire being in an economically difficult situation and Abdul Hamid um being
38:10
unwilling to compromise his values based on that
38:16
is something which is interesting because today um when we speak to Muslims of a
38:22
particular inclination, they will make the case that out of necessity particular um decisions have to be made
38:28
and The idea is is that if you didn't do that then there will be a particular
38:34
type of ruin. Now Abdul Hammed um may have calculated that um but also probably would have
38:41
trusted his own instincts in terms of safeguarding uh the region and so on. Um
38:47
now the empire collapses in World War I so there's not much he can do there but um
38:53
yeah he wouldn't have he wouldn't have given an uh an inch to anyone of the empire and that does say something um I
39:00
think that narrative in of itself is important because it shows um a particular level
39:06
of um steadfastness and um stoicism
39:11
in which a a particular type of compromise is not going to be made. And I'm not saying Abdul Ham didn't make
39:17
compromises. Um he was running an empire at times. Political decisions forced him to do so. But on this case, it wasn't
39:24
going to happen. And it tells us something about
39:30
leadership again, right? And the expectation we have in regards to leadership about making the right decision.
39:35
Yeah. And then trust in Allah and then trust in the um perhaps. So Yakub I I'm trying
His anxieties
39:41
to understand these challenges that he faced like did is Abdul Hameed II um
39:47
afraid or anxious that the empire may crumble that the economic crisis his uh
39:54
his sultanate faces may bring bring the empire down that foreign forces foreign
39:59
countries are conspiring to chip away at the peripheries of this empire you know
40:05
are these the anxieties of Sultan Abdahed II absolutely And it's not just his
40:11
anxieties, it's anxieties of many, right? I mean, we spoke about Zionism. If you look at some of the works of like um
40:18
Ruhel Khaledi, okay, so I think Ruhel Khaled is the grandfather of Rashid Khaled.
40:24
Um and so even in Rashid Khaled's 100 years, right? He writes about this. So Rohi is a is a
40:31
is a Palestinian who goes to Istanbul, educated in Istanbul, um you know, comes back uh understands the notion of
40:39
constitutionalism and so forth, but is aware of the particular Zionist threat in a way that other people were not
40:45
aware of. Um the the feeling of um western
40:51
encroachment and the collapse of empire was very real. And I think there's two
40:56
things here that we need to understand about power. One is the perception of power and then two is the reality of power. Most power
41:05
projects a particular perception. It has to. And so sometimes we don't appreciate and understand that the way that you
41:13
project that perception like America today as the all you know conquering empire that can never be defeated. it
41:21
there has to be some level of skill required in the thinker to make the distinction between how much of this is
41:26
projection of a perception as a way like in the case of the Mongol invasion which is that if you move we're
41:35
going to kill you so then you just maintain it um and there is a belief amongst certain Muslim thinkers that in the Muslim world if they just free
41:42
themselves from the shackles because a lot of it is perception then that things will be a little different and then there is the reality on the
41:48
ground itself which is pointing to a particular um direction. The loss of Egypt, parts of the Balkans, the Balkan
41:55
question, the eastern question and so forth are very real. And so Abdul Hamemed is concerned about that. Did
42:00
they believe the empire would collapse? That's a difficult one because when it
42:05
does collapse, the shock is huge. Yeah. So that means
42:11
that to some degree while the fear was always living rentree in their
42:17
heads, they still didn't come to the terms that that was going to happen. I'll give you
42:23
an example. If I said to you tomorrow, today, let's put it out now for all your viewers. I'm going to be quite blank.
42:29
It's very possible that we may lose masa. It's very possible. Yeah. Is that perception or is that reality?
42:36
What am I projecting here? And everyone's going to say this, you know, what's he talking about? Okay, but we're
42:41
looking at the we're looking at a genocide right now. We're looking at a chipping away or something. And fundamentally, Muslims have not moved.
42:48
That's the reality on the ground for whatever reasons in their various homes or whatever. They haven't moved.
42:55
So, it's this feeling and sentiment of mine, is this real or is this a perception?
43:00
And then you'd say it's a bit of both. Yeah. Um and tomorrow, um you know, that could
43:05
be possible. And so in that sense um that is something that need to be thought about. But let me give you
43:11
another counter to that. The state of Israel won't stick around for another 1015 years
43:17
that it will collapse. Is that perception or is that reality? That's also possible. It's also
43:23
possible. I mean the the level of aggression and violence that you ramp up to that point. It's goes back to that point I made
43:29
before about the moral decline of a particular civilization is irreversible. That now the decree of Allah tala has
43:34
begun. the laws of nature cannot be changed and so now it's just a particular matter of time so what does
43:39
that mean exactly now going back to the question of Abdhammed at the time the Ottomans were thinking
43:45
because they were a power and they existed of multiple permutations Ottoman thinkings were continuously
43:51
drawing up the possibilities what if this happened what if that happened and so you read the projection of those
43:57
fears based on reality and perception and so it gives us a particular understanding now because the empire
44:02
collapsed in the those became self-fulfilling prophecies perhaps and so many historians make the
44:08
case that this was inevitable in the way that I suppose what I'm asking is you know there is that we retrospectively maybe
44:16
look back at those times and say that everyone was in doom and gloom and there was this sort of crumbling empire things
44:21
were were you know the house was collapsing and Sultan Abdah Hammed II comes along
44:27
and tries to uh stabilize the house steady the ship right is that is is that more than
44:33
perception Was that the reality of of Ottoman society? Not totally. Yes, among certain elites
44:39
because there are people who are half glass empty and half glass full. I mean, but let's look at the case of the British Empire, right?
44:44
Yeah. Um, the Ottomans were looking at the British and in one degree the British are
44:50
stretching their resources and so forth. But after the success of 1924, who would
44:55
have thought that Britain in 4748 would have totally collapsed and combusted in the space of 20 years? that empire you
45:01
have the creation of the state of Israel independence of India from and and the partition of Indian Pakistan and so
45:06
forth it it's empire crumbled but it's it's written a sort of like what the
45:11
Brits have been good at is when they've written their history they've written it about a residual decline in empire and
45:18
the small island exists even today right um the Ottomans don't have that chance because the nation states emerge as a
45:25
consequence of that so it's not just the Ottomans who have this concern there are multiple
45:30
um concerns about powerful blocks and thinkers like in Russia regarding the
45:36
Bolevik revolution and so forth. These it goes back to this question about the
45:41
perception of power and how fragile is power. Maintaining authority
45:47
continuously from generation to generation is not an
45:52
easy task. It requires a particular level of skill and culture and tradition. Right? And so that fragility is always
45:59
there. And I think the point here is interesting why let's look at the United
46:05
States of America. What are we examining here? Right? They're talking about the Americans are not there is a segment in
46:13
the right that's trying to revitalize the state and give it a rebirth and so
46:18
forth. And one could argue that there is a recognition even the United States. But by and large you speak to most
46:24
Americans and say you know is your empire in decline? They will probably tell you no. So um but outside
46:31
commentators were looking at this and how long will they maintain this? There are many commentators talking about the multipolar world but others saying this
46:37
may not be the case. I think in the Ottoman Empire this is similar. What's unique about Abdul Hamid he's in power
46:43
for 30 years. And that opens the question about how long should one be in power? Because a
46:50
lot of Ottoman achievements ironically have happened when Sultans
46:56
maintain long reigns right fate Sleman Abdul Hamid Mahm II these long stretches
47:04
where there is a continuity of political decision-m and a plan and and so on. Now
47:11
today some people will will counter that and say that one shouldn't be in power for that long but in the Islamic mindset in those days
47:18
that was never part of the imagination um if somebody was incompetent they found ways of removing him from power
47:24
hijar's railway you know there was this sort of attempt to connect uh the um the Muslim world with this
Hijaz Railway
47:31
sort of mega infrastructure project um what was the idea behind that the
47:37
hajj right it is It's this is well documented you know like sometimes um thinkers and
47:44
writers will say you know really it was the Hajj when you look at the way that the money was collected
47:50
there is a particular amount of money that comes from India but the majority
47:56
of the money the majority of the money came from the Ottoman Empire and why did the money come from the
48:01
Ottoman Empire and only from Muslims by the way it was only demanded from the Muslims because this was considered
48:08
their saddakaria of building a railway for the people of Hajj to be able to fulfill their
48:14
pilgrimage duties. Right? Um this is well documented and the reason why everybody was allowed to
48:19
contribute irrespective was this was now I don't use this word often. This was
48:25
the first um atic effort. This is a proper omatic effort if we're going to use that terminology,
48:31
right? which is the um collectively invested in a project that was driven by
48:36
the Khalifa globally around the world to create an infrastructure for the Hajj.
48:43
Yes, it was also used during World War I for moving soldiers up and down, but that wasn't its primary use, you know,
48:49
and they were very careful in making sure that um the Muslims were in, you know, control. They took no loans, no
48:56
debts, nothing. this was and and Abdul Hamid himself um put in a lot of his own money. Um so this was a a fantastic um
49:04
endeavor in that sense and this is important um because often
49:10
when people are talking about the Ottoman Empire, they want to imagine that the Ottomans are just like everyone
49:15
else. And when Muslim historians like me make the case they are a little different. The the sort of like claim
49:22
that's placed in my direction, well you're just being romantic cuz you're Muslim. But actually this is well documented by historians who who've
49:29
written about the hij this is not just you know me saying this this is well known and you can see that in the
Strategy with the West
49:34
documentation right okay um I understand that sultan Abdah was um famous at and skilled at
49:42
playing European uh powers against each other um uh to preserve the Ottoman uh
49:50
terrains. um was he successful in his strategy and
49:55
um you know could could we argue that this was sort of a a you know a a skilled diplomatic effort?
50:01
Absolutely. Really? Yeah. Absolutely. Go through that with me please. I mean one of the things that Abdul Hamid recognized was that the danger to
50:08
the empire was coalition. So if we look at from the time of Sim the third Yeah.
50:15
um we're looking at like 1808 onwards the world of coalition political coalitions start to become the new thing
50:23
right and the Ottomans are struggling to to to create coalitions who do they make coalitions with because the Muslim world
50:29
is colonized so you're isolated in the possibilities of the types of coalitions you can make
50:34
whereas the western world even though they were in competi competition at times will construct particular forms of
50:40
coalitions against one or the other and Abd's major concern concern was was that
50:45
if for example Brit Britain Russian Russia and France created a particular coalition against the Ottomans
50:52
then that would spell the end of the empire right and he wasn't wrong because we saw that in World War I so what he
50:57
tried to do was continuously offset particular policies of interest where something might be of interest to
51:04
the French and he would pit them off against the British and so forth and then this once again becomes interesting about his claim and call for um Muslims
51:12
around the world because he has some level of agency regarding the Hajj for Muslims in India.
51:17
He had the cap ability to apply pressure on the British in India as a way of making sure that the British don't put
51:23
pressure on the Ottomans in Egypt and so on. And he exercised that. Now some people today may disagree with that type of diplomacy. But that's what he was
51:30
doing as a way of trying to put um pressure on the western powers and maintaining the integrity of his
51:37
domains. Right. And so the term you use panislimism I think this I want to address that because in the Ottoman
51:44
works we see the words Islam which means uh Musl Islamic unity
51:50
and the British constructed the term panislamism which was to try to make a
51:56
distinction between Islam the religion and then the politics of Islam and his activism. And so they they needed to
52:03
give that vocabulary. The Ottomans didn't have a distinction. They didn't see it in that way. So when they were
52:10
calling for the um to collectively move, it wasn't seen as a unique form of political activism. It was just
52:17
something which was a given. It was just a unique environment because they had global reach. But for the British in
52:23
particular, they needed to give it that type of name. And that name was porative. In fact, you know, it was and
52:30
the reason why this is important is because you probably had guests on here who have countered the qualification of
52:37
the vocabulary regarding Islamism. Yes. This is the extension of that. No other
52:42
religion gets the word pan. By the way, you get panfricanism, panasianism and so forth. Islam is the only one that you
52:49
don't get panhity. So, Islam is the only one that got panelism. Now, why is that? That's interesting because it tells you
52:55
that in the west to some degree they recognize that Islam is unique civilizationally. It has a particular
53:00
type of political component that can galvanize people from around the world
53:06
in a particular way. And this was happening not simply driven by Abdul Hammed II. This was reciprocal. And this
53:13
is important because there is an assumption by some within even Ottoman studies that
53:19
people of power instrumentalize Islam and the masses just follow as if they
53:25
have zero agency in understanding their de and the Muslim world is far more complex and layered than that. There
53:30
were too many people that would have called you out if you try to use Islam as a weapon in that way. Um and we would
53:36
have seen those types of contestations. So often this was reciprocal. people recognize that you know um it's it's not
53:45
just that the Ottoman Empire is under threat. What the Ottomans believed and Abdul Hammed himself and the thinkers is
53:51
that Islam was under threat because as a civilizational bastion that is an
53:57
alternative to colonialism that if it collapses then the Muslim world as a
54:04
whole is never going to be the same. And they were right. Um you've mentioned this before but let's explore
Was he authoritarian?
54:10
authoritarianism uh because the criticism of Sultan Abdami second is that you know he starts
54:17
he starts out as a reformer and as someone who wants to modernize uh the Ottoman state and you know you've
54:23
qualified what we mean by modernization and what isn't modernization he certainly wasn't westernizing the Ottoman state but he's
54:30
modernizing the state and um initially there are political reforms and you know
54:36
he continues the tanim marked reforms and constitutionalism. But then but then the argument goes that he becomes more
54:42
and more authoritarian and um uh concentrates power at the
54:48
center uh and towards the end uh even uh his um uh his ministers and those people
54:56
around him whittle down to a very few choice individuals. um how true is this
55:01
and how much can we attach the label of authoritarianism to to sultan of the
55:07
it's an interesting question I'll tell you why because um there's a writer called Ahmed Midatendi
55:14
who um writes um a track calls it authoritarian constitutionalism
55:21
right now what's intriguing here is um the
55:27
question Um, how do we qualify authoritarianism in the way that the
55:33
Ottomans or Abdul Hammed himself was practicing at the time? This is not me giving him a green light. By the way, I
55:39
think there is and and I told you mendu pasha to some degree believed that so long as the the sultan was
55:45
pious, which he was, he was religious, which he was, that he believed in justice,
55:52
which he did, that um if he made mistakes,
55:58
then that's on him. Yeah. But this type of system of entrusting
56:04
the buck with an individual is a better system than to put it into a
56:10
structure. And so my point is I guess and Abdul Hamid is not the only one here
56:15
because in the Tanzimite period you see this from the sublime port which is the office of the grand vazier that power or people in authority have a
56:24
concern just like a desi father that I don't want to hand this over to the kids
56:30
because I've invested so much into this that um
56:36
if I give it to you it'll fall apart. Now some people will say well he was right
56:42
because when Abdhammed is removed from power the empire starts to fall apart by the seams. So
56:48
there is a belief in Abdul Hamid at least at a particular moment in the
56:54
highest point of his reign where I think he felt that he's the best decision maker in town. Um, if people want to
57:02
call that authoritarianism, that's fine. And I think there were people who were making this case.
57:09
Near the end of his reign, where a new type of educated elites come into
57:15
emergence, they believe that Abdul Hamid is surrounded by a kitchen cabinet
57:20
which is um not best suited for the de needs of the empire.
57:26
Yeah. And so now if you have if you're surrounded by a group of people who are
57:33
um not giving the right type of advice to the person at the top something needs to
57:40
change and so that's why you start to see the emergence of the revolution right um because we'll talk about this maybe
57:46
later if you want about the and so forth right soad right which is translates can
57:53
translate to authoritarian desperate whatever it depends on h how you
57:58
contextualize the severity in the way you write it. Um but the point I'm making is there was
58:04
a group of people within the Ottoman structure who believed that it should remain in one person's hand and then
58:10
there was a group of people who believed it shouldn't. I have seen works so for example the daughter of Abdul Hammed II
58:18
um and um Tasin Pasha. So when you watch the famous TV show Tasin Pasha's
58:24
biography, he both of them make the claim that near the end Abdul Hammed was quite exhausted and was willing to give
58:30
constitutionalism a go um to some degree because he recognized that he'd got to the end of his reign
58:37
and you know that was that and let's let's put it into a more technocratic state. Um now why am I mentioning all
58:45
this? It's possible that he was an autocrat, which I think he was,
58:52
but I'm not going to say he was insincere, I think he genuinely believed that what
58:57
he was doing was right by the um right and that's a difficult one here. Yeah. Um,
59:02
today will Muslims outright reject authoritarianism as a
59:09
concept or will Muslims tolerate somebody to be in power for a prolonged
59:16
period of time so long as he was upright and just? Do we put a time frame
59:23
like terms on Muslim leadership? Yeah. or do we say no that the pool of
59:32
talented people is restricted and to only have a unique charismatic
59:38
individual in power for 8 years is a problem and I think in the Ottoman period they didn't have that type of
59:44
option it was a sultanate right so um so one would argue that every type of
59:50
sultanate system is predicate on some level of authoritarianism in that sense um but like I said there are some checks
59:56
and balances there But in a long-winded way, I think the simple answer is yes,
1:00:01
because the nature of the structure is that. Yeah. But it's it's not the same type of authoritarianism,
1:00:07
I guess, in what we're seeing today. And I think that distinction ought to be made. It's not like a totalitarian. Absolutely. Absolutely.
1:00:13
That's the the impression that we're given. Absolutely. Because Abdul Hamemed is nervous about being removed from power all the time.
1:00:19
There were multiple attempts of coups against him. He he knew this. His his his uncle was removed in a coup. His
1:00:25
brother was removed from power. Yeah. multiple sultans were removed um from power. There was some level of
1:00:31
agency amongst the political elites and Abdam was nervous about that. Yeah. Now what he did to counter that and this
1:00:37
is where people will call him authoritarian perhaps is that he sent people out in exile
1:00:42
from Istanul so that they can't be politically problematic right and he did he did exercise those types of um powers
1:00:50
and um that was a heavy form of criticism against them by the near the end they said this was unacceptable.
1:00:56
There was an attempt by Sultan Abdam II to extend a hand of friendship to the
Friendship with Germany
1:01:02
Germans. Yeah. And um maybe that's one of the reasons why the Ottomans ultimately joined the
1:01:09
German effort in the uh first world war. Um what why why was um that relationship
1:01:17
established with Germany? I think they had very little choice to be honest. Um,
1:01:24
some of our viewers who are from the United Kingdom will probably may not like to hear this, but this is quite
1:01:29
true. The British were very disingenuous. Um, they if anyone reading their politics and the way that they operated
1:01:35
at the time and the Ottomans were concerned about that. What type of relationship could you establish with
1:01:41
the British? Now, there was a belief amongst Abdi. This is you see this in some of the paperworks. Um, he believes
1:01:48
that the British to some degree were people of their word. Yeah, but near the end he started to get concerned that the British were making
1:01:54
particular promises and then breaking them. Aical example is Sykes and Pico, right? So
1:02:01
the Germans were a rising power. Abdul Hame's belief would have been by aligning with the Germans
1:02:09
to some degree. Um this rising power put a check and balance on British and French ambitions.
1:02:14
It's like aligning with the Chinese today or something. Absolutely right. The Germans had no intentions on
1:02:20
colonizing the empire. Yeah. And the the Germans were perceived just like today by the European powers in in
1:02:27
America as a check and balance on Russian expansionism. And so for the Ottomans, not just Abdul
1:02:34
Hamid. Um the Germans were a very unique rising power um that they were willing
1:02:40
to negotiate with. And the Germans um saw the Ottomans as a gateway to the
1:02:46
Muslim world. and they were interacting with the Ottomans in a very different manner. Yeah. Um and we talk about China, similar to
1:02:52
the way the Chinese interact with the Muslim world um irrespective of what they're doing at home, but
1:02:57
um in regards to how they interact with Pakistan and so forth, the Germans were operating the Ottomans in the same way
1:03:03
um in that sense. So the Ottomans saw them as the less of two evils perhaps. Right. Um you did say that um he was
1:03:09
removed from power in 1908 and um it was the young Turk revolution that removed
1:03:15
him from power. So uh explain that what what were the causes? What were the reasons given
1:03:22
for uh his ultimate uh removal from from office?
1:03:27
So he's removed in 1909. Okay. But the revolution happens in 1908. Right
1:03:33
now the the popular literature does call it a young Turk revolution. Yeah. The reason being is because it's seen as
1:03:43
this movement by young military officers who are trying to um establish a
1:03:48
military crew to remove Abdul Hamid from power. This is interesting though because the Iranian revolution there is no young
1:03:56
Iranian revolution. It's just called the Iranian revolution. Right. The Russian Revolution is called
1:04:02
the Russian Revolution in 1905. There is something in the way that the Ottoman Revolution
1:04:09
is framed as a way of making the case that the revolution was inspired by
1:04:14
Western Europe. Yeah. By calling it a young Turk revolution. Um, you know, so instead of calling it
1:04:20
like the French Revolution, they never called it the Ottoman Revolution, they call it the Young Turk Revolution.
1:04:25
Because the narrative is is that the young Turks were inspired by the values of the French Revolution. Hence they were westernizers in the vein of western
1:04:33
Europe and so they moved against a religious sultan which was Abdi the second. Yeah. But this is a little bit of a narrow
1:04:39
interpretation of what happened because there were members of the am and so
1:04:44
forth who were also part of this revolutionary moment. Right. And the reason why this was possible
1:04:51
perhaps is because there were many people who were educated who felt that
1:04:57
they were being marginalized from the decision-m process that they wanted to have some level of agency in the way
1:05:03
that the state was being governed and they were not satisfied with the direction that Abdul Hamemed had taken
1:05:11
um in the latter end of his reign. Right. Um why why what was it that he had he had
1:05:17
done? Well, once again new group of people who are educated from from the schooling system and there is a bottleneck. I mean
1:05:23
there is the sense that meritocracy is not um being given a chance here. Instead um loyalty to the sultan is
1:05:29
what's being given precedent. So there's a particular level of patronage system that Abdul Hamid executed perfectly to
1:05:36
his advantage. And so that feeling of meritocracy is one. Second
1:05:41
thing is there's a belief amongst a particular group of military soldiers in particular that the Abdul Hamid has um
1:05:50
strayed away from the ideas of expansionism and and has become quite static of just maintaining the status
1:05:56
quo. Now they didn't have an intention of expansionism in the way that we understand it. They just wanted to
1:06:02
return the territories of the Ottoman Empire that have been lost back to their domains. M
1:06:08
and so they felt that um a different type of strategy needed to be used. Um
1:06:14
there were those who um didn't know anyone else but Abdam II. He was in power for 30 years
1:06:20
and they'd become like exhausted by this sort of like continuum of the same old same old and Abdul Hamid had a
1:06:27
particular spy network that he used to gather information. Um initially the spy network was designed to just gather
1:06:34
information like what's happening in Yemen tell me. right? Reports have been sent. But this became a beast in of
1:06:40
itself where people were were making money from obtaining information to the point that there was levels of
1:06:45
corruption that that went beyond the Sultan himself now. And that antagonized a lot of people um in the Ottoman
1:06:51
domains and that and so on. And so there is this this belief that there needs to
1:06:57
be some sort of renewal perhaps in that sense. Now there is a Muslim belief that there was some sort of Zionist
1:07:02
intervention here. Now most Ottoman historians don't lean in that direction. They do believe this was internal um in
1:07:09
that sense. Um but um it's important to put that out there. Do you think the Zionist did have a part
Zionists removed him?
1:07:16
to play in his uh in his removal? Um personally,
1:07:22
I'm not convinced by that. Um I I think for me it was a bit more um detrimental
1:07:28
that it was done internally. Um the revolutionary movement was a wide umbrella um and it had multiple people
1:07:36
and agents as as a part of it. Um who had their own vested interests in in
1:07:41
what they wanted from the empire. And so one of the interesting things about I guess these types of revolutionary
1:07:48
movements is people are not too sure on what they want but they kind of pull together what they don't want. And um although the
1:07:55
constitution was used as the sort of like rhetorical device to remove Abdul
1:08:01
Hamid from power, fundamentally um I think a large group of um Ottoman elites
1:08:09
um fundamentally um wanted him gone. Okay.
1:08:14
And I, you know, for us that can be shocking looking back now, but when
1:08:19
you're part of a political structure, Abdul Ham is a regular human being to them. He's not seen in the same way that we
1:08:26
are um imagining it in that sense. And so, um, they just see him as another
1:08:31
agent who's an executive authority. And, um, yeah. And also uh Jacob I understand
Scholars responsibility
1:08:38
that the Ola scholars uh many of them were responsible for or some of them
1:08:43
were responsible for the removal of uh of Abraham second like what lay behind
1:08:49
that? Yeah, I mean so they're not homogeneous block. Um there are those who are heavily supportive of him. But
1:08:56
then there is a group which you can say today um are venerated within the um
1:09:03
scholarly class amongst Muslims um who were very um critical of Abdul Hamid the second um and they were
1:09:10
critical they were critical in regards to his policies. And this is interesting
1:09:16
because I think what we learn from just the human behavior is that um as a
1:09:22
person who's in a position of authority and power, there's always going to be those who are going to be critical of
1:09:27
that irrespective of whether it's you know you being a manager as local supermarket or somebody who's running
1:09:33
the the empire or nation and for some members of the like Mustafa
1:09:38
um and so forth and for anyone who's interested I mean
1:09:44
you can look at the works of Ismael K. It's a Turkish academic but has written very extensively on this. Um they were
1:09:52
of the inclination that they wanted to move away from a charismatic leadership
1:09:57
model and place the charisma into the state
1:10:02
structure. Right? So for them and this is goes back to where we started right um is that to
1:10:10
what I mean Muslims are captivated by charisma. charismatic speakers,
1:10:16
charismatic leadership and so forth. And Abdhammed wasn't charismatic because he had a particular oratory style or something. He was
1:10:22
charismatic in the sense that he was an enigma. He was invisible. People never saw him
1:10:28
and and that created a particular mystique around him. But they saw his policies. They saw the hij railway
1:10:34
station. They saw pictures of previous sultans being replaced by the name of Allah and Muhammadam in Arabic and so
1:10:41
forth. They saw Abdul Hamid's policies were deliberately outwardly projecting
1:10:48
Islamic symbolism as a way of continuously maintaining a reverence and
1:10:54
remembrance of Islam for the mass. Um and so he had that type of charisma.
1:11:00
Yeah. Um and that goes back to Mu Pasha as I said before the the his um sort of like
1:11:06
trusted aid who believed that it should be invested in a person. Now people like Mustafa Sabri believed that um it should
1:11:13
be in the hands of the the law, the Sharia, the constitution, right?
1:11:18
They believe that nobody should be above that and that to create a system, a political
1:11:24
structure in which the Sharia is supreme um meant that it doesn't matter who's in
1:11:30
power so long as the machinery safeguards itself. Right? And this is really interesting because we saw these types of
1:11:36
conversations in the United States of America more recently in regards to Biden um in terms of who was actually running
1:11:42
that state, right? Um what was it the president or was it a particular
1:11:47
infrastructure machinery and kitchen cabinet and so forth, right? And so I'm not saying that the were
1:11:53
trying to reduce the um the agency of the Khalifa. I think what
1:12:00
they were trying to do was pronounce more clearly the supremacy of the
1:12:05
Sharia. That's what their thing was. And their concern was, I guess, that the
1:12:12
revolutionary actors who had moved towards removing Sultan Abdah could potentially create a
1:12:18
different type of political structure that was ignorant of the supremacy of
1:12:25
the Sharia in that sense. And so um like I said the revolution is made up of
1:12:30
multiple actors who have different inclinations of what they want to see in regards to the revolution moment and and
1:12:36
I think for somebody in particular and alhamdulazar you can clearly see that this is what
1:12:41
they're trying to visualize. Okay. Um yet 15 years after his removal
Empire decline
1:12:48
uh the empire collapses. Absolutely. And uh you know various the
1:12:53
Ottoman Sultanate, the caliphate uh is no longer uh in in control in
1:12:59
power and and you know you have these um states that are established nation states and Turkey is just one of those
1:13:05
nation states. And then we have the sort of uh the rowing back I suppose of um of
1:13:13
you know Islam in in in Turkey and the rest is history. Um now we've had this
1:13:19
conversation before but I think it's worth talking about it at this stage. Um
1:13:25
the common view of Ottoman decline is that Abdah Hamid II presided over this
1:13:31
decline. He failed to prevent it. He failed to slow it down.
1:13:36
And um in a sense you know he may have aided that decline by his
1:13:41
authoritarianism. Uh and so that decline which was set many many decades if not a century prior
1:13:49
that decline took its full course and the Ottomans in 1924 they collapsed.
1:13:55
Yeah. Um is that you know I know you contest that you argue that that's not the case.
1:14:00
So just explain that argument to us please. To be honest with you I just don't care
1:14:06
anymore. Um like this is going to sound really harsh to some of your viewers.
1:14:11
Yeah. Like I think one of the things that's frustrated me about these podcasts that I do
1:14:17
is there is an entitlement amongst Muslims. Yeah. To give them what they want because they
1:14:22
asked. And um if history is an interpretive field,
1:14:28
from my interpretation, I'm not inclined to thinking of the narrative
1:14:35
that you've put forward. Right. from my studies and years of research of looking at the sources and
1:14:42
so forth and workshops and conferences and arguing with other Ottoman historians. And I'm not the only one who
1:14:49
holds this position, by the way. There's a large corpus of us, contrary to what some people on YouTube might think
1:14:54
because they don't see us on the internet. Yeah, I'm not convinced by that position. Now,
1:15:00
if people want to hold that position because they are Wikipedia historians, good for them.
1:15:05
But I think what I'm trying to do as a historian
1:15:11
is not obsess about um the mistakes of the Ottomans.
1:15:17
Yeah. That's all out there. It's easy. It's uh low hanging fruit. Yeah. The question is is that where did they
1:15:23
succeed? What did they do well? Like what value ad can I bring to the table? The other debate we can have to the cows
1:15:30
come home over the dinner table just like people do when they talk about football matches. M it's irrelevant. How can Ottoman studies
1:15:37
be um how can it resonate with you in terms of giving you some level of meaning?
1:15:42
Yeah. If you want to believe that Abd was authoritarian who maintained a particular level of you know um despotic
1:15:50
policies that led fundamentally the decline of the empire. Go with it. Whatever makes you happy.
1:15:56
You you do you. For me, what's interesting is
1:16:02
when we look at World War I, the reason why Muslims around the world are still
1:16:07
pulling together for the Ottoman Empire. It's not because of Mehmed Rashad. It's not because of the Young Turks. It's
1:16:14
because of the policies of Abdhammed that Abdhammed II had managed to with
1:16:19
his policies globally invest in the Muslims in a way that they
1:16:26
felt invested in moving for that empire like the Kilaf committee in India. Yeah.
1:16:32
You know Kalamazad, Muhammad Kalam Azad, the Johar um you know um Muhammadbal.
1:16:40
Why are these people these are intelligent people why are they moving for the Ottoman Empire? It's because prior to that there was a Sultan who
1:16:47
invested in a particular form of policies. Yeah. That had centralized this idea that um
1:16:53
the CIA of the Ottoman Empire was important that
1:16:59
resonates with us even today. That means to some degree
1:17:05
um he's been successful. M he couldn't save the empire
1:17:11
but he saved an idea. Yeah, he saved an idea. Um all of those who
1:17:17
are now moving towards particular forms of revivalism, they have a huge debt to pay to Abdul
1:17:23
Hamid II. Um and that can't be denied. So
1:17:29
my frustration I guess and I'm not hiding that. Um is it's very easy to be
1:17:36
flippant. in our critique about a group of people who I've invested in deeply who made
1:17:43
very human decisions and made human mistakes but I gave it a go.
1:17:49
But today I don't think any of us have elected a stunt on post Gaza to look at
1:17:54
Abdul Ham the second in the eyes and say hey you know what I don't think any of us do and and that's what I guess as a
1:18:01
historian has made me exhausted which is that if we're going to do history if we're going to do Ottoman history we're
1:18:07
going to speak about Abdul Hamemed the second what's the point? History is an intellectual endeavor
1:18:14
that is supposed to help us re-imagine ourselves and trying to find
1:18:21
solutions to our current predicament. And the way you do that is you take the
1:18:27
whole package, both good and bad, and say, "Okay, this is where they succeeded. This is where they failed."
1:18:33
Um, I've said to you before that I disagree with the spy network of Abdul
1:18:39
Hamid II. I think that perhaps you know him being in power for too long was problematic.
1:18:44
Yeah. Um but his works on the hijaz railway station can't be denied. Yeah. His um ideas on bringing a sense of
1:18:52
pride back in the minds of the Muslims at a time where there was a belief that
1:18:58
the Muslim world was crumbling under their feet was important. I think the hardest thing to give anyone and I think
1:19:04
this is where the Ottomans and the Hamidian state managed to do that was to give the Muslims at that time a level of
1:19:10
hope and hope is hard especially when everything's crumbling around you and
1:19:15
you're making particular levels of appeals and and no one's moving for that to to still give hope is
1:19:23
important. And they were not just rhetorically given hope. They were resistant. They were the only Muslim
1:19:29
entity that resisted Western colonialism to the point of combustion. And I think that that is something that Abdul
1:19:35
Hamemed should take a lot of credit for. Um you know the empire didn't collapse on his watch. It collapsed on the watch
1:19:42
of the young Turks and that is their legacy. Dr. Yakub Ahmed, thank you so much for
1:19:47
your time today. Please remember to subscribe to our
1:19:54
social media and YouTube channels and head over to our website thinkingmuslim.com to sign up to my weekly newsletter.
1:20:01
Perfect.