Ep 228. - India vs Pakistan – Dissecting Pakistan’s Tactical Triumph with Ibrahim Moiz
The recent escalation of military hostilities between Pakistan and India resulted in some decisive tactical victories for Pakistan, despite the sheer weight of misinformation coming out of India. The downing of five Indian aircraft with the confident use of Chinese hardware would have sent a signal to India that its war readiness is in question. But did Pakistan do enough to consolidate its battlefield gains? And what of the broader regional dynamic for the country, which has been bogged down by political and economic crisis?
To help us understand the broader analysis, we have today Ibrahim Moiz, author of The True Story of the Taliban. He is a writer and researcher on Pakistan and Afghan affairs.
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Transcript - This is an AI generated transcript and may not reflect the actual conversation
Introduction
0:00
pakistan has been using sort of Chinese weaponry it does seem like it's been a very comprehensive tactical victory for the Pakistani air force it might have been a false flag operation a
0:08
China Pakistan access versus an a US India access so far there's no proof that it has
0:15
anything to do with Pakistan we have a a very solid military culture that produces
0:20
these tactical victories strategically Pakistan sort of got much less than it should have there is potential for Afghanistan and Bangladesh and Pakistan to get on the same
0:30
page the recent escalation of military hostilities between Pakistan and India resulted in some
0:39
decisive tactical victories for Pakistan despite the sheer weight of misinformation coming out of
0:44
India the downing of five Indian aircraft with the confident use of Chinese weaponry would have sent
0:51
a signal to India that its war readiness is in question but did Pakistan do enough to consolidate
0:57
its battlefield gains and what of the broader regional dynamics for the country which has been
1:02
bogged down by political and economic crisis to help us understand the broader analysis we have
1:07
today Ibrahim Moyes author of the true story of the Taliban he is a writer and researcher on
1:14
Pakistan and Afghan affairs ibrahim Moyes welcome to the Thinking Muslim thank you for having me
1:22
zak well look um we've uh this conversation is overdue um there's been a number of weeks of um
1:29
really interesting developments between India and Pakistan and um I think you are in a very
1:35
good position inshallah to uh to address some of the outstanding issues of analysis that um really
1:42
will inform our viewers about uh these past few weeks now as I said in the introduction you're
1:48
the author of a book The True Story of the Taliban uh which is available on Amazon and and all good
1:54
bookshops and uh we will talk about Afghanistan as we as we uh proceed but I want to focus firstly
Tactical victory for Pakistan?
2:00
on what seems like a comprehensive tactical victory for the Pakistan Air Force in particular
2:08
um uh there was this skirmish dog fight between India and Pakistan uh a week or so back and the
2:15
claims are that Pakistan uh uh uh conducted uh a very smooth operation and achieved pretty decisive
2:23
victory maybe seven aircraft some of them French Raphael jet fighters uh were uh were downed by the
2:30
PAF by the Pakistan Air Force uh just explain it i mean of course there's a lot of exaggeration uh
2:36
on both sides maybe but just give us a a picture of that tactical victory yeah so the uh Indian
2:45
u military conducted strikes in Pakistan um and some of them were you know quite um sensitive
2:51
areas so for example the air base near Rahul Bindi um and uh in response Pakistan uh basically sort
2:59
of had had an air battle on the on the border with India and uh they're said to have shot down
3:06
a number of aircraft uh and and one of the reasons that this is gaining a lot of attention is because
3:11
uh Pakistan has been using sort of Chinese uh weaponry and uh some of these Indian weapons
3:18
uh aircraft have been French and you know from other western countries so um a lot of these sort of international powers they look at how their weapons are are uh performing so because of that
3:28
there's been quite a lot of attention but it does seem like it's been a very comprehensive sort of uh tactical victory for the Pakistani air force uh let's talk about that uh the China element of
3:38
this because a number of analysts defense analysts have said that uh this shows a victory for uh of
3:45
p of Chinese hardware uh in comparison to you know western or NATO equivalents and uh I've heard many
3:53
Chinese commentators suggest that uh this was sort of a test case right for for future conflicts um
4:01
how much should we read into the China element of uh of Pakistan's uh military makeup so um I think
4:10
uh you know all military analysts are sort of uh motivated to sort of you know exaggerate and play
4:15
up that you know this next battle is the most uh amazing technological advance and things like that
4:22
but uh you know the Chinese uh the the Chinese military manufacturers they've sort of had their
4:28
weapons battle tested uh at no cost to themselves right it's been done by Pakistanis so um they're
4:34
very pleased with it obviously and you know China also has sort of been u part of this sort
4:41
of backrooms competition with the west not just in weapons manufacturing but in other things as well so this is sort of seen uh they sort of see this as um another sign of you know like Chinese
4:52
um a Chinese ascendance or if you if you want to call it that um the obviously um the Pakistani air
5:02
force um you know they they have been using Chinese equipment for a while traditionally
5:07
Pakistan had sort of uh relied heavily on sort of western arms manufacturers until recent decades
5:13
and you know with uh with with the very close relationship between China and Pakistan and China's uh military manufacturing uh you know sort of progressing a lot uh Pakistan has been using
5:25
Chinese uh weapons for at least part of their uh you know training and things like that and obviously as we saw in warfare as well um so so this is uh sort of geopolitically interesting on
5:37
a couple of levels uh number one it sort of shows uh that thei that the west is not the only sort of
5:46
outlet to get weapons from uh one reason that a lot of you know sort of um developing countries
5:52
for lack of a better word uh uh uh go to the west is because they want to you know buy their their
5:59
their planes their you know their drones their bombs whatever um but now China is has sort of
6:06
it's been doing it for a while but this sort of helps confirm that China is a major competitor uh on another level it also shows that just in a from from a local point of view it shows that
6:16
Pakistan is sort of not as reliant uh exclusively on western weaponry as it had been before uh you
6:23
know it's been known for a while that Pakistan has been getting weapons from different places but this is sort of a a pretty important sort of sign that they don't necessarily need western
6:33
uh weaponry uh in order to succeed militarily that said it's not as if you know it's not that the
6:38
that the weapons uh that India employed which you know there were a mixture of sources in India has
6:44
has a number of suppliers ranging from you know France to Russia and a number of others um but uh
6:51
it's not that that their weaponry was bad i just think that um the Indian the Indian rationale for
6:57
the war was uh was not sort of properly thought out it was quite foolhardy sort of wanted to show
7:03
that that they could sort of you know avenge this attack that happened uh in Pelgam and and they
7:09
decided to sort of go in without thinking of that the other side might be able to punch back uh so
7:16
that sort of ended up being a bit embarrassing for them i mean what does this tell us about the war readiness of the Indian military because because of course India spends much more on um
War readiness of India
7:27
on its army on its military than Pakistan uh yet Pakistan was able to achieve uh by all accounts by
7:35
many commentators non-Pakistani commentators quite a decisive tactical victory yeah so um
7:42
I I wouldn't I wouldn't comment like too harshly on the Indian military in this case i think that
7:48
they were given a sort of a mission that was sort of not well thought out you know just go and bomb
7:53
and and and expect that that if anyone tries to hit back it's not going to work basically essentially that's what it was um and I think it was much more of a political sort of attack than
8:02
it was any intelligence-based attack or any sort of political how so yeah sort of yeah uh political
8:07
in the sense that um the the government wanted to sort of show itself as avenging the attack in
8:13
Pelgam and they they you know they they've been uh sort of be uh beating their chests for a long time
8:20
about uh when it comes to you know when it comes to the Indian state in general but in including its military performance and things like that so um I think there might have been a bit of over
8:31
uh confidence at least from the decision makers maybe not the military themselves uh but there was
8:36
definitely uh overconfidence and I think um they they they weren't they were they were politically
8:44
complacent they thought that that they would be able to do this without getting much of a backlash
8:50
and they thought that they would have more international support than they had end up getting
Donate to Baitulmaal
9:49
[Music] the uh Americans for some time have been talking of the Indo-Pacific and and they've been sort of
Forming new axes of power?
9:55
exaggerating or or expressing India to be quite central to this region uh whether it's South Asia
10:04
or you know the Pacific region and some American commentators have for some time spoken of building
10:11
an axis against China and India is is the obvious choice because of its size of population and its
10:16
it its ability to uh project uh project power in the region um there's even discussion about a
10:25
China India a China Pakistan access versus an a a US India access i mean how much do you confirm or
10:35
read into uh such such comments so uh the United States has definitely been trying to sort of
10:41
uh bolster India uh for a while against China not just the United States other western countries as
10:47
well but obviously the United States specifically yeah um you know I had a professor he said that uh
10:55
the he was mentioning superpowers and he mentioned you know China the United States and he added that the west likes to encourage India to think of itself as a superpower but they have been sort of
11:05
uh for geopolitical reasons sort of bolstering India and uh for you know for probably 20 to
11:10
30 years now uh sort of uh trying to form a more strategic sort of uh bull work bull work against
11:16
bull work against China um that said I don't think that the talk of a China Pakistan versus uh India
11:24
Pakistan uh sorry versus India American access is that um I think it's a little bit oversimplified
11:32
uh because the United States still has you know occasionally strained but very strong links with
11:38
the Pakistan uh and in fact Pakistan has been trying for the last uh 20 odd years to sort of
11:45
um remain close to both the United states and uh China India you know India has been
11:53
close to the United States and Russia by you know by contrast just just for comparison m
11:58
um so I wouldn't say that it's so much China China Pakistan versus India uh the United States i'd
12:04
say it's more India and the United States uh with both of them uh having a dislike of China uh but
12:13
uh India is definitely more interested in Pakistan uh than the United States yeah I mean
Pakistan America relations
12:19
that's that's really really uh interesting so your argument is that Pakistan at this stage uh is not
12:27
um you know is not fully in in the Chinese camp right and and doesn't want to uh strain relations
12:33
with America well let's talk about the Pakistan America relationship uh because of course America did broke or at least the argument suggests that America had some part to play in the current in
12:42
the recent ceasefire uh between the two sides somewhat belatedly but the Americans did move
12:48
uh uh to to broker that ceasefire now uh there is conversation about Americans strained relationship
12:57
especially since 2001 and and uh Pakistan's relationship with the Taliban i know that's your
13:04
that's your expertise and specialism but before we get to the Taliban part I mean you know under Zia
13:10
um and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the relationship was pretty strong between America
13:16
and and Pakistan under Masharov at he said the very opening stages you know Masharov made a
13:22
decision that he was going to put his lot in uh that relationship with America the relationship
13:29
then was strained because of bin Laden because of of the Taliban just characterize the the last
13:35
20 years of Pakistan America relationship and where Pakistan currently is in that so um if
13:44
it's possible I'll just go a little bit further behind frontiers So uh you mentioned uh the Soviet
13:49
invasion of Afghanistan where Pakistan and the United States had a strong relationship this is 1979 this is the Yeah 198 Yeah basically through the 1980s um they both uh supported
14:00
the Afghan insurgency now the the thing is that they both sort of had different aims from for the
14:07
Afghan insurgency as well the United States just wanted the Soviets to leave uh Pakistan wanted the Soviet sleeve but they also wanted to sort of um uh remove the Soviet installed Afghan
14:18
government and as well as uh Andre Za sort of uh sort of repurpose or sort of transfer some
14:24
of that material into their into their conflict with India or into their rivalry with India yeah
14:31
so what um what happened was in the very last days of Za's uh government he and the Americans
14:37
sort of fell out over the 1988 Geneva accord which sort of said okay the Soviets can leave
14:43
uh Afghanistan they have to leave Afghanistan but you know they can still give air support they can still give you know weapons and this and that and it didn't really it didn't really uh talk uh about
14:53
either side uh demilitarizing Afghanistan um so from from Pakistan's point of view or for from at
15:00
least Zia's point of view this was unsatisfactory because it still left that Avhan government Pakistan and the United States sort of diverged in in the late 1980s uh over what they wanted from
15:10
Afghanistan so the United States by that time they were quite close to Gorbachev in the Soviet Union they wanted the Soviets to leave uh Afghanistan uh but they didn't uh want to sort of overthrow
15:21
the government after the Soviets left and there was no demilitarization so the Soviets could keep selling we uh sending weapons the Pakistanis could keep sending weapons and the United States
15:31
actually became nervous because a lot of these weapons ended up going to you know other actors like for example Iran or you know or on the black market whatever um what happened in Zia's period
15:41
and this is sort of related to Kashmir is that a lot of uh this uh material was uh transferred
15:48
uh to Kashmir uh where sort of the Indian government had been manipulating elections
15:53
and sort of cracking down for a while uh in favor of its sort of local local agents so
15:59
um by by the late 1980s there was an insurgency in Kashmir which Pakistan did help militarize
16:06
like the you know the grievances were there mo the vast majority of the organization was local you
16:12
know in in in universities or in camps or whatever within Kashmir uh within the Kashmir valley but
16:17
um Pakistan did sort of uh give them weaponry uh they sort of trained uh trained a lot of them in
16:23
the Azad Kashmir side of um of Kashmir which is the Pakistan uh governed side so they were sort
16:30
of influenced by the Soviet uh experience by their experience against the Soviets and they thought that uh sort of arming the Kashmiris would sort of help bleed India out uh especially
16:40
because India and Pakistan were already sort of you know in disputes over other issues as well so during this period the the United States uh sort of you know turned against Pakistan they
16:49
didn't need them anymore after the cold war uh I think in 1990 they they they stopped sending any
16:55
aid and then you know throughout the 1990s there were a bunch of different diplomatic and political sort of maneuvers against Pakistan uh by the by Washington uh and it increasingly became seen as a
17:06
rogue state and especially because in that period the Americans were sort of starting to see you know like radical Islam as as the number one enemy and sort of um this was what Pakistan had had sort
17:16
of been in the 1980s right and a lot of these uh groups were sort of waiting waging jihad uh in the
17:23
name of Islam so to the United States in the 1990s especially when they had a very paranoid black and
17:28
white view of this stuff uh this looked like you know dangerous extremism and things like that so
17:34
the the the United States shifted closer towards India by by then India was already liberalizing
17:39
its economy the cold war was over and uh you know the Russians were no longer really a threat india
17:45
had been somewhat close to the Soviets but but you know a bit discreet about it during the cold war um but after the cold war they increasingly tilted towards the Americans and uh especially these sort
17:55
of um far-right sort of groups in India such as the BJP uh but even even the sort of more liberal
18:03
to leftleaning Congress they started making uh a lot of strong links with the United States now uh
18:09
how this relates to Kashmir obviously first of all um it meant that Kashmir didn't really have much
18:15
of a hearing in the United States it was seen more as a counterterrorism issue by people like Bill Clinton or even by you know the Congress of that period uh their foreign affairs committee things
18:24
like that they accepted the Indian narrative they more or less accepted the Indian narrative you know they might say oh you know maybe you should be less you know maybe you should be more
18:32
uh humane or whatever but it was it was uh not much more than that uh essentially they looked at it at it as a terrorism issue um and then at that time there was also the war in Afghanistan where
18:45
uh a number of groups that Pakistan had formerly backed and a number of groups that the Soviets
18:51
had installed they began to fight with each other and you know uh neither Pakistan nor the former
18:57
you know uh former foreign powers involved in Afghanistan were really able to control them and then the Taliban sort of came out of this and uh when the Taliban came they basically took over
19:08
much of Afghanistan and in around 1995 So about a year after the Taliban uh emerged Pakistan
19:13
started sort of full fully supporting them um by contrast all of the other countries in the region
19:20
um India Russia uh Iran Usbekiststan Tajakistan uh all of these countries were supporting the
19:26
Taliban's opposition uh and you know because at that time the Taliban were sort of seen as a pariah state they weren't recognized except by Pakistan and a couple of other countries um this
19:37
was also this also sort of fed into the Indian dipl uh the Indian diplomatic uh narrative right
19:43
which is that Pakistan is sort of responsible for extremism in Afghanistan and it's also responsible
19:50
for extremism in Kashmir and they sort of uh there was a very massive literature that was produced during this period um by Indians and also by sort of pro-Indian western writers as well
20:01
Rashid Ahmed Rashid he's a Pakistani dissident but yeah he basically he sort of took out his irritation at the Pakistani uh establishment and he sort of painted um the Taliban and and
20:12
these groups as puppets of Pakistan but even Ahmed Rashid his earlier work if you read it he admits
20:17
uh this is the work before he became famous he admits that you know the Taliban aren't remote
20:23
controlled by the Pakistani government or by the Pakistani military he says that they've got a lot of different supporters within Pakistan much more than the former mujahedin groups did because those
20:31
groups were very very close to uh like they were basically um they were almost exclusively like
20:37
armed by the military rather than you know sort of having different political parties or whoever uh supporting them uh by contrast with the Taliban they had a a bunch of different uh parts
20:47
of society a bunch of different religious groups a bunch of uh you know merchant class people on the border supporting them but uh obviously these are nuances that were not really accepted at in
21:00
in in that period in the late '9s early 2000s and sort of the Indian narrative won out which
21:05
it was that uh you know the that Pakistan is remote controlling the Taliban the Taliban's
21:10
uh internal rivals also very diplomatically like you know they sort of created this diplomatic um
21:17
echo chamber you can say you know they went to the European parliament they went to the United States and they sort of lobbyed to say that you know the Taliban are basically just uh created in Pakistan
21:26
and there as if it's like a laboratory um they talked a lot about madrasas in Pakistan although
21:32
you know those madrasas were also there in the 1980s and before long before the Taliban came uh they also you know Um they also ignored Madras in Afghanistan right in rural Afghanistan which is
21:43
where the vast majority of the Taliban came from um it was basically shown as a sort of proxy force
21:49
so obviously the United States uh during Clinton's term especially they sort of accepted this narrative and Clinton very famously after um after the 1998 nuclear tests by Pakistan and India he
22:01
steadily started to move towards India um although both those countries had had made the tests and
22:07
India had actually tested it first um Clinton sort of saw India as a more responsible actor at that
22:16
time uh in 1999 it was the the Pakistani army sort of attacked on the Cargill front uh which
22:22
was another tactical victory right for Pakistan it started as a tactical victory so what happened at
22:27
Cargill was that they that the Pakistani sort of expeditionary force they sort of they sort
22:33
of stole the march on the Indian so they occupied the sort of strategic points uh around Cargill uh
22:38
which itself is a sort of strategic location and they were hoping that this would be like a fate to comply type of thing which would force India to sort of uh submit uh now the problem was
22:49
that India you know uh reacted and uh they re they counteratt attacked and because of that um uh they
22:57
were able to use their air force uh as well which uh the Pakistani air force didn't get involved
23:02
in that war unlike this one for example you know they were already sort of getting a bad press as uh as international aggressors and also uh you know the fact was that these were both two recent
23:13
nuclear states so you know it was it was seen as especially explosive um So because of that uh
23:19
mush uh sorry Clinton came to see uh Pakistan as especially reli unreliable and then after Masharov
23:26
took over uh the army commander took over a few months later you know it's not only unreliable it's also a dictatorship so you know this ticks off all the all the sort of the villains of the
23:36
anti- oh sorry villains of the liberal world order uh which is you know military dictator you know
23:41
Islamic extremism and uh you know uh aggression against international uh or over international
Musharraf helping Americans?
23:48
borders right but this all changed after 9/11 and General Musharov who uh you know who who famously
23:56
put all of his eggs in probably the American basket I mean it seems to me that didn't he offer
24:01
book in the line of fire which is you know named right quite similar to that American Clint Eastwood movie where that security guard takes a bullet uh for the American president so you know
24:12
in other words you know he he was uh he was you know helping the the Americans and well well uh
24:20
Musharif um he he miscalculated at that time too if you if this is again this is 2001 by this time
24:28
the Kashmiri insurgency which Pakistan was backing it had started to fragment um and uh you know
24:35
Musharov's attempt to sort of force a solution in 1999 that hadn't worked yeah so the Kashmiris
24:40
were essentially like you know they were going in they were raiding and then they were coming back and you know there was no political end to that so instead of that Masharaf had already
24:47
been even before 911 he had been sort of trying to make a b Kashmir a bilateral issue between
24:53
uh the the Indian and Pakistani governments um and when 9/11 happened India was very very quick
25:01
to not only you know um support the American war in Afghanistan which most countries did but they
25:07
also said that this should be expanded to Pakistan right because they saw the Taliban as a Pakistani
25:13
proxy um and what happened was that uh Musharov basically in an attempt to sort of divert this he
25:22
he he sort of beat the Indians to the punch as at least as he saw it by saying oh you know uh we're
25:30
not extremists we'll join you we'll help you um it should be noted that Masharafh did try like
25:37
for the first couple of weeks uh quite hard to get uh the Taliban government to uh to extradite Osama
25:43
bin Laden uh the Taliban didn't extradite Osama bin Laden for their own reasons uh he was funding some of their you know their units and stuff so and you know they were they were uh economically
25:53
isolated and um they they sort of didn't want to risk a rupture by kicking him out basically
26:01
um especially because there was no guarantee that you know if he was kicked out the Americans would actually leave the Taliban alone uh and especially after 9/11 you know uh the Americans had to make a
26:10
stand or or they had to make a statement rather um like I often say to people that even if you know
26:17
even if the Taliban had sort of executed bin Laden themselves in public the Americans would have still invaded because there was there was that sort of uh you know everybody knows the atmosphere
26:26
after 911 it was sort of this thirst for vengeance right u Iraq didn't obviously as famously Iraq
26:31
didn't have anything to do with it but they still invaded Iraq uh so there was this sort of uh call for an American retaliation uh the thing I would say is that um Masharaf miscalculated in the
26:42
sense that he thought that instead of letting the Americans and the Indians sandwich me I'm going to
26:48
get in the Americans good books and there by you know sort of beat the Indians to the punch the problem was that the way to get into the American good books was to sort of do whatever India wanted
26:57
in the first place right uh but the Indians were quite annoyed at that time uh because they had
27:02
wanted obviously they had wanted the United States to expand its war into Pakistan so from Masharov's
27:08
point of view that was a win and also initially he didn't expect the Americans to stay that long in in Afghanistan uh he had there's a few different articles uh from that period which sort of showed
27:18
that the Pakistan government expected very naively that the Americans would leave Afghanistan by the end of 2001 uh and then obviously when Osama bin Laden escaped they they stayed much longer
27:27
and then Pakistan sort of tried to milk you know the this new status quo by sort of supporting the
27:32
American extraditions and stuff of uh sorry not extraditions what's the word rendering you know
27:38
forced their surren um extraordinary rendition right extra extrajudicial sort of uh murders and
27:47
um executions and uh abductions India was still not satisfied with this obviously as I mentioned
27:54
uh in and in December 2001 which is you know at the same time as the Taliban government was falling in uh Afghanistan uh the Indian parliament in New Delhi was attacked and India immediately
28:04
blamed the same group that they have been blaming very often uh which is led by Masud Azhar uh this
28:09
is a pretty small group um but what's notable about this group was that number one Masoud Azar was quite a high-profile figure uh number two this group was mainly Pakistanis as opposed
28:18
to Kashmiris number three they were uh they had been close to like Basud Azar had released by uh
28:25
by Taliban mediation with India so he was seen as close to the Taliban and number four he was also seen as close to the Pakistani state uh uh they were believed to have helped sort of fund him in
28:35
the early 2000s uh so India immediately blamed this group um this group actually broke up after
28:42
9/11 because a lot of its members thought that Masudas was too close to Pakistan and Pakistan
28:47
was seen now as a traitor for sort of betraying the Taliban so the group basically splintered and it isn't much of a group anymore and I don't think it's been much of a group for more than 20
28:56
years now um but India sort of very conveniently blamed them they didn't really give any proof they they convicted a man and had him executed but there was no sort of there was no sort of
29:06
proof that he was you know in cahoots with these different groups in Pakistan at any rate uh there was sort of this standoff on the Indian Pakistani border and this sort of set a precedent which we
29:16
see now as well in 2025 which is that India sort of makes a claim uh that you know that so so and
29:21
so group attacked us and they immediately sort of mobilize uh against Pakistan so that sort of
29:28
starts here now we we see Mosher's strategy was to sort of um say no we're not harboring terrorists
29:36
i'm actually going to ban these militants and I'm going to you know crack down on them uh he did formally ban all these groups uh although you know some of them just changed their names and you
29:46
know they were in practice they were tolerated some of the less some some of the less danger quote unquote dangerous ones um but uh the idea was that Musharaf diplomatically increasingly
29:58
tilted towards India and he did that because the United States was pressuring him in uh to sort
30:04
of uh be more of a sort of partner in the war on terrorism uh so sort of writing that he sort of
30:12
exceeded the Indian wish to portray Kashmir as terrorism he said you know it's like basically
30:18
uh if if in if before 2001 India had said Kashmir Kashmir militants are terrorists Pakistan's
30:25
response would have been that you know the about Kashmir self-determination about you know freedom fighters things like that masharov himself said this before 911 um after afterwards you
30:35
know slowly but surely during his dipl talks with uh with Indian uh diplomats and things like that
30:40
Masharov basically said well uh you can't accuse us of being terrorists of supporting terrorists
30:46
because we also think that these people are terrorists right right so apart from a few like um apart from a few much weakened Kashmiri groups uh Pakistan uh sort of u didn't support any more
30:58
militant groups after that that's this situation now because of course after the Pelgam attack the
Pakistan funding militant groups?
31:04
Indian government very quickly blamed I mean there was this FIR that was um uh lodged like 10 minutes
31:09
after the attack which blamed uh Pakistan for for being behind I think they called it resistance
31:15
frontals there was an organization behind it so what's the truth of Pakistan funding and helping
31:23
uh these um so-called militant groups so uh there are several categories of militant groups right
31:30
and like their their heyday was in the 1990s when Pakistan was supporting just about all of them um so some of these are ma mainly Kashmiri groups uh you know a few foreign fighters here and there
31:41
maybe some of these are sort of Pakistanis who've been recruited in places like Punjab or even like you know um places like that uh and they sort of uh they they sort of uh joined the jihad in
31:52
Kashmir um this latter camp was is the one that India highlights more because it sort of shows
31:59
that Kashmir is controlled by Pakistan pakistan had supported these groups but banned most of
32:04
them in 2002 there's a couple of them there's one called Lashkar which is quite you know infamous in India uh this one is to all intents and purposes tolerated by Pakistan uh they they
32:17
for a bunch of different reasons i don't know if we have time to get into that but uh one of the reasons is that they provide sort of social services uh another reason is that they're among
32:26
the Islamic groups that did not turn against the Pakistani government uh after 9/11 so for these
32:33
reasons you know Pakistan sort of tolerates these groups um tolerates or arms finances
32:40
so there's a lot of talk that Pakistan arms and finances them but um at least with the groups
32:48
uh that that have been sort of active in Kashmir after 9/11 uh most like the evidence suggests that
32:54
Pakistan was sort of starting to sort of quietly sideline them or sort of cut them a drift you know they sort of mine that border area so that people couldn't infiltrate uh in the 1990s there
33:04
was this process where they used to call it like launching which is that you launch the militants into Kashmir which is you know they just train in Pakistan and they go into Kashmir and fight
33:12
there uh they stopped doing all of that in 2003 I think it was 200 and November 2003 I think but
33:21
um because of this it it's a very convenient uh sort of rhetorical tool or even propaganda tool
33:27
for India to use right they can say that you know Pakistan has a long history of supporting these
33:32
uh terrorist groups and uh you know the long history the last time dates back to decades
33:38
ago right a generation ago now it's similar to how you know how how how there was propaganda and uh against uh Iraq in 2002 2003 which said that you know Saddam Hussein has pursued nuclear
33:48
weapons and things like that and they neglected to mention that he pursued them 20 odd years earlier and had stopped um so there was quite a lot of misinformation uh it's not that Pakistan cut off
34:01
the Kashmiri groups entirely but they did cut them off militarily and there's a few proofs of this um
34:08
uh one recent proof was in 2019 when the the main Kashmiri group like the biggest Kashmiri group's
34:14
military commander he he just defected and he joined al-Qaeda instead and his one of his ration
34:19
was that Pakistan is sort of you know playing us like a yo-yo that they that they you know they say they'll help us and they won't help us and when when push comes to shove uh Pakistan has been very
34:29
very nervous since 2001 about being portrayed as a terrorist state Right right it's much more it's
34:37
much more um vulnerable to these sorts of claims because of what happened in the 1990s or the 1980s
34:44
compared to a lot of other states uh there's a few others there's Sudan for example which had the exact same process uh throughout the 1990s Sudan was portrayed by all its neighbors as almost
34:54
all its neighbors as a source of extremism and Islamism and and radicalism and a whole bunch of
34:59
countries including Israel including uh Iritria Ethiopia uh they sort of backed the uh Sudani
35:05
insurgency and the United States backed them very heavily uh and then in 2001 the Sudani government sort of bought time for itself the same way as Masharov did by basically offering to cooperate
35:15
with the Americans in the war on terror and sort of share intelligence and do this and that so you see that you see these patterns emerging and in in the specifically in the Pakistani case uh all the
35:26
evidence s like I'm not talking about rhetoric right because there's always rhetoric uh all the all the solid evidence suggests that Pakistan stopped uh arming Kashmiri groups in around 2003
35:38
they did they did get them a very token sort of position which is like of an observer uh observer
35:44
status at the organization of Islamic cooperation but you know that doesn't really mean anything Okay this sounds um in some sense is quite negative because of course um the Indian
Kashmir
35:54
government is a fascistic government and Modi has increased the securitization of of the ordering
36:00
lives of uh Kashmiris uh on on the so-called Indian side of the line of control um we have a uh
36:09
a situation in Kashmir where uh the um uh Indian police uh and military are constantly engaged
36:18
in horrific uh abuses of rights of of ordinary citizens uh and the impression I had until very
36:26
recently was that at least there's some support coming from the Pakistani side because of course
36:32
you know I would I would say that the Kashmiris have a right to self-defense in in in the face of
36:37
such aggression so the truth of it you're saying you're suggesting is that in a way the Pakistani
36:44
government has has given up the fight and probably accept now uh these um uh the cessation line
36:51
between u the two sides of Kashmir they might you know there is on and off border firing uh
36:57
even now I think there are you know some shots and whatever fired on either side of the border by the militaries but um Pakistan has sort of stopped um the sort of serious arming of groups that was very
37:10
prevalent in like you know 1990s which is sort of what Indian uh accusations normally they they
37:17
sort of act like the 1990s are still continuing right um you're right of course that any sort
37:23
oppressed group like that does have a right to uh to sort of self-defense um Pakistan has sort of
37:33
you know they've sort of pursued a more diplom diplomatic uh avenue uh in this which I think
37:38
is unwise because that that diplomacy is sort of based again on this sort of counterterrorism narrative right that uh which is what Mashara originally said in 2004 which is that you know
37:48
um we're as committed to India as fighting in fighting terrorism basically this is almost
37:55
yielding to India in not so many words that you know the Kashmir issue is also part of terrorism
38:00
where Pakistan has supported Kashmir has generally been diplomatically since since 2004 even even
38:05
Musharaf I don't think I think you know he was sort of a a vain man i think he overestimated himself a lot i don't think his intention with Kashmir specifically was to abandon or to sort
38:16
of throw them down river he did continue talking about Kashmir for example even after he retired right um but uh you know uh he was too he was too sort of in invested in this American sort of
38:29
uh security architecture that he had joined in 2001 right and because of that um plus because of
38:35
you know sort of insurgency in western Pakistan uh he wasn't uh willing to he wasn't willing to
38:42
sort of take the sort of risks that he might have been willing to take in 1991 to 2001 which is like
38:47
you know his first two years where he had been quite aggressive um since then Pakistani diplomat diplomats have generally been defensive on this issue right so for example this week you had
38:57
um you had a news item that now you know the United States has offered to mediate between
39:03
Pakistan and India and you know this news piece has been repeated a lot in the last 20 years and
39:10
it it doesn't really mean anything because it's a little bit similar to to Donald Trump's diplomacy
39:15
on Palestine right which is that you know between a few Arab princes and Israel you know you can
39:21
sort of cut a deal and you know the the locals are sort of cut out of it entirely m so when there is
39:27
this atmosphere and Pakistan is not really you know arming the Kashmiri insurgency the way it
39:34
used to there's also a loss of control and when there's a loss of control you see things like
39:39
for example more random type of attacks and things like that right this is this isn't something that that's exclusive to our part of the world you know even in uh occupied east Turkiststan right there's
39:49
no insurgency there but every now and then you you have who sort of um who had sort attacked
39:55
you know uh officials or officials or policemen or even even civilians in some cases right with
40:00
knife attacks and things like that it was quite famous about 15 years ago um and the thing is
40:06
that it's not really an insurgency at that point right it's it's not a foreign backed insurgency it's just people who are sort of vent venting their frustration um this this attack that took
40:17
place in Pahelgam so far there's no proof that it has anything to do with Pakistan there isn't even really proof that it has anything to do with right you just had some news articles claim that there's
40:28
a group called the resistance front and you know and and that it and that it's sort of justifying
40:33
this this attack and then it sort of disappears right what of the claim that uh many Pakistanis
40:39
make and analysts make that it was a false flag operation on behalf of India uh it it it might
40:45
have been a false flag operation because Modi if you look at him since he's come to power he has been sort of he's been sort of chomping at the bit to sort of you know uh get into a confrontation
40:55
with Pakistan um he knows that the diplomatic and the international scene is loaded in his favor
41:01
so it's it's a very lowrisk strategy for him there's not a lot that can deter him from that
41:06
um so he has he has tried I think this is maybe his third or fourth time to sort of make a sort of
41:13
regional flare up over this um so it is possible but I always want to have more proof before I see
41:19
these things and uh I mean it's perfectly likely that some that some Kashmiri did get frustrated
41:25
and attacked uh but it is also possible that it's a false flag like uh I we know that there's other
41:33
countries who have basically gotten away with genocide right on very very flimsy pretexts you know uh when their own air force is bombing festivals and then they sort of accuse the
41:41
enemy of massacring them so uh you don't need to have a high threshold of proof for these sorts of
41:47
things especially when you when you can call the opponent a terrorist so I haven't seen any proof
41:53
uh that this had anything to do with Pakistan but I I haven't seen any convincing proof that this was a false flag attack it might have been though it's like it's it anything is plausible at this
Pakistan’s military leadership
42:02
stage um until now we've talked about Pakistan in a generic sense but of course politically Pakistan
42:08
is is really split between a civilian leadership and a military leadership and by all accounts I
42:14
mean everyone would suggest that actually it's the military leadership that calls for shots when it comes to foreign policy as well as some very important economic issues and and beyond that in
42:24
fact um uh so when we think about um this military leadership we often um and it is the case that
42:35
Pakistan's military has been getting a very bad press mostly because of Imran Khan's incarceration
42:42
but also because Pakistanis have grown weary of the corruption of the armed forces and and their
42:48
uh inability maybe to govern the country and and they see everything from a sort of military lens
42:54
uh and and as a result of the development and of Pakistan has been lagging and is economically in a
42:59
very parallel state um uh yet we saw the Pakistan Air Force uh conduct probably one of the most you
43:08
know excellent operations uh in the Muslim world i mean you know this is a a high caliber air force
43:16
let's square that circle for me you know we've got a we've got an army uh that is accused of
43:21
being uh nepotistic and corrupt uh and cronyistic uh yet we have a a very solid military culture
43:30
that produces these tactical victories so the the Pakistani military uh particularly in tactical
43:37
terms they've always been much better than they have sort of strategically you know there's there's some people who sort of like to say that Pakistan hasn't ever won a war which is also not
43:46
correct but uh even if it was correct uh they have had a lot of tactical victories uh usually it's at the strategic level where these things are lacking and I mean I would say even this current
43:55
uh standoff strategically Pakistan sort of uh got much less than it should have uh but they they
44:01
do take you know training and things like that very seriously the air force in particular has always had a very very good reputation uh and it generally speaking when people criticize corrupt
44:11
uh sorry uh military sort of uh practices and um sort of you know military interference in in in
44:19
uh politics they're they're usually talking about the army or in rare cases the navy uh but they're
44:24
not usually talking about the air force the air force is so there's a distinction to be made here they all sort of uh join in tandem when it comes to uh you know to outsiders uh so
44:33
like outside the Pakistani military uh there are sort of former United Front but when it comes to
44:40
um you know this the separate uh sort of um sort of chapters of the of the military the army the
44:47
the air force etc uh they do have these sort of distinct cultures and these sort of distinct
44:53
norms and it's not like these are written down you know set in stone but it's just sort of patterns
44:58
that have been happening from the start the air force historically has generally been the most
45:03
reluctant to enter wars but also the most capable of fighting wars so if you look at the 1965 war
45:10
uh at the very outset the air force did not want to get involved and uh they eventually did get involved and they played a very big role in in Pakistan sort of uh repelling the Indian uh
45:21
counterattack uh in September 1965 um in 1971 the air force largely stayed out of it uh they were
45:31
actually supposed to participate but again they stayed out of it they they didn't sort of get their hands dirty uh in the 1980s the air force performed quite well against the Soviets uh who
45:39
were sort of bombing the the camps on the Afghan border uh and then in 1999 uh the the air force
45:46
did not get you know involved in the Cargill war and that was one reason that sort of Musharov's strategy ultimately backfired despite starting off well um and then again we've seen in 2019 uh
45:56
the Pakistan's air force did quite well and then finally this time around you're applying some sort of like autonomy to the air force i mean you know Masharok in 99 was what chief of army staff uh yet
46:08
he couldn't um organize or control the air force so uh he he basically arranged that war himself
46:17
uh without really consulting the navy or the air force or anybody else um I actually know a few
46:22
people who were involved in that so I know some of the the details but the Air Force chief who was his former roommate from when uh they were young he he had expected that the air force chief is
46:31
going to back him up because the air force chief had had backed up uh you know the nuclear tests the previous year uh the the the chief's name is Pveves Kureshi uh but now Perves Kureshi sort
46:42
of refused to get involved in the cargill war and that was a big uh reason for the Pakistani defeat eventually because they didn't have any air support they were being bombarded by Indian planes
46:53
uh you know from the sky then obviously Indian uh soldiers on the ground as well so there is
46:58
um I think between sort of equal ranked sort of generals or whatever you want to call them
47:05
there is some you know sometimes there's rivalries sometimes there's there's partnerships things like
47:10
Uh but it's not one block right it's only one block when it comes to outsiders um there have
47:16
been several periods in Pakistani history where you know where the where the chief of one service was loyal to the government and the and the chief of another service was sort of you know either
47:27
hostile to them or you know sort of like critical of them so uh things like these have happened quite often and there is there is something of a distinction usually when people um when people
47:37
complain about the military they're complaining about the army uh in particular just because it's been so involved in politics but when the army you know is sort of implementing military rule it also
47:47
gets the help of the other services as well right as we're on the subject of of army chief I mean uh Aimir U has has gained a reputation maybe fairly or unfairly by the opposition the PTI
Asim Munir
48:01
in particular Immran Khan supporters uh of um of of of craving power and um um uh you know ruling
48:10
or governing uh with an authoritarian stick uh what is the truth of that like how how do you
48:16
rate aim as a as as as a chief of army style yeah as far as authoritarianism goes he has
48:23
always had this reputation as being very very like harsh uh even before he sort of climbed the army
48:28
ranks um sort of uh doesn't tolerate disscent or criticism things like that uh he was Imran Khan's
48:37
uh spy master too in in for a few months for about 6 months I think 6 months or four months
48:43
uh and he was actually sacked right after the 2019 standoff between Pakistan and India um where his
48:51
job among other things was to sort of you know uh communicate with his Indian opposite number
48:57
i'm not sure what happened there maybe he did something wrong uh he claims that that he was that he sort of uncovered corruption in the government and things like that um I don't I I don't know
49:07
if that's true or not um but definitely he his reputation has uh taken sort of a a recovery in
49:15
the since this happened although again as the army commander he didn't really have much to do with
49:20
what what went into but you know now he's sort of seen as a hard man uh someone not to mess with you
49:26
know things like that somebody who sort of defends Pakistan as far as uh the opposition uh are
49:31
concerned his his crackdown against them was has generally been you know again very authoritarian
49:37
very authoritarian very brutal um he is uh he has been portrayed I think a little bit with
49:44
some exaggeration he's been portrayed as sort uh you know linked with other parties leaders uh he
49:52
does have I think some familial connections with some members of the other parties but that happens with everyone in Pakistan there's like you know the it's it's a very very like you know there's
50:01
people in families who are on totally different uh sides of the spectrum of the political spectrum
50:07
uh he does have some familiar links but I think above all his whole thing is to sort of keep the army and you know by extension himself uh in in uh in power and sort of um sort of I think
50:21
he he sees as a source of stability uh and this is something that you hear very often with like
50:26
autocratic leaders right which is that they're sort of bringing stability and things like that uh I think I think the main accusation that can be directed towards Assamunir Um apart from the fact
50:39
that he has been quite brutal in his crackdown uh but he you know he isn't the first he isn't
50:45
the first sort of military strong man in Pakistani history he's what he has done has been sort of to
50:52
um exacerbate a lot of Pakistan's existing issues and uh this is you can especially see this in the
50:59
western half of the country where he's sort of pursued a very militaristic sort of uh campaign
51:04
uh against you know various insurgencies and things like that um and and that's also linked
51:10
just to the military sort of marketing itself as a force for stability uh and a force for like you
51:18
know counter extremism which you know that always sells well on the international stage earlier on you talked about how the uh the air force won a a tactical victory but strategically
51:29
uh it uh it failed or at least it it it fell short um can can you explain that like strategically
51:37
what could they have done better so strategically I I don't mean the air force per se i mean that
51:43
um India took the opportunity of the Pahelgam attack to sort of unilaterally escalate and attack without you know without bothering to give any proof anything like that and this is
51:51
just like the latest episode in a long series of you know events 2001 200u 86 2019 and now 2025
52:03
um Pakistan's uh air force you know sort of struck a very sharp blow and at that time they could have
52:11
definitely done much more especially because India had already um India had already sort of
52:17
demonstrated that it could hit you know targets deep in Pakistan and when the air force sort of
52:23
fought back against them uh the military was very very quick to accept you know the American and
52:28
Chinese whatever brokered ceasefire um I think the fact that they accepted it has to do a lot
52:36
that they accepted so quickly has to do a lot with the fact that Pakistan is still sort of internally
52:41
vulnerable right so they just wanted to say okay okay we we've won we've won we we sort of have something that we can go home with and say you know this is our achievement and they haven't
52:51
really done anything to sort of deter Modi or any other Indian government from doing this again because you know Kashmir is still sort of under the jack boot uh I'm not sure if it's still the
53:01
case after this Gaza thing but it used to be until very recently the the most militarized region on the planet right and um you add to that you know sort of settler literal you know settle
53:11
uh Israeli inspired settlers even from uh other parts of India sort of very chauvinistic sort of
53:18
Hindu extremists and um this is going to obviously uh provoke a backlash and uh sooner or later if if
53:27
if a Kashmiri militant or militant group rises India is going to again sort of you know blame
53:32
Pakistan and they're going to again unilaterally attack there's been nothing done to deter them from that pakistan's tactical victory was very impressive but their strategic stance was always
53:42
defensive they did nothing to sort of change the perimeters back to what they were before and is that because uh Pakistan doesn't have an effective political leadership and it's really
53:50
the army people so the the political leadership isn't very effective uh the the army is mostly uh
54:00
focused again on the sort of security security and things like that right uh and again this is both
54:07
because because both the United States and China you know sort of the the two countries that the military cares a lot about they they sort of favor this idea too right of Pakistan as sort of more
54:17
more of a security state rather than you know sort of an unpredictable or you know even democratic
54:23
type of state um now obviously Iran Khan was closer to China and the current government is not as close to China but uh throughout China and the United States have both sort of been more
54:33
uh sympathetic towards sort of security hard hard uh sort of approaches m um so because of that the
54:43
army I don't think is willing to sacrifice this uh the rationale that Modi used against them is the
54:49
same rationale that they're using with Afghanistan for example right like literally until a few weeks ago um which where they were sort of say you know blaming everything bad or or every attack
54:58
in northwest Pakistan and now even in southwest Pakistan and Balojasthan they're blaming it on unspecified camps in Afghanistan it's literally the exact same script that India uses and the
55:08
army and the Pakistani army and government have been doing very well off it right because uh they have sort of set themselves as a frontline state against the Taliban uh ever since Imran Khan was
55:20
ousted from power um and as a frontline state they get much more leeway than they would otherwise so
55:26
they don't want to risk this whole thing just so that you know just for India with India they're
55:32
sort of confident that that the United States or some other power is going to real is going to sort of you know keep them in check um as long as India doesn't attack inside Pakistan like they did this
55:42
time Pakistan is not going to sort of assume an aggressive posture now the reason I think that that's a mistake is because like I mentioned Modi has already moved the goal post so far that after
55:52
any attack he can just attack Pakistan that you have to move the goal post back right to at least a reasonable extent on paper it seems that uh Pakistan has got a favorable regional position
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan
56:03
um you know 10 years ago uh India had a very close relationship with the uh American Afghan
56:12
uh government and and that was at the expense of of Pakistan uh the America the the Indians
56:18
had a very close ties with Shikh Hassina uh of of Bangladesh and of course she's now being deposed
56:24
from government um is Pakistan taken advantage or has it taken advantage of this sort of regional
56:30
shift at least when it comes to Bangladesh and and Afghanistan what is the relationship between Pakistan and these two countries bangladesh is sort of longstanding government has was ruled
56:40
by you know the Awami League which was a very very strongly pro-Indian government
56:45
um specifically Hassina and her personal network which were sort of the apex of the government
56:51
um they were obviously overthrown last year which Pakistan has made some diplomatic uh you
56:56
know outreaches there have been a few differences as well but it's generally been very positive and um relations between Pakistan and uh Bangladesh since then so that that was a major loss for
57:06
India and you know uh they reacted again very very um almost petulently to the the the Bangladeshi
57:14
government of Hina being overthrown um with Afghanistan it's a little bit more complex and
57:20
um depending on how much time we have I might go more into detail yeah uh the the Pakistan and uh
57:26
Afghanistan relationship it should be much better than it is uh you know there is some bad blood
57:32
because of the war on terror but again Pakistan while it was complicit in the American war in Afghanistan uh it you know it it didn't go nearly as far as the Americans wanted and in fact it it
57:43
uh in a way uh indirectly sheltered Taliban who were you know in places like Balojasthan
57:49
for example uh I think there was only one American air strike in Balojasthan the whole time and the Taliban were generally safe there um but at the other on the other hand you know you also had
57:59
uh Pakistan uh sort of delivering the the supply lines into Afghanistan uh it was one of several
58:06
sort of neighboring countries that did that and you know uh Pakistan also made the war easier for the Americans right it's like classic fence sitting so there's a lot of hostility from
58:15
uh Afghans and from the Taliban about that uh on the other hand you know you have Pakistan sort of blaming the Taliban for uh not uh not cracking down on the Pakistani insurgency right uh and also
58:28
for taking more of a neutral stance on this rather than their sort of historical proakistan stance
58:35
uh which which is a it's a little bit rich because you know uh until a few weeks ago Pakistan was
58:40
sort of going out of its way to sort of you know escalate hostility with Afghanistan and then as soon as a crisis hit with India they sort of demanded compliance but at at the same time
58:50
it's also true that India has you know been much much more hostile to the Taliban and you know it was a big big cheerleader of the of the American war in Afghanistan it didn't get directly involved
59:00
simply because it wasn't next to Afghanistan that was basically the only reason but similar Israel with Iraq you know it didn't get involved but it it had been urging their occupation and the
59:09
invasion for a long time so there's a lot of bad blood to go around uh at the moment the the major issue is that Pakistan blames the Taliban for not sort of cracking down on its insurgency the
59:18
Taliban who are basically fighting against Daish uh they don't want to sort of they don't want to
59:25
alienate the militants who are in the Pakistani uh uh insurgency so there is sort of [ __ ]
59:31
footing around it and they're sort of you know proaricating and things like that um and this has
59:36
sort of led to a lot of hostility between the two neighbors a lot of suspicions uh even even some
59:42
uh some some pro- Afghan sort of accounts have been accusing Pakistan of sheltering dish which I don't think there's any proof or any indication of that but uh you know it sort
59:51
of shows this paranoia so the best I mean what what is good is that at at at during this conflict
59:58
uh rather than sort of take a pro- India stance as uh you know the Avran governments did during the
1:00:05
American occupation um the the current Afghan government sort of just took a neutral stance
1:00:11
uh it didn't go out of its way for Pakistan and you know there's still some bad blood obviously but they sort of sat down with China and Pakistan and you know offered to mediate and um they've
1:00:23
also they they've also sort of in keeping with their general regional uh policy they've also
1:00:28
sort of uh talked to the Indians as well uh their whole thing nowadays in the last 5 years or so has
1:00:34
been about diversifying their foreign contacts so even countries like Usbekiststan or or Tajakistan
1:00:39
which had been hostile to them for a long they've been developing contacts with these countries so
1:00:45
the the upshot is that Afghanistan and Pakistan at the moment they both have a lot more diplomatic
1:00:51
um a lot more diplomatic punch than they had before uh especially with regards to India like
1:00:59
there is potential for Afghanistan and Bangladesh and Pakistan to get on the same page um but it's
1:01:06
just been it's been squandered by a lot of sort of selective memory from people holding grudges
1:01:12
but also a lot of sort of you sort of mutually um harmful behavior let's put it that way but we need
1:01:19
more mature heads really more mature heads more mature heads sort of more trust i have an uncle
1:01:25
uh who had who's quite close to basically all the sides concerned because he had fought in
1:01:30
Afghanistan during the 1980s he knew a lot of the actors in Afghanistan uh he himself is Pakistani
1:01:35
obviously and he knows a few actors quite a lot actually of actors in Pakistan as well he had said to me uh that the biggest problem is that whichever Afghan group Pakistan supports they
1:01:46
in at any time they insist on treating them like a like a pawn rather than like a friend or like
1:01:52
a partner and then on the Afghan side as well I would say that there's also a lot of sort of selective memory right like like the Taliban have sort of pardoned you know Afghan commanders who
1:02:02
had been very very you know brutal against them they've they've made you know they've mended their
1:02:08
fences with other countries in the region who had been ve much much more hostile to them than
1:02:14
Pakistan was even during the American occupation uh but you know they're still sort of fixating on this this Pakistan issue and I think one reason they're fixating on it is just to sort of
1:02:24
um reciprocate this sort of hostility from Pakistan in the last 3 years so there just needs
1:02:29
to be more mature thinking more long-term thinking and also thinking about what best benefits Muslims
1:02:36
and realizing who has been the shared enemy or which groups have been the shared enemy of
1:02:42
both countries uh um over the last 20 to 30 years and is this is India india and you know uh like
1:02:53
for example um Afghanistan gains very little by sheltering the TTP and there's you know there's
1:03:00
domestic reasons for doing that but um for the for the greater good they could do a lot more Pakistan
1:03:09
for its part could do a lot more in Waziran besides just this very very militaristic attitude
1:03:14
which encourages people to join insurgency right uh there could be intelligence sharing you know
1:03:19
there could even be like you know commit you know border commissions things like that um there just
1:03:26
needs to be more long-term thinking rather than sort of fixating on little snags yeah exactly so
Hope in Pakistan
1:03:33
one final one final question for you uh Ibrahim i think this has been very detailed and fascinating
1:03:38
um um you know there's a lot of hope in Pakistan after the most recent events and you know I've met
1:03:45
Muslims from all over uh who were very who have praised uh Pakistan for its for its operations
1:03:52
for its air force and and how it maneuvered uh tactically and and and achieved these these
1:03:58
victories um so there is you know there is a belief out there you know a sincerity out there
1:04:04
that Pakistan could be could be uh could be more could be doing more for this um and could have a
1:04:12
uh a stronger position on the world stage yeah Pakistan remains uh fairly uh well certainly weak
1:04:20
uh as a as a as a regional actor but also economically weak um and um you know has
1:04:26
a uh a series of problems that it insurmountable it seems it's not able to to overcome regardless
1:04:32
of of its political leadership i mean what hope do you see in in Pakistan over the next 10 years
1:04:40
i'm not very optimistic because for most of my lifetime we've had this uh this sort of um pattern of infighting and also a lot of wasting good opportunities you can put
1:04:53
you can go back to the 1990s uh sort of wasting a geopolitically good opportunity over infighting
1:05:01
and things like that uh you know for for for a country with the nuclear arsenal Pakistan
1:05:08
is very very shockingly you know dependent on other people's goodwill and things like that
1:05:15
uh and and sometimes overly concerned with foreign goodwill at the expense of its you know it its own
1:05:20
uh interests and also its own people's sort of well-being so I'm not very optimistic um I think
1:05:29
this is one reason that even though you know he had major flaws but this is one reason that Imran Khan was very very popular uh is because he was seen as somebody rightly or wrongly he was
1:05:38
seen as somebody who could sort of move Pakistan towards that path and he was he wasn't anybody's you know he wasn't the he wasn't anybody else's man right he was an independent independent-minded
1:05:49
person who had something of a vision for uh you know for what Pakistan can and should be
1:05:56
um even if he wasn't able to implement it so I'm I'm not very optimistic because to me it seems
1:06:02
like um we're going you know through the same circles again and again right uh the military
1:06:09
uh the men who matter in the military they don't seem to learn from their old mistakes uh most of
1:06:16
the civilian politicians are they're e they're either you know they're concerned with their own
1:06:22
uh with their own power or their own privileges or they're just you know yesmen of the military um
1:06:29
so I don't think that there's much of of a vision for Pakistan about about 20 30 years ago there was
1:06:35
this idea that oh you know Pakistan is is a very fanatical Muslim country you know especially you know people used to blame Islamization and things like that obviously Zhak had a lot of issues
1:06:45
um because they often blame him right uh but Islamiz Islam has been a very core part
1:06:51
of Pakistan's identity from the start and is particularly Islamic sort of internationalism
1:06:57
right uh if if you look at at Pakistan sort of founding ideologues or ideologists you know they
1:07:03
all mention you know Turks Afghans Arabs you know it's not it's not just that you think in terms of
1:07:09
nation state uh the problem with Pakistan is today one of the problems is that most of the people who
1:07:15
are in positions of power they're doing very well if they even think of the nation right uh if if
1:07:21
they even think of the state they're doing very well uh most of them are just looking out for themselves and those who aren't are looking at the state in a very very hard securitized
1:07:30
sort of zero sum sort of fashion uh this is something I think is true of Assam for example
1:07:35
um as far as I know I don't think he's as I don't think he's personally corrupt or anything like
1:07:41
that but he is part of this sort of uh product of a very very tunnel vision you know security
1:07:48
uh security focused and just you know very often this uh ceasefire is is a good example right
1:07:54
uh the ceasefire essentially came when India was sort of on the back foot and it essentially
1:08:01
ensured that India wouldn't lose the same sort of strategic uh advantage that it has over Pakistan
1:08:07
which is to be able to attack Pakistan whenever uh they want uh but instead of doing anything
1:08:13
to change that Pakistan's sort of uh Pakistan's government and establishment immediately sort of
1:08:19
declared victory and started patting themselves on the you know on on the back and congratulating themselves and and you know getting social media and things like that to to promote them
1:08:27
so there needs to be more long-term thinking and there needs to be sort of a more uh committed uh
1:08:33
and um just intelligent sort of strategy uh for Pakistan to be able for its politics to be able
1:08:41
to match sort of its military potential ibrahim Moyes Jaker thank you so much for your time and
1:08:46
just a reminder your book uh is the true story of the Taliban Emirate and insurgency 1994 to
1:08:53
2021 thank you to Zaker very much for your time today thank you for having me pleasure
1:09:03
please remember to subscribe to our social media and YouTube channels and head over to our website thinkingmuslim.com to sign up to my weekly newsletter
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