Ep 276. - The Saudi–UAE Rift: Yemen and the End of an Alliance? | Dr Andreas Krieg
This week on The Thinking Muslim, we are joined once again by Dr Andreas Krieg to unpack the developing rifts and shifting relationships between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Yemen. We explore how changing regional priorities, proxy dynamics, and post-war manoeuvring are reshaping Yemen’s future and what this reveals about power politics in the Gulf.
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Transcript - This is an automated transcript and may not reflect the actual conversation
Introduction
0:00
Andreas Craig, welcome back to the Thinking Muslim. Thanks for having me. Well, it's wonderful to have you with us. Now, today we're going to talk about extraordinary events of this
0:08
past week between Saudi Arabia and the Emiratis in the UAE. Uh we started with the uh ultimatum
0:17
or at least a bombing of a Emirati shipment at one of the ports in Yemen at the port of Mckela. and
0:27
um uh the Yemenes have the Amiratis rather have retreated from Yemen, the south uh part of Yemen.
0:34
So we want to uh hopefully um discuss really build on what we've talked about already about uh the
0:41
way in which the Amoratis function in the region. Uh I think you call it the axis of secessionists.
0:48
the idea that the Emiratis have built this sort of network of non-state actors that that really work
0:55
as a proxy on its behalf and pursue its strategic ends within the region. So there's a lot to to
1:03
talk about now. Maybe I should start with Yemen itself. Um, often when we talk about Yemen, we
1:11
depict it as a war torn country, not particularly important, impoverished, a lot of its its citizens
Importance of Yemen
1:18
are now, you know, migrants around the world. Uh, and so we we tend to dismiss Yemen and not
1:24
follow it very closely. Is that am I I mean, is that a a a fair way to uh from your perspective,
1:31
from a geopolitical perspective, is that a fair way to characterize the importance of Yemen? No, I think you're not doing justice to the importance of Yemen in its, you know, its role within the
1:40
region as well as in the role within the history of the Gulf and the history of Arabia. So most of the tribes that you see living on the eastern part of Arabia, what we call the Gulf today,
1:50
have their root in in that part of uh of Arabia in Yemen. Yeah. Um you know, you go to the Quran,
1:56
there's a lot of you know, there's the talk about King Abraa, for example. So Yemen features in there as well. you go back to Roman history um you know the Romans called it Felix Arabia as
2:05
the happy Arabia that's the part where people were happy because they did have they had they lived in abundance they had water natural resources unlike the more deserted Arab parts of of Arabia further
2:16
north and east uh and then you're moving into the 21st century um and obviously even Yemen today
2:22
yes it is impoverished and yes it has a lot of you know social political issues economic issues and whatnot but it still has natural resources and it's just positioned at probably at the most
2:32
important geopolitical and geocconomic chalk point in the world which is the horn of Africa
2:37
the Babel Mandab on the on the Yemen side if you look at Satra which is an a Yemeni island which is just off the coast it's almost like an aircraft carrier in that very very important maritime trade
2:48
route in that corridor and so whoever controls the Babal Mandab and the Horn of Africa controls most of the flow of hydrocarbons and trade going from Asia to Europe uh from east to west and north to
2:58
south so hence why the British were there as well. I mean it's an immensely important choke point. So instability in Yemen is not a local issue. I mean it's a geopolitical it's a global issue. Uh
3:09
and it's one that you know insurance companies, banks, anybody who will involved in shipping, everyone who's trading is interested and should be interested in the stability of Yemen. So it's not
3:20
just some backwater. And um before we go and talk about UAE and Saudi, I think it is important that to understand that globally Yemen is an absolutely important factor in global stability. Right. Okay.
Saudi Arabia and UAE tension
3:30
So, let's talk about what happened this past week, the bombing of this um uh weapons shipment,
3:36
uh the ultimatum, Saudi Arabia's ultimatum towards the UEE. And I know in our last program,
3:42
you talked about the tensions that exist between Saudi Arabia and the UEE. And we saw that uh in
3:47
real life in in, you know, over this past week. uh and of course the UAE retreating from the south
3:55
uh and its ally the STC in the south of of uh of Yemen. Um explain just that to us like why did
4:05
uh Saudi feel it necessary uh to bring out in the open uh these tensions that that really did exist
4:12
as you've described in on previous programs for a number of years. Well, we have to go back quite a lot in history if if you want to do it justice. Um but you know if we want to start in 2015 which
4:22
is the the so-called Saudiled war uh in in Yemen where you know the Saudis kind of bore the most of
4:29
the burden of that war in 2015. MBS Mah bin Salman at the time just became crown prince. He was the
4:34
defense minister. Um he wanted to make a name for himself in Saudi. Uh his dad had just become king.
4:41
Um, and so he wanted to position himself as a a doer, a maker, and he wanted to go into Yemen to
4:48
say, "Okay, I give it a month. We're going to anni we're going to eradicate the Hudi militia that had taken SA the year before, and the war will be over in four weeks time, and we want the rest of the
4:58
GCC, the Gulf Corporation Council, the Emiratis, the Katarist, the Bahrainis, um, to help us." Uh,
5:03
and so the Emiratis came along. Obviously, Emirati is a very potent military force. Um, and they did come along and they they were very successful. uh on the ground. Um but as this
5:13
war then started to become a quagmire in many ways you know Yemen is the the the Vietnam of
5:18
the Saudis if you will. I mean Afghanistan or the Afghanistan whatever you whatever kind of analogy you want to use here but it was clearly not it was operationally tactically and strategically
5:28
a disaster for the Saudis. The Houthis obviously not only have not been pushed out of SA but have probably consolidated more power than ever. Um Yemen now is more divided than it was before.
5:39
Um but you know the the Saudis very much relied on the Emirati as a you know as a as a proxy on
5:45
the ground to support that operation. Yeah. Um and what we see over time this coalition of then
5:52
2015 1617 we see a a growing split or rift where the Saudis are stuck fighting this war against
5:59
the Houthis in the northern part of Yemen and the Moratis by building their own network of different
6:04
militias on the ground in the south embedding them in what is a fairly organic um local narrative of
6:12
of southern secession and independence. um using that narrative to embed their militias in that
6:18
narrative um started to invest more bandwidth into actually consolidating power in the south rather
6:24
than fighting the war against the Houthis. And so we're seeing the very first very thin cracks in 2017 when the Southern Transitional Council is formed as an umbrella organization for all these
6:34
different militias on behalf of the Amiratis. Um and then if we move forward uh 2019, the Saudis
6:40
are trying to really rescue the the growing rift by creating this uh this ried agreement where they
6:46
wanted to bring reunite all the different factions in Yemen under an umbrella of an anti-hoodi
6:51
coalition. Um but at that point already the STC and all these different militias the Emiratis had
6:56
been supporting uh were already off uh off the leash if you will. They were they were already out to to consolidate their power. And so what we saw last week is the end of that very long process
7:08
where over time the STC became more and more a a de facto state with you know political power,
7:14
economic power, extreme diplomatic support and financial support from from the Emirates and Saudi
7:21
being left to kind of administer the rest. Uh and so that has been brewing and simmering for years.
7:27
And I think this strike on this on these two ships that arrived from the UAE to Mala to the port in
7:33
the south of or southern east southeast of Yemen. Yeah. Um that is really a manifestation of these
7:38
grievances the Saudis have had for quite a long time. And that was they said now enough is enough. You cross the red line and we're willing to use force to enforce these red lines. And why now?
Saudi’s bold move
7:48
Like what led to the Saudis? Because until now there has been yes there have been the simmering
7:54
tensions but the Saudis haven't uh uh haven't made such a bold move as they did in this past week. So
8:01
what happened uh in this past week to to to lead to that type of it not really what happened the
8:07
last week what happened over the last month. So in early December we see the SDC who already had consolidated you know all the beautiful cherries and crown jewels of of Yemen controlled most of it
8:18
um in the south had then moved made a push into the Hadramode and Mahra which are the eastern provinces of Yemen if you look on a map um and were seizing trying to seize
8:29
um key choke points in these provinces which the Saudis consider to be core in spheres of influence
8:36
for Saudi Arabia and they went pushed further further and and wider um than the Saudis expected
8:42
and probably more than what the Emirati intended them to push for. Um and that all happened in and
8:47
that's an important part in the wider discussion of the axes of secessionist that sort of arc that
8:52
we described last time uh is to to bear in mind that um the Emiratis were doing this as
8:59
the Saudis were using their convening power their leverage in Washington to put pressure
9:04
on the UAE with the Trump administration over Sudan. So, you know, the the Saudis very very
9:10
much antagonized what happened in in Sudan with the RSF and the UAE support for it. Put pressure
9:16
on the UAE in Washington. And at the same time, the Emiratis are saying, "Okay, you're putting pressure on us in Sudan. We're going to put some pressure on you in in the south of Yemen." So,
9:25
it has to be seen within that context. It's not out of, you know, it wasn't a spontaneous sort of
9:30
um SDC operation in southern Yemen. It has to be seen in that context. They want to deliberately
9:36
put pressure on the Saudis and they they succeeded in seizing a lot of territory and putting pressure
9:42
on the Saudis and the Saudi are quite slow to react. So it took them quite a while to say, "Okay, now we're we're putting pressure and this is what happened last weekend.
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10:53
power between Saudi Arabia and UAE, but the fact that the UAE retreated so quickly, it was within the 24-hour deadline. Does that indicate that the Saudis really have the upper hand here when it
UAE’s retreat
11:03
comes to just sheer strength and force? Um because it's two entirely different models. Um again,
11:09
something we discussed last time, strategic culture, I think, is very important. The way that Saudi Arabia does foreign policy and security policy and the way the Maratis do
11:17
it are fundamentally different. fundamentally different in terms of the means and the ways they're using but also fundamentally different in terms of the ends and the values they're pursuing.
11:26
Um but what is key here is theorked approach the Maratis are using multi-layered delegating through
11:32
to surrogates and intermediaries. Yeah. And the Saudis using state-on-state sort of relationships
11:38
with partners using the international organization international organizations the UN and whatnot. Um
11:44
and so in terms of agility the UAE are far more agile than the Saudis are. And if you look at
11:49
Yemen, they have a, you know, they have really a network of different actors they can work through. The SEC is somewhat the political umbrella, but you go underneath that umbrella, then you
11:58
have so many different brigades that have received training equipment um and direction and any form
12:04
of, you know, material support from the Emiratis over the years. Um, and the Saudis have tried to
12:10
emulate that by having their own sort of proxy forces in in in in on in on on in the in Yemen,
12:15
but none of them are as agile and resilient as the Emirati model. Plus, the Emiratis control the core
12:21
choke points on on the sea, right? So, they can resupply quite quickly while the Saudi forces are
12:26
now somewhat cut off from the seaside and have to be resupplied by air over hooi territory,
12:32
which is very, very difficult. So, in terms of supply chains, um, the Emirati is far more agile. The Emirati also have supply chains through their ports on the other side of the Horn of Africa,
12:41
right, in Somalia uh and in in in in Aritra and so on. So they they can really they're far more
12:48
agile to position their forces as they see fit. Um plus this the Saudis are risk averse. They tend to
12:54
be much more patient uh you know waiting seeing what's going to happen. The Emiratis are far more
13:01
transactional far more riskprone um more assertive more makavelian as we discussed last time and they
13:08
seize an initiative as soon as it occurs and the Saudis can't deal with that kind of tempo that that the Emiratis put put put forward and so it took the Saudis quite a long time to wake up to
13:18
what happened last month to then make the you know come you know reaching out to partners such as the
13:23
Omanis who hold a very key portfolio when it comes to to Yemen um to discuss with other partners ers
13:29
around the region of saying okay what is it that we can actually do here uh and then they did react and they did respond quite harshly but going back to your question about the Emiratis willing to
13:39
withdraw the Emirati made an announcement in 2019 already that they were withdrawing from
13:44
from Yemen so and we we know they haven't right so this is now the second such announcement where saying we're withdrawing but they're actually probably not plus even if they I mean we're seeing
13:52
some planes leaving we're seeing some forces being moved out of Yemen so it's all very much signaling
13:58
to the world we're we're leaving it. Um, but as I, you know, if you look at it, the network itself,
14:03
STC being the umbrella, that network exists. It's on the ground. It's funded. It's well-maintained,
14:08
well directed. Um, that's not something the Emiratis can or will um abandon because it's
14:14
a network they control. And so, in that respect, um, there, you know, the Saudis, even if they're asking the Emiratis to leave, the Emirati footprint in Yemen will be maintained by
14:24
the SEC and the proxy forces. And and what does the UAE hope to achieve from the STC? Why I mean
UAE and Yemen
14:30
you're it seems like they want an independent state carved out of of Yemen. Uh is that why
14:38
does that benefit uh the Emiratis? So it's about strategic autonomy and strategic depth. I mean the
14:44
the UAE as we discussed many times is a country of a million people, right? A small state by all
14:50
measure, micro state in in many ways. Um so for it to have this sort of leverage across the region
14:55
having these tentacles out they need to delegate and so the axis of u secessionists as I as I call
15:02
it relies on these kind of um carved out spheres of influence within broader states bit of divide
15:09
and rule sort of um it's a it's a neoccolonial approach to divide and rule very similar to what the Brits used to do in in colonial time you basically create a you invest in an entity that
15:19
has an issue with central government you build them up strategically. Most of the time they already have a secess secessionist narrative and appeal. It's organic. You you invest in an organic
15:30
community. Um and then you kind of in that sphere of influence, you kind of build up your sort of
15:35
foothold. And the SEC provides exactly that. And they're doing it at, you know, especially around Aiden. Aiden is the most important port in this part of the world. It's a deep sea port.
15:46
uh obviously the Brits have been there since the early 19th century because it was so significant for the resupply of shipping towards India um that they you know they couldn't do without aid
15:56
and and the Brits stayed there until the 1960s so for for 150 years because it was so strategically
16:02
significant and the Emiratis want uh control over that choke point they want control and access to
16:07
the port um and connect this port to their the ports they're already controlling on the other side um of the Babal Mandab in in Somalia and Barb Berber for example in Somali land uh in
16:17
Puntland and they're also now obviously expanding their footprint and influence in in Jubaland in the south of Somalia. So this is all part of that sort of picture. Um but also it's about resources.
16:27
I mean the the areas of Hadramut and Mafra that the the SDC was pushing towards were those where
16:33
you have oil um oil wealth. Um so having access to oil is is is part of making the SDC a self-
16:40
sustainable economically self-sustainable um sort of um um entity. And lastly what the Emirati want
16:46
to do is they're using the SEC as a bargaining chip because they make you know they can elevate themselves as a regional broker regional powerhouse. They can say to the Russians as they
16:55
have if you want to have control or influence in this part of the world we can introduce you to our proxies the SDC. They've done it. Israel um same thing and they have been using the STC
17:06
to or have have introduced the STC and proxies to the Israelis. The Israelis have a vested interest
17:13
in having access not just in Yemen to fight the Houthis but having access to the Babal Mandab and
17:18
and the Indian Ocean. Um so you know it's it's really about it's about maritime security. It's about trade but it's also about intelligence. And there is another issue that is is been over
17:28
um you know sort of overlooked a lot is Satra in itself. I mentioned that this island that is if you look at the map the island that's kind of wedged between Yemen to the north and Somalia
17:38
to the west it belongs to Yemen supposed to be part of Yemen. The SDC is claiming it and the
17:44
Emiratis have really built a foothold there uh for intelligence and you would wonder why. So one of
17:50
course it's like a is like an aircraft carrier in the middle of the Indian Ocean but more than that it all the undersea cables that go from Arabia and Western Asia into Africa run through Satra.
18:00
So they have an intelligence unit, a single intelligence unit that's embedded there and there have been allegations raised by locals in Sakotra that Israelis were seen there as well.
18:09
So it would be makes a lot of you know would be very very interesting for the Israelis to get access to these undersea cables. So all of that is more about geopolitics and and geoeconomics than
18:19
it is really about the southern cause. So the southern cause is just sort of a legitimizing narrative that they're using and I'd say in many ways the SEC is a porn that the Amiratis
18:28
are using to further their own interests. So let me ask about then Israel's objective here because there is this close relationship close tie between the Israelis and and the UEE. And in in our last
Israel’s objective
18:38
conversation you talked about that relationship is very transactional. Um, and you pushed back
18:43
maybe ever so slightly when I uh suggested that there is a more of an ideological tie
18:49
between the two and you know your argument was you know that that the UAE gets something from that relationship and the Israelis get something from it. how some analysts have described. So I
18:58
want you to talk to talk about that, but also some analysts have have talked about how the Israelis see their future in in that region to be a future where the the states surrounding it uh
19:10
are carved up into many states and and that keeps its its security and and its its power, you know,
19:19
rubric in in in or or its its u balance of power against the surrounding countries. like how much
19:26
do you buy into that uh that narrative that um one of Israel's um long-term objective is ready to see
19:33
these countries carved up into smaller statelets. Um so going firstly the ideological element it's
19:39
it's not you know it's not diatic it's not either ideological or transactional I think it's a bit of both there is a very strong transformational foundation of that relationship between Abu Dhabi
19:48
and Tel Aviv um and it's about fighting Islam and political Islam right um and and what there you
19:54
know a lot of the argument we've seen which is kind of you know bizarre the people who've been advocating for um SDC's sort of um independent some of them were you know Tommy Robinson who
20:05
I don't think even knows where Yemen is. Um but uh you know are people who've been recently in
20:10
the UAE or have been people who've been recently in Israel. So the Israeli husband network is now
20:16
pushing that narrative of saying if you need to support the SDC because they're the only ones who are fighting the Muslim Brotherhood, right? I mean this has come up and Alisa is the sort of Muslim
20:25
Brotherhood offshoot in in Yemen. Um who is you know it's not the Muslim Brotherhood but is very
20:30
much ideologically affiliated. And so the argument is and that's I think where ideologically the two align with where the Israelis and the Emiratis are saying we're fighting that war against al-Islah.
20:39
It's not really about the Houthis. And we can see that going back all the way back to 2017 where the Amiratis bring in mercenaries to fight in Yemen. Some of them being Israeli companies or
20:48
Israeli individuals who are fighting um basically cap capture and kill sort of um operations where
20:54
they go out and they hunt al-Islah operatives or al-Islaf politicians and kill them. assassination at killing squads basically. Um and that so there is a very deep sort of ideological alignment in
21:05
that respect and I think for the Emiratis it was always more about political Islam in in in Yemen than it was about the Houthis per se. Um and towards your later you know letter point about
21:17
the regional order very much so I mean Israel is interested to you in order to control this
21:23
part of the world in order to create you know they have this bunker mentality where they kind of dig in and say you know it's us against the rest of the region we don't want to reach out to the rest
21:31
of the region but we need to manage the rest of the region so instability around the rest of the region is in our interest if we can't get a sort of abracourse deal like we can with the moriratis
21:41
Um then the rest are basically our enemies and then we have an interest to weaken them domestically. Um and the Emiratis, so the Israelis are interested in breakaway uh regions,
21:51
right? I mean, they've been doing it in in in in uh in in Lebanon. They've been trying to do it in in Syria now with the Drews. Um and they're trying to do it with Somaliand and Somalia where
22:01
you know, recognizing Somali land. Um and I wouldn't be surprised if the STC, you know, obviously we know this relationship between the STC and the Israelis exists already.
22:10
So I wouldn't be surprised if the Israelis weren't the first to recognize Saudi Yemen as an as an independ independent entity and again facilitated by the Emiratis. But the exes of resistance what
22:21
it really does and it's something that really only dawned on me over the last couple of weeks because I'm seeing the Israelis really getting drawn by in by these Emirati or maybe it's the other way
22:31
around. Maybe the Emirati influences are being drawn into the Husbor networks. We've seen loads of these bizarre accounts and moratis, you know, tweeting against the Muslim Brotherhood, you know,
22:40
against Hamas and and pro uh pro- Israel. Um, but what we're seeing is a new this excess of
22:47
resistance is really trying to isolate all the other former powerhouses of the region,
22:52
particularly Saudi Arabia, but also other GCC countries. You mean the actress of secessionist? Yes, sorry. Did I say resistance? Yeah, sorry, getting confused. But we can talk about this later
23:01
because both of them kind of overlap a little bit in in they have very many similarities. Very a lot of similarities. And so the you've got the ex of resistance by Iran, but you also
23:10
have the the order which is bit more Saudi GCC nowadays with Egypt involved, Turkey involved.
23:15
They all want to keep territorial integrity and territorial sovereignty. And the odd ones out
23:21
are the Emiratis and the Israelis who don't want territorial sovereignty and territorial integrity. And I think the axis of secessionist going from Libya, you know, Hafta has a very strong
23:30
relationship with the Israelis to the RSF that has a relationship with the Israelis to Somaliand
23:36
which has a relationship with the Israelis to the SDC that has a relationship with the Israelis.
23:41
um you you see that the Axis becomes a a UAE Israelcentric order and the Amiratis are quite
23:47
happy with this because that's something they can sell to the Trump administration and the Americans of saying look we can give you an order that you like which is anti-Muslim fighting political Islam
23:57
um and is sidelining all these other kind of countries like Saudi Arabia the countries or Oman
24:03
or Egypt or Turkey um and I think this is where the Saudis are also waking up to they're saying oh
24:08
my god this axis that is being built right now is one that isolates us. It undermines our leadership
24:14
in the region. And a lot of the um sort of um emotional response in Saudi Arabia on social media
24:20
kind of reflects that that they're saying we you know we have we are the regional leader debatable
24:25
of whether they're the most powerful player. I would say the the Amiratis are more powerful. Um but um they have this sort of request or this demand of saying we are the regional leader can't
24:35
really act upon it and are being extremely being extremely frustrated by the hutzbah uh using that
24:42
kind of word um hutzbah by um by by the amiratis to actually completely ignore that and do their
24:48
own thing at the expense of Saudi Arabia. I mean why do you think because you know on on paper the Saudis should obviously have the upper hand here. Why do you think the Saudis are, you know,
Are the Saudis failing?
24:58
you you describe the UAE as being far more agile, far stronger probably because of its network,
25:05
uh, you know, far more strategic. Why is it that the Saudis are failing where the UAE is successful
25:12
for all the things you just mentioned? So, it's not about the size, right? Size doesn't matter in in in in aworked global order that we're operating in today. It's about connectivity and who you
25:23
can mobilize on your behalf, whether it's in the information environment or armed non-state actors such as, you know, the STC and others. Um, but it's also the commodity traders, the financers,
25:32
the the banks, the insurance companies, the other, you know, trading corporations, commodity traders that you can mobilize, that you can use to generate influence. That's what strategy is all
25:41
about. It's about generating influence and power. The Saudis haven't understood how to generate power. Yes, they have the biggest military in the region. They have, you know, immense wealth u
25:52
through also their public investment fund. Um but they're still very hierarchical in the way they
25:57
operate. They still down to NBS. Not necessarily. I think NBS has made the country far more agile than the previous uh leaders. Um but Saudi Arabia today is hamstrung by quite a big bureaucracy.
26:09
It's still quite hierarchical, bureaucratic um and and it for them to make a decision takes forever.
26:16
in the UAE it's it's you know the I call them the Banif Fatima right Muhammad Tahun and Mansour the
26:22
three of them make the strategic decisions between them bringing in their own sort of uh uh minions
26:28
and then they delegate this out to who whatever entity they they want to operate with a very very
26:35
direct um sort of um chains of command if you will and they can respond very quickly they're very
26:41
agile and the the Saudis on the other hand apart from the fact that they're risk averse They don't
26:46
have these sort of networks and the networks that they have generated in Yemen for example aren't as agile. They aren't as multi-layered and when they come under pressure they don't
26:55
have an alternative. The Emiratis can they could abandon one of their proxies if they wanted to in you know in Hadramode for example or uh you know the giant forces or these other sort of
27:04
entities. They can they could have fought losing one of them and still have the upper hand because it's a multi-layered network. And I think that's something that the Saudis and none of the other
27:13
Gulf countries or other Arab countries have. Um, how would you describe the Trump administration's
Trump administration
27:18
um, stance on what's happened in this past week? Because, you know, historically, we could
27:24
um, we could find some form of strategy within uh, the American foreign policy uh, uh, um, you know,
27:32
grouping. But but it just seems to me that uh the Trump administration isn't particularly engaged
27:38
and maybe I'm wrong but particularly engaged with the the details of of the skirmishes and tensions
27:44
that exist between its allies. You know Saudi Arabia and the UAE would be would be you know
27:50
would be termed allies of of the Americans like how are the Americans treating uh what's happened
27:57
in this past week and those ongoing tensions between uh these two powers? Well, the Americans
28:03
again they they're very similar in many ways to the Emiratis these days. So you have a very small
28:09
group of people making all the decisions on the very top. Yeah. Bypassing the bureaucracy of you
28:14
know state department and defense department and so on. um and also bypassing the experts people
28:19
who've been you know working on Yemen for example for decades um and making their own decisions based on very sort of almost on basis of you know chat GPT kind of um level of depth in terms of
28:30
what what needs to be happen and I think much of Yemen's policy came to the came to the open on on signal uh with this hackath uh group chat where where they basically discussed what they're
28:40
going to do next in Yemen um and this is kind of it shows what kind of administration this is
28:46
um means it means they are very agile. They might not, you know, because and they're extremely unpredictable because they they act very swiftly. Um, but they don't have a policy. They don't have
28:55
a strategy. They don't have a vision for Yemen. And so the Yemen conflict really shows obviously the the the the Americans relying heavily on the Omanis to speak to the Houthis and kind of bring
29:05
this deal about. And the Omanis are delivering on behalf of the Americans. Um, but after that,
29:11
nothing. I mean, it's not like they're translating the ceasefire with the Houthis into a sustainable
29:16
solution to the conflict because the Houthis are still firing in Israel. They're still firing at the vessels. Um, and the Americans have nothing in terms of an idea of what could come next.
29:27
Same is true for Somalia and Somaliand. Um, the Amiratis have been lobbying heavily the Trump administration to recognize Somali land and so far the Trump administration hasn't made
29:36
up their mind. Um the narrative that the Israelis are selling is look, Somali land might, you know, not only are they normalizing with us, but they're possibly taking over some Palestinians that you
29:45
can then get push out of Gaza. Um which might be appealing to the Trump administration. Uh
29:50
and beyond that, the Somali land is again strategically positioned. They're saying, "We're willing to host an American base. If you want to operate in this part of the world,
29:58
we cannot make this happen for you." And the the Amirat are pushing that. And the same with the STC, they're pushing it, saying if you want an if you want basing in this part of the world,
30:07
we can provide you with a sphere of influence where you can do the basing. I just don't think the Americans are interested in basing anymore in this part of the world. They already delegated
30:14
loads of that counterterrorism uh um you know, these counterterrorism operations to local proxies
30:19
which are the Amiratis in many in many ways. Um so yeah, I don't think there is much of a
30:24
policy or a strategy when it comes to this part of the world on on in Washington. So can I ask you about the national security strategy which came out of course a couple of weeks back and
Americans giving up?
30:32
um I don't know it it didn't seem like it was much of a strategy beyond and it was very short and and
30:37
it you know it some of it was contradictory and didn't tie together but uh the conversation or the
30:44
narrative within that strategy about the GCC about the Muslim world was almost the Muslim world now
30:51
has settled and you know we've we've made peace supposedly in between Gaza and and and Israel and
30:57
And now it's really a case of um just maintaining that and and our focus is now really on on the
31:04
east and and on China and other places. Um I mean beyond what we see in that document um you
31:12
know maybe just echoing what you said there does that imply that the Americans have really given
31:18
up on on the Middle East as a in an active way? Look, for the most part, as if you're if you live
31:26
in this part of the world, you're Arab or you're Muslim, you would welcome the MAGA's approach to this part of the world for the most part, right? Um, if you juxtapose this with the neocons on the
31:37
other side, which is an active being proactive and imposing a particular vision onto a onto a world
31:44
which is so, you know, different to the American vision. Yeah. Um, I would choose MAGA every day,
31:50
right? I think there's a lot more alignment nowadays if you're from the region with mega than there is with the neocons. And first and foremost, the neocons are the ones who still pushing us.
32:00
We need to un unequivocally stand with Israel. Whatever Israel does, whatever genocide Israel is involved in, we stand with Israel. That's not MAGA. Mega says this is not in our interest. Um
32:10
it and the the interestonly approach says America is not withdrawing from this part of the world,
32:15
but we're delegating. happy to work to lead from behind letting local partners bear the burden of conflict whether it's the Gulf GCC countries or the Egyptians or uh or anyone else. Um but also
32:27
saying we want them bear the burden and we don't want more conflict because we don't want to get dragged in. Israel is the odd one out here because they keep on dragging the is the Americans back
32:36
in. Um and and so I think this national security strategy is a reflection of that vision of that
32:42
mega vision for this region where we're saying you know we have interest in this part of the world but we we want to collaborate it's about interdependence rather than you know sort of
32:51
transactional there is a transactional element obviously to create that interdependence but it's not like it's America doesn't have a problem with the Muslim world and I think that's kind of
32:59
part of the message there are the mega messages we don't have a problem with the Islamic world um you know 9/11 is a long time ago we made a lot of mistakes um and now we need to re-engage and
33:10
you know pragmatically extreme a lot of pragmatism of saying you know wherever the growth is coming from wherever the money is coming from and I do agree that for the most part the Americans look
33:18
at the Gulf as a as an ATM but you know it's it's still you know they're very much you know
33:24
Trump and his family and the organization I think are very much interested in working pragmatically with this part of the world which is a lot better than the alternative view that we
33:33
get from the neocons which says basically Arabs are second class whether they have money or not
33:38
um and should always be secondass to Israel um in this part of the world even if it doesn't serve American interest and the neocons are extremely ideological right they mostly born
33:48
and and carried on by by these fundamentalist Christians um MAGA is not ideological in that
33:53
respect but then MAGA is I when they view the Muslim world they see it as this ATM but also they
MAGA and Muslim world
33:59
see the Muslim world from the sort of stability lens and the autocrats and the dictators as Ris
34:05
security and so in that sense you know they there is an alignment with the neocons that
34:11
um ordinary people and their aspirations are not going to be met by this administration. Is that a
34:17
fair Yeah, that's a fair characterization I would say. Um but it's all I I think that's true for every every branch of American foreign policy. they you know if if you're not a democracy and
34:27
they don't they only value their own liberal western democracy as legitimate democracy
34:32
um then you know you might as well work with the autocrats and the authoritarians and they don't really make a make a difference there yeah let's talk about Abu Dhabi's grand strategy here
Abu Dhabi Grand strategy
34:42
because we we have discussed this now on a couple of occasions but I'm fascinated I know our viewers
34:47
in the comment section are fascinated by you know just the state craft of the UAE even if we
34:52
deplore it we hate it and we know what they've done in Sudan is is unacceptable from for many
34:57
humanitarian standard. Uh but they have created this network of mercenaries or businessmen or
35:04
propagandists of logisticians who operate at arms length. You know they're not directly connected at
35:11
least there's a plausible deniability there. Uh but they see they achieve the strategic interest
35:18
of the Emirates. Um like what is the grand strategy there? like you know what is the UAE
35:24
really trying to do here uh beyond the immediate you know um uh the immediate the immediate a ends
35:32
in say Yemen or Somalia or wherever it may be so the UAE want to Abu Dhabi I think we have to be
35:38
very careful here because there are differences between these seven emirates right it's Abu Dhabi it's an Abu Dhabi strategy right it's Abu Dhabi strategic culture it's the the thinking strategic
35:47
thinking of the al-Nafyan and Muhammad bin Z in particular um that really lead that very
35:53
innovative approach to to statecraftraft in many ways. Um and it's overall is creating Abu Dhabi
36:00
um or establishing Abu Dhabi as a hub in a hub and spoke system that is regional um as the hub
36:05
and the gobetween for every sort of transaction that takes place right they look at the region
36:10
the region of flows rather than a region of states flows of you know of of commodities of of capital
36:16
of people of ideas and if you're the hub in these flows and every flow flows through you or maybe
36:23
Dubai um you have influence right and You use that to generate influence. That's what I call network
36:29
ccentric statecraft. It's a it's very similar to how the British Empire built its empire. It started off through interdependence, right? It was it was trade on trade. Um it only became very
36:40
coercive and exploitative in in the letter P. But initially it was a small island state like Britain
36:45
on the periphery of the world with 4 million people with you know the Indians when when the way they described the Brits when they arrived you know they described people with bad teeth
36:53
and terrible hygiene and you know they looked at them as inferior beings and they didn't to take them seriously at all but within a hundred years they kind of crippled the the most the richest
37:03
country in the world India at the time um and and and made it their own and subverted it through
37:08
these sort of networks that they've built. Um and obviously it took a lot of intermediaries to make
37:14
this happen. It wasn't just a few a handful of Brits who were able to do this. It required a lot of collaborators on the ground in India. But it was the divide and rule that kind of allowed them
37:23
to happen to to do it. And I think a lot of the thinking in Abu Dhabi now is how can we as a small
37:28
state looking at England as a small state in the year 1600 when the East India Company was founded
37:33
just you know around the corner from here. um how can we emulate this and build a similar uh empire
37:38
that is built around you know built on networks and obviously the UAE more than England even or
37:44
less than England have have theap don't have the capacity to maintain these networks and these
37:50
inter relationships so they needed to delegate and one thing they have that Britain didn't have is this immense endowment financially where they can just pay people to do it uh and so that
37:59
makes that's why they had this hyperdevelopment it's not just development hyperdevelopment in the last couple of um decades to become that hub in the region. So it's about strategic autonomy,
38:09
it's about strategic depth, it's about relevance in the world and elevating yourself from a small
38:15
state to a middle power and the broker that can connect the Russians, the Americans, the Israelis,
38:22
the Chinese to this part of the world. And in many ways they've achieved this. If you want to do any business in this part of the world, you probably it's very difficult for you to avoid,
38:31
you know, dialing 00971, which is their kind of country code. You got to go through the Emirates one way or the other. If you want to solve any of the conflicts, they already a stakeholder there.
38:40
And that's what they were trying to achieve um of being indispensable. And in many ways, they are indispensable. But that's why their vision is now clashing with the Saudis who also
38:51
wanted to be indispensable in this part of the world. They wanted to be the broker. they want to be the leader. Yeah. There are some commentators who argue that Muhammad bin Salman has come of age
MBS
39:01
in a way. He's he's you know he's moved beyond that that initial uh display of bravado where
39:08
you know the the Lebanese prime minister was was was hauled up in in Saudi Arabia in Riyad
39:13
and you know the the killing of Jamal Kashogji. Uh and you know some argue that this past week
39:19
has shown that maturity in a way in the way that he exercises power. I mean, we've seen the ending
39:24
of the siege on Qatar in in 21. Uh we saw the uh opening up of ties with Iran uh in 23. Uh I
39:34
think the Saudis initially actually opposed any US bombing of of Thran, at least publicly opposed it,
39:40
right? Uh there's I mean I think they've plastered over the the disastrous war in with Yemen in Yemen
39:47
uh by using the Omanis to broker a a an easy but a peace deal with with the Houthies. Um I mean
39:55
from your perspective because you know your your previous answer seemed to display that the Saudis
40:00
haven't quite moved beyond those initial phases. Um, do you feel that the Saudis have have matured
40:06
and and there is a and and maybe this past week shows a a departure from that old sort of MBS
40:14
slightly, you know, very um uh erratic form of foreign policy making. So I think we're in the
40:21
third phase now. So the initial phase 2015 very erratic um you know he's still um almost teenage
40:27
boy who loves video games and you know a lot of the stories about you know he Saudi had a lot of
40:32
problems at the time. There were different ways I think of how to you know shake the tree and make sure that those corrupt networks were kind of in in the kingdom um were were broken. He chose a
40:43
very radical way of, you know, remember going to the Ritz cult and hanging people by the ceiling and, you know, all the kind of stuff that happened there, coercing people, making people disappear.
40:51
Yeah. Um, very erratic. You know, the war in Yemen without a clear strategy, just saying we're going to bump the Houthies out of Ye out of SA and we'll win this. Very erratic. Didn't didn't.
41:01
And also the same the rhetoric towards Iran, very escalatory. Um, all the way until 2019. I do think
41:08
the second phase that kind of happened. The Jamal Khashugji incident is probably the single most
41:13
important turning point in in NBS's reign. Um because first of all a lot of these erratic
41:20
people around him were dismissed. He brought in bureaucrats and technocrats um who were there
41:25
because of meritoctocratic sort of um uh you know based on me meritocracy basically people
41:32
who could get the deal done but also people who knew how to maintain relationships with the rest
41:37
of the world that that NBS first had had to learn and also knowing that you know this was a massive
41:43
mistake that he supervised right so he you know very much implicated in that um and so the second
41:49
phase is Saudis saying okay we need to be more pragmat IC we have to be more patient. We have to
41:55
you know also focus inward because development is everything and if we want development internally we need stability in the region. We can't escalate further. We need stability. Um and so he's mended
42:05
ties since 2018 2019 with the Biden administration with the Europeans you know attracting people
42:11
attracting some FDI to come into Saudi Arabia. Um and so that's the second phase. Now the question
42:17
is and this was sitting and waiting right you mentioned Qatar very pragmatic you know very you
42:23
know deep ties now but also reaching out to the Iranians saying we need the only way we can deal with Iran is through diplomacy and engagement not through military means and now this even with the
42:34
the managing the relation with the Emirates for a long time was through diplomacy and engagement trying to invite MBZ over last year to have a speak to him directly over Yemen and you know
42:43
to know he was you know it didn't really change But now using military force on a tanker, sorry,
42:50
or on a on a vessel that brought in uh armored vehicles um wasn't really it's not striking the
42:56
Emirati directly, but indirectly that's a is using military force. That was um I'm not saying it's
43:02
uncalled for, but it was a shock to the system in the Emirates. They didn't expect that because that guy who was always about patience, sit and wait, now suddenly he's using force and saying,
43:11
you know, maybe I'm coming of age. Uh and so we might see then a new phase of of MBS because NBS
43:17
the sitting and waiting strategy of not having a clear assertive strategy is not working for Saudi Arabia because they're being outmaneuvered by the Emirati. They're being outmaneuvered in
43:25
uh in in Sudan. They're being outmaneuvered in Somalia. They're being outmaneuvered in Yemen. And you could make the argument they're being outmaneuvered in Gaza as well because here the
43:33
Emiratis are leading because they have that special relationship with the Israelis. and and it was the is the the the the Amiratis who putting a lot of pressure on Saudis saying you
43:41
need to normalize join the Abra and the Saudis saying no we don't want this we don't want this on you know at at you know at any cost and we want to lead this in our own way so I think we might see a
43:51
new MBS coming of age who is more assertive still more calculated than he was in 2015
43:58
um I hope so because what is required to contain the Emiratis is a Saudi that is able to act more
44:05
assertively when necessary and a new realignment in the region between Saudi Arabia and potentially Qatar and Turkey and Egypt. I think that's an important one. So as I said if if the axis of
Realignment of the region?
44:15
resist of of of secessionist is one that is trying to isolate Saudi Egypt Turkey which it effectively
44:22
is doing. I mean ask any Egyptian they're being on the opposite end of any of these axis powers whether it's the LNA in Libya or the RSF in Sudan Ethiopia. um you know the the Egyptians really
44:33
feel this squeeze but at the same time they're a beggar state still requiring quite a lot of money from the Emirates um but what you're effectively seeing is a new world a new regional order through
44:43
this axis which is Israel Emirati led everyone else being isolated so I think the the ven diagram
44:49
between Saudi and Turkish interest and Saudi and Egyptian interest is has just increased quite significantly over the last couple of months um and I think the Emiratis are underestimating how
45:00
that could potentially isolate them even further and they might take the hit and say we don't need them anymore because we got Trump, we got the Israelis, we don't need the rest. Uh but it's
45:09
a very awkward position to be in considering that the Emirates are surrounded by countries that are not aligned with the Emirates and disagree with the Emirates on pretty much all foreign policy
45:17
issues. Andreas, you know that many of our viewers uh really want there to be some form of alignment
Muslim World Alignment
45:24
within the Muslim world where you know Muslim countries tend to you know at the moment they tend to work against one another against their interests of the people uh instead of working
45:34
with one another and building these economic and cultural and political ties that very much
45:39
is required for the Muslim world to to uh to move forward. Um, how close are we to that to that idea
45:47
of Muslim unity that's eluded the Muslim world probably for the last century? Well, yes. I mean,
45:55
we we're further away from that than ever. I mean, there are two two levels. On the state level,
46:00
you know, we see major wedges between royal families and different states. I don't think it's necessarily that important. I think it's more the people-to-people relationship is more important.
46:09
And I do think that the one issue that has brought Muslims together, Arabs together, the region together on the people-to-people level is is the issue of Palestine and Gaza. And that
46:18
that is maintained and I think people have woken up and it's the same mobilization that also feeds
46:23
into advocacy for South for Sudan and for uh you know for or against the atrocities being committed
46:31
by the RSF. So there is a a feeling of empathy across the Muslim world which I think people are
46:36
waking up to. Um but on the state state regime level, the regime obviously doesn't want this to
46:43
spill over into any political power because it's a sort of dynamic nobody can control. Yeah. Um and
46:48
and by the way, this doesn't exist just in the Gulf. I mean exists across the Muslim world. I think that is very powerful. But if it's not being translated into politics and it can't because most
46:58
of you know most of these countries there's no outlet for democratic will onto governance uh
47:04
or on statecraftraft um then it's it might be uh it might be meaningless and in in it but I also
47:10
think moving forward I think the as the divide is widening between what people want and what
47:16
the regimes want what the states want that is an unhealthy relationship. it's it's out of balance and eventually we'll have to come back to some sort of balance and we might see that at the
47:24
moment in Iran where a lot of that mobilization is happening where there's such a gap between the people and the regime. um if you don't manage that relationship, it will come and haunt you. And the
47:33
Emiratis think in particular, hence why they're so scared about the mosque, why they're so scared about mobilization, why they're scared about um the people, is because they can't control this
47:42
dynamic. And they think they can subvert public discourse to make sure that this will not arrive on their shores. But Palestine has arrived on their shore as well. Um and and I think Emiratis,
47:52
even if they don't speak out publicly, those who are not on the payroll of the government, see the atrocities being committed, um must disagree with what the government is doing,
48:01
particularly those in the northern emirates. And if you speak to Khaliji, you speak to people from the Gulf who come through London who've been here over Christmas or New Year's from all different
48:10
backgrounds, they speak to one another, right? They sit there, they have coffee, you've got an Emirati, you've got a a Saudi, you got a Katr, you got a Omani, whatever, a Kuwaiti sitting around
48:17
the table, discuss these issues, and I'm sometimes part of these conversations. Um, you realize that,
48:24
um, the Emirati are the odd one out in all of this. Uh, and so even the Emiratis are being
48:29
Emirati citizens don't want to talk. I mean, there's a bit of, uh, cognitive dissonance
48:34
there where they're just like, okay, I don't want to discuss my government's policy, but they see, they witness how others discuss what they're doing. uh and so eventually I think there there
48:43
has to be there has to come a point of reckoning even in Abu Dhabi where they're saying maybe we need to readjust uh our foreign security policy. Um let me ask you about uh you talked about Somali
48:53
land and Israel recognized Somali land as an independent country the first country to do
48:59
so. Uh Somaliand of course has de facto been independent or semi-independent from mainland
49:04
Somalia from for many decades. Um what was the role of the UAE in in this announcement? Um so
49:15
Somalia is very strategically very important. Somalia as a country um in in the Horn of Africa
49:20
obviously just it is the Horn of Africa if you look at it geographically. So the Turks, the Kataris, the Saudis, the Emiratis all have an interest in making sure Somalia is somewhat
49:28
aligned with their policy. You want to have influence there. Uh Somalia is a federal country. So it has federal states that have quite a lot of autonomy. If you look at puntland and Somaliand
49:38
particular quite a lot of autonomy historically speaking as well I mean Somaliand has been its own country. So there's a very strong organic claim to say we are you know we need to succeed
49:47
from Mogadishu. We're an independent country. Um the Emiratis have arrived really I mean they've always not always but they had already in the early 2000s they had relationships with Somalia
49:56
for agriculture. Um very similar to Sudan. Um um but it was really 2011 12 um when it was DP
50:06
World Dubai Port World as a company wanting to set up a foothold in in uh in Somalia and they
50:13
were given and they were reaching out to these breakaway regions particularly Somaliand see if there is a way for them to get access to ports um in in Somalia and it was a commercial relationship
50:24
nothing problematic. Mogadishu allowed it to happen and so for the decade that followed the Emiratis are doubling down on infrastructure projects and then allowing you know infrastructure
50:33
projects connecting ports to airports connecting them to railway connecting them to um land routes
50:40
and connecting them into the inland of Africa um particularly and Ethiopia where the Amiratis also
50:45
have quite a lot of leverage and so that kind of maritime or logistics project um this you know
50:52
we're part of financial statecraft if you will or logistics statecraft. Um this is where Somalian
50:59
plays such an important role. On top of that, the Emiratis then reach out to political elites, you know, lure them into, you know, doing business in the UAE. um reaching out to the defense and
51:10
security sector domestically training missions uh equipping them uh and thereby allowing this
51:16
entity which is already an autonomous region in Somalia to have to actually no longer requiring
51:22
the federal government not requiring Mogadisha for any support because they're almost self-sufficient now because of that relationship that they have uh with the United Arab Emirates. So Somalia
51:34
um has very similar to the STC or the RSF and the LNA. Somaliand is also part of that axis
51:39
because the Emiratus have layers upon layers of layers of investments there um across the
51:44
spectrum from economics to security sector to politics. Um where if you know if you
51:50
wanted to do anything in Somaliand it wouldn't happen without the approval of Abu Dhabi. Um, so this recognition of Israel of Somaliand wouldn't have happened without the Emiratis,
52:01
you know, advocating for it. And we have on the record here in the UK and also in the United States lobbying firms on behalf of Somaliand have gone around advocating for why Somaland should be
52:11
an independent country. And a lot of that PR or all of it was paid for uh through the UAE or were
52:17
companies who are based in the UAE. So that's not coincidental. And so for Israel now to take that first step is also not coincidental. that was only possible because the the Emiratis allowed
52:26
it to happen. All the votes in the Arab League for example that obviously um push back against this
52:31
because it undermines this uh you know this this sacresened value of territorial integrity. Um all
52:37
of these condemnations of that movement move were uh were not supported by by the Emiratis. They
52:44
didn't vote together with other Arab countries. So it's very clear that the Emiratis really wanted
52:49
this to happen. And it's very easy for them to let it happen and and say, "Oh, the Israelis did the first step, so maybe we can do we can take the second step or maybe someone else in our axis can
52:59
take the second step. Maybe Morocco will take the second step." Um, so there is a lot of movement and the Emiratis have been lobbing also using their diplomatic cloud to advocate for Somali
53:08
land recognition and that's what we're seeing right now. Great. And one last question for you. I mean stu lots of uh our viewers will be students of politics and international relations and I know
UAE’s Realism
53:17
that's your field and um uh often um students of undergraduates will be studying I don't know
53:24
realism as a school of thinking I mean it just seems to me that you know UAE should be central
53:30
stage in any conversation about realism today I mean you know it is the most machavelian state you
53:36
know the way you describe the way in which it it functions and it statecraft I mean this is realism
53:43
101. I mean, is that a a fair I definitely something that I so I use the UEE and Abu Dhabi
53:49
a lot in my courses in my teaching as an example for pure realism. The most purest form, not neo
53:55
realalism or anything, the most makavelian sort of 16th century or 15th century sort of view of of of
54:02
of interestbased foreign security policy. And it is really all about MLA. It's all about interest.
54:08
It's not about values for the UAE. And in some respects, people admire that because they're saying that, okay, there's a country that really cares for its own people. Yeah. And they don't.
54:17
And it it's very interesting in the way that the UAE or that Abu Dhabi in particular has become so
54:23
obsessed with interest that they're even willing to throw their own countrymen and their own family
54:30
under the bus. I mean, there's a long history in Abu Dhabi of fetraide, of cousins killing cousins,
54:35
brothers killing brothers, more so than in other royal families in the region. And that shows that they do they when they think it is in the interest of the regime or in the interest of the country,
54:45
they're willing to, you know, do whatever is necessary. And that kind of persistence and focus
54:51
doesn't exist in any of the other Gulf countries. Um, and they have the means to do it. And it goes
54:56
back to the point about strategic culture I made last time. This is a very bedin approach of, you know, we're pursuing our interest no matter what. And you know the collective which is Abu
55:06
Zabi it says you know the collective interest is the interest of the al-Nan that interest um has to
55:12
be pursued at at you know at any cost against any sort of enemy and it also shows that the Emiratis
55:19
don't have any permanent enemies or friends. It's it's very clear and think the Saudis have woken up to this now. um the Emirates only has interests and that's what they're pursuing and it's it's
55:30
something that I do think will come and bite them eventually because after all they are part of
55:35
that region. They're part of that local fabric. They can't ignore the rest around them. And if you do everything through coercive and compulsive means um and not never find a ground of consensus,
55:46
it will come and backfire. There will be a counter reaction. You are if you're coercive, there will be coercion coming right back at you. Uh and it it you know I think the chickens will come
55:55
back to roost um eventually. I've just received some news from a friend of mine who knows I'm I'm speaking to you today. Uh I'll read it out. Yemen's Saudibbat government launched an operation
Movement on the ground
56:06
to take back military positions from the UAE bat southern separatists on Friday today and said it
56:12
had reclaimed one of the largest military camps in Hadammud province. Any comment on on that? No. So
56:17
this morning we've seen quite a lot of movement on the ground. Um where you know this the Saudis have
56:23
for the most part relied on air power to project force and influence in Yemen. Um but they've now
56:28
backed also their their ground forces in Hadram to to take more of more initiative and having the air
56:34
cover they can make uh rapid advancements. The question is is it sustainable or not? And this
56:40
is my that's you know my big question mark in all of this is um the Saudi forces on the ground have
56:45
not shown that they're resilient enough to maintain gains on the ground and for the STC
56:53
itself in Mahra is a you know it's a it's a it's an additional it's a um bonus it's not something
56:59
they necessarily need per se and for them to withdraw from this wouldn't be his defeat at
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all because I mean at the core they're very consolidated and Had and Mahar alone are not going to save the PLC which is the Saudi backed uh or UN backed government in Yemen. So more needs to
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happen. We need to have some sort of dialogue in Yemen for this to to actually be resolved. Dr.
57:19
Andreas Craig, it's really been a pleasure as always. Thank you so much for your time today. Thank you. My pleasure. Asalam alaikum. Now you've reached the end of this show and the
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