Ep 270. - The Bloodied Emirates II: How the UAE failed in Sudan with Dr. Andreas Krieg
This week, Dr. Andreas Krieg will join The Thinking Muslim to unpack the UAE’s complex involvement in Sudan’s ongoing turmoil and the ascent of the notorious Rapid Support Forces (RSF). He will explore how regional power politics, covert support networks, and geopolitical ambitions have shaped the conflict, empowering the RSF and deepening Sudan’s instability.
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Transcript - This is an automated transcript and may not reflect the actual conversation
Introduction
0:00
Dubai has always didn't just turn a blind eye but two blind eyes from where that gold comes from. You know these satellite imageries that we see of mountains of dead people within their own blood.
0:10
Yeah. The capture of al fascia put the RSF in a far more powerful position than they were before. The RSF is being supported by the UAE. I mean are there any good guys in the starvation being used
0:20
as well as a weapon? But one of the narratives that the UAE sort of influences is one where
0:25
they're saying, you know, they're they're fighting the SAF as as a proxy of the Muslim Brotherhood. I'm a little bit like the Israeli saying this this guy's Hamas and this guy is Hamas. This is
0:33
none of the European powers and the United States have actually come out openly pointing the finger
0:38
at the UAE despite the fact the evidence is there. I I think it's been called the forgotten war in in
0:44
many ways because Ukraine and Gaza is happening. Well, the atrocities that are being committed are
0:49
very not only sadistic, but they're very it's a very personal. It's a direct proximity between
0:55
civilians and these fighters where atrocities being committed against children and women in front of their, you know, the entire family. Here is a country that has developed immense
1:03
power and influence in the world. Why are they not using it for something good? Dr. Andreas Creek,
1:10
welcome back to the Thinking Muslim. It's a pleasure to have you with us. Thanks for having me again. Well, it's lovely to have you with us. Now uh today I want to talk about Sudan. I mean
1:18
it's a very precarious uh situation in Sudan and you know we've been seeing some horrific scenes uh
1:23
from Alasir and from other places in Sudan and it seems like uh this civil conflict if we can call
1:29
it that or a conflict between two military men is is just never ending and uh the pressures that's
1:36
putting on the ordinary Sudin is heart-wrenching really. So I I think it's been called a the forgot
1:42
forgotten war in in many ways because um Ukraine and Gaza is happening and and uh for whatever
1:49
reason we just haven't spoken enough about Sudan and today we want to correct that a little bit on this show and I know you've been talking a lot about it and you've been writing about the various
1:59
factions in particular the relationship between the UAE and one of those factions the RSF led by
2:05
General Hametti and I want to I want to talk about the UAE's role But let's maybe step back a little
2:11
bit. Let's start with the background. So this is in effect a conflict between two generals.
2:18
You've got General Brhan from the SAF and then you've got General Hetti uh from the irregular
2:23
RSF force. Um just tell us a little bit about these two individuals because they were former
2:29
allies. Uh why did they fall out and why has that led to this catastrophic conflict across Sudan?
The Complexities of the Conflict
2:37
an atrocious conflict really if you look at what the pictures and images came out of alasha. So
2:43
how far do you want to go back is the question but um generally the media portrays this as a binary
2:48
conflict between the RSF and the SAF. It is a it's a bit more complex than that because the
2:54
both of these actors aren't you know hierarchies which just rally around this one leader. I mean, they're kind of, you know, hetarchical uh entities where you have all kinds of different um sort of
3:04
militias and and non-state actors or paramilitary actors. And basically, it's these are two networks
3:11
that are clashing uh where militias and brigades are fighting within one sphere of influence, which
3:17
is one is revolving around the the Hemeti family um this warlord who runs the RSF. Mhm. Um and the
3:24
other one revolves around the SAF um uh which is the more regular military but also in itself works
3:31
with paramilitary groups um and is a remnant of the former of the Omar Bashier time sort of
3:37
regular military. These two have been clashing for the last two and a half years since April 2023.
3:44
But we shouldn't forget that for a long time they were working together. Yeah. Uh and so they're part of the same problem really because if what what the people in Sudan wanted in that revolution
3:53
2018 2019 was kind of creating a you know wanted to get rid of one dictatorship by Shia and then
3:58
replacing it with some sort of uh civilian rule and that never really happened. Uh what we ended up with is you know a pseudo civilian rule for a year or two wi with a with a civilian sort of
4:09
face. But in reality, we transition from this Omar Bashia Islamist military sort of uh dictatorship
4:16
to a military dictatorship run by the SAF and the RSF who really control all elements of of power
4:22
and obviously have a monopoly over violence in the country for for many years. And they staged a coup in 2021 against the civilian face of this transitionary government and ma very
4:34
much established a military dictatorship. And so both of them were part of that. Both of them were cooperating. But over time, the SAF, which was obviously quote unquote the regular military,
4:43
wanted the paramilitary RSF to integrate into uh their sort of chain of command and and Hemet,
4:49
the RSF said, "No, definitely not." Also, because Heati has grown into a far more powerful player than just being a warlord. Uh he's also a major economic player, billionaire,
4:58
um with extensive funds and access to resources in southern Sudan, which make him, you know,
5:03
extremely powerful. And so he refused to do that. And that kind of that refusal to integrate between 21 and 23 really led to the outbreak of the current civil war where the RSF has been trying
5:14
to usurp um governance altogether um capturing Khatum or capt trying to capture the government.
5:20
They've failed or they were pushed out eventually by the SAF but it's a it's a stalemate. It's not
5:25
really neither side is winning. I mean, it's a bit like World War I in the European battlefield where one one year or one one month you've have the SAF making an offensive and and and kind of
5:35
gaining territory in the other and then the next month you'll have the RSF regaining that territory and obviously as of late the the the capture of Alfasia certainly made uh made the RSF or put
5:45
the RSF in a far more powerful position than they were before. But we're basically in this stalemate right now where the RSF has as of late gained territory, but are nowhere near powerful enough
5:55
to win this conflict and take over Katum. Neither is the SAF powerful enough to really recapture the
6:01
fall from the RSF. So we're in that stalemate now. Alaykum, this is your brother Mean Mtar, CEO at
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to learn more and give. So this is a conflict between two generals who formerly had uh warm
The RSF and SAF
7:06
relations. They were allies and they worked of course under the Omar Basher dictatorship. um uh they thwarted did you say the civilian rule in uh in many ways civilian government the uh the
7:18
the cries of the revolution were were undone by these two military men. So I suppose you
7:24
know often we can we can um characterize this conflict in a very binary way. You know the RSF
7:29
is been supported by the UAE who we'll talk about and so they're the bad guys and Bhan's the good
7:34
guy. I mean are there any good guys in this conf? I mean there's is maybe the RS maybe the SAF is
7:40
the lesser of two evils if you will but um it's you know in both it's it's pest against cholera really if you're a Sudanese and you want civilian governance then neither site will deliver this for
7:50
you um but I think what what kind of makes the RSF stand out is the the atrocities that they've
7:55
committed and the fact that they're obviously based on the genocidal Janja who was been accused
8:00
of genocide in in in Dur in the early 2000 and 2003. Yeah. So explain that to me. So uh General
8:08
Hamemedi uh used to lead these Januid militias and they've been accused by all sorts of agencies,
8:15
international bodies, credible people within Sudan of committing uh horrendous atrocities in Darur.
8:22
Yes. Largely against Sudanese Christians. Um just explain that dynamic like why is it that Omar
8:29
Basher the former dictator why did he need these irregular forces when he had the SAF when he had
8:35
uh the regular army. So Saddan is a you know if you look at the border of Sudan again is one of these cases where the British and the colonial powers drew the map and drew the the borders and
8:46
um so you have a very diverse group of people living within the borders of Sudan. Some of them being Christian, some of them being Muslim, some of them being different tribes
8:54
who are transnational in nature. Some of them living on the Sudin side, others living on the Chadian side. Uh you have an issue between what they call the Arab Sudin and the black African
9:03
Sudanese. Usually that kind of correlates with the distinction between Christians and Muslims as
9:08
well. Um but it was very much a racist um ethnic conflict in in in the early 2000s. And Omar Bashir
9:17
saw the rebels who were asking for more power or for more influence or for more autonomy in Darur
9:23
in the early 2000s. Uh he saw them as an enemy of the regime. Um and he needed someone to clamp
9:29
down not in an you know he didn't want to enter into negotiations. This was a the intent was to
9:34
exterminate the rebellion and under the context of fighting that rebellion and count insurgency they committed all kinds of atrocities against the people on the ground and the RSF obviously
9:42
at the time didn't exist but they used these um Sudanese Muslim fighters um the Janja which means
9:50
fighters on horseback to kind of clamp down on this rebellion and kind of also uh kind of you
9:56
know act of with acts of retribution against the civilian population as well where you know you all
10:02
kinds of massacres being committed and it led it's one of the few occasions where you see a western leader actually coming out and calling a calling atrocities for what they are genocide and actually
10:12
it was at the time it was the US secretary of state um Powell who who called it a genocide so
10:18
you know under the Bush administration and most people didn't really recognize what was happening there because Iraq was going in Afghanistan and it was very much forgotten but the Janja were
10:27
you know they are accused and there's a lot of evidence for war crimes being comm committed and for a gen genocidal campaign of extermination against these kind of mostly Christian black
10:37
African Sudin. Um and so the Jawit militia became sort of a a deniable part of repression
10:45
by the Bashir regime, right? Because they were not regular forces. They were not regular forces. So a plausible deniability bash said I have no idea what's going on there. Although quite clear that
10:53
they they were quite powerful. Um and he is a very powerful warlord in the in the Janja at the time,
10:59
but he's not the only one. Um over time there are others um but he is really becoming over time an
11:05
ever more powerful omnipotent leader within the Janja that then becomes a paramilitary force after
11:13
the what they did in Dur for the regime they're being rewarded by becoming an an unofficial
11:19
paramilitary force within the Bashir regime right so um a brutality of heist forces you know the
Importance of Al-Fasher
11:27
Janjid militia that's carried into this RSF force that that has been created that brutality remains.
11:33
I mean we saw some horrific scenes from Alashir. Just explain what happened in Alfasir and and
11:40
I suppose you you talked a little bit about the strategic importance of this city like why why is
11:46
this why is this seen to be a major gain for the RSF forces? No has been a very much an embattled
11:53
city for a while that has been besieged for many many months. um uh you know starvation being used
11:59
as well as a weapon. Um but the SAF was able to hold it out um because it's a very it's it's if
12:05
you look at the map of Sudan, you can see it's at a very strategic sort of choke point between
12:10
Dur and um the southern sort of corridor in the south of Sudan where most of the resources are
12:17
especially where a lot of the oil is. Right. Um so if you want to control um DO in particular and
12:23
that's ultimately what the RSF wants to achieve in the in in the first instance to make DO to dig in
12:28
D4 and make sure that the SAF uh can't regain any of that territory in D4 and if you want to control
12:34
DO alash alas is is kind of one of these key sort of choke points that you need to hold and that you
12:40
need to uh and that you need to kind of defend as well if you wanted to keep Dour and if you wanted
12:46
to then leap forward into into the resourcerich basin uh to the east and um potentially even go
12:52
up north towards Katum. You need to take Alfasia. So it's it's a very pivotal moment if you will in
12:58
in reconquering all of Dor and potentially preparing a bigger offensive further east and for the further north. Right. Okay. And um we we noticed that a lot of the RSF fighters,
Impunity of RSF soldiers
13:08
they tend to film themselves committing these atrocities. So there is an an impunity there. Like what why why is there an impunity there? Why is it that uh they don't see a a a problem from a
13:20
sort of like soft power, let's say, perspective, a problem with with their actions and and
13:25
um how they're conducting and prosecuting this conflict? Well, the atrocities they're being committed are very not only sadistic, but they're very, you know, it's it's different from a remote
13:36
warfare conflict like we see in Gaza where, you know, someone presses the button and you drop a bomb. Um it's a very personal it's a direct proximity between civilians and these fighters
13:45
where atrocities being committed against children and women in front of their you know the entire family you know these satellite imageries that we see of you know mountains of dead people within
13:55
their own blood. Yeah. Absolutely atrocious. And it's it's it's it's very much, you know, this sort
14:01
of barbaric approach is being celebrated as some sort of form of masculinity of show of strength by
14:06
these militias who are who are basically showing off and saying, you know, look what we're doing and we we'll come for you as well. It's an act of it's it's a bit an element of deterrence in
14:14
there of saying you better stop or else this is what we're going to do what we're going to do to you. And this a ditarian element is part of that ethnic cleansing and that goes kind of connects
14:23
this current conflict to what happened in 2003 um which you know there was a clear campaign to
14:29
push you know Christians and black Africans and and certain tribes that don't align with he push
14:34
them out of DEO to the south or somewhere else in this case now probably to the east um because that
14:40
form of deterrence is part of ethnic cleansing right it's and it has to be propagated in that way to show that this is something that might happen to whoever stands in the way of the RSF
UAE relationship with RSF
14:50
Now Andreas, you are someone who you've you've studied and researched uh the role of the UAE in
14:55
multiple conflicts across the world and and just how UAE uh conducts itself, you know,
15:01
through these shadowy organizations, these middle organizations that that help fund and and uh and
15:07
create and develop these uh these paramilitary forces in Libya, in Somalia, in and elsewhere.
15:14
Let's focus in on on the UAE and its relationship with this RSF force. And so until today,
15:21
as far as I know it, the UAE will swear blind that it has no relationship or little relationship with
15:26
the RSF. Just, you know, how would one uh respond to to those claims? Yeah. The narrative is there
15:34
there is no relationship with the RSF. The UA is saying that they, you know, they want a civilian government. They're saying that they they want an inclusive Sudan and so on so forth. Um but this is
15:44
part of the sort of genosfaced two-faced approach that the Emiratis are driving in many of these
15:49
conflicts where the official governance sector which is Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense in Abu Dhabi is kind of following more or less the playbook of most other countries in this
16:00
part of the world. Very much formal engagements, diplomatic engagements, trying to work with the UN. Um they've done that in Yemen, they've done that in Libya. But then under the table, what
16:08
really is the deeper and much more strategically relevant sort of um form of or way of statecraft
16:15
that they're using is is these private networks uh of uh of entities mostly corporate entities
16:21
who are aligned directly with the inner circle of power in Abu Dhabi. What you know I would describe
16:27
as the Bani Fatima, the these three brothers around Muhammad bin Zed who were in Zid's who were
16:33
the the sons of Zid's wife Fatima. um and they in their networks that they have with their these
16:39
massive um sovereign equity funded hubs. These networks are extremely instrumental in building
16:46
relationships with these non-state actors, sustaining them logistically um helping them to bring commodities from let's say Africa into into Dubai and laundering that in this case mostly
16:57
gold. Uh and also translating that that cash into a value chain that can be used to purchase you
17:03
know any any sort of support that they need. Um so logistics important, commodity company, trading
17:09
companies are important. Um private military and security companies are important because we have a lot of mercenaries there as well. We're supporting the RSF. Some of these mercenaries have
17:18
come from the were in a were in the UAE before or employed by companies registered in the UAE. So
17:24
that again not coincidental. And so the UAE have really been able to supercharge their regular
17:29
means of state craft with these kind of informal networks that provide this fairly small state in
17:34
terms of you remember the UAE is a country of a million citizens with an ability to kind of use
17:40
um the full spectrum of statecraft that is necessary to sustain a war effort such as this
17:46
one in Sudan and the RSF being the key key target here. But how do you respond to the allegation of
17:52
them saying you know we we have no relationship with the RSF? So it's plausibly deniable. So if you use these kind of networks, there is always a one or two degrees of dissociation between
18:02
what's happening on the ground and Abu Dhabi uh in you know and the core of power in Abu Dhabi.
18:08
the relationship exists and it's easily traceable but it's still plausible deniable when you have a
18:14
plane load of arms being flown into uh Chud for example uh under you know where half of
18:22
the plane or a third of the plane is humanitarian aid UAE remains a a donor of humanitarian aid a
18:27
very important one in Sudan so they fly humanarian aid in and twothirds or even more than that of the plane are actually military is military equipment and military support for the RSF how do we know of
18:38
Yes. Now we have there's a lot of investigative journalists who've been on the ground who've you know been very reputable one. These are not kind of conspiracy theories. It's been very well
18:46
documented in the New York Times. Um but also a lot of you know I I work in the in in in in in the due diligence space as well looking at you know these uh uh you know into geopolitical risks
18:58
on the ground and if you tap into these networks on the ground who work in some of these airports
19:03
for example who work with some of the companies as well you know there's images out there there's pictures that were taken these this is not hearsay there is solid evidence we have the UN um the
19:12
UN uh expert panel on Sudan who've also really unpacked these lings as well and showing how the
19:19
arms how these arms come into into the country. So that's all very well documented. Um and so you
19:26
know when the UAL we have no relationship. It might be that you know the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has no relationship with the RSF although that is also disputable. Um, but it certainly is
19:35
these informal networks that do. And I think we should also not forget that the UAE were instrumental in 2019 after the revolution to reach out to both Burhan and Hemeti um and using both of
19:48
them as their pawns in order to control together at the time with with Saudi um to kind of build
19:53
this military dictatorship that then fell apart in 2023 prior to this civil war. So this relationship
19:59
with Ameti goes back at least and that's another important aspect I think we need to talk about here. It goes back to the the the early 2010s. Uh when he emerges as a very very powerful um actor
20:11
within the Janja powerful within the RSF but also becomes a very important sort of businessman. I
20:17
mean he's seizing when he seizes these gold mines in the four he becomes a a major player in in the
20:23
in the in the gold trade. And where does he bring his gold? there is no no other hub but but Dubai
20:30
and Dubai is always closed you know not didn't just turn a blind eye but two blind eyes of where
20:36
you know where it came from where that gold comes from and how you can translate that gold launder it in in Dubai all that is also well documented so people estimate that the family now is worth
20:47
billions of dollars that money most of it is in the UAE because UAE banks are quite open to
20:52
hold anybody's money um and he is able to access this money and buy whatever he needs for the RSF.
20:59
That's one aspect and that's the economic side. On the military side, what is important as well
21:05
is that uh Heati becomes a mercenary in 2015 where he's saying he's no longer just fighting
21:10
in the war, but he offers the RSF services, the Janja services to the UAE and to Saudi Arabia to
21:17
fight for them as a proxy or surrogate in Yemen. So a lot of the RSF fighters go and fight in Yemen
21:22
return after this with quite a lot of money but also with arms and equipment back into
21:27
uh into Dur. So that relationship between HTI and the UAE predates this conflict right now.
21:34
It predates even the engagement in 2019 when the Emirati become a major player in building this military dictatorship. It goes back to, you know, like I said, 2015 war in Yemen where they work
21:44
very closely with the Emiratis, but also the gold trait which was really supercharged in 2017 after
21:50
the Janja had a little bit of an internal coup and he really emerges as the most potent player within
21:55
the Janja and within the RSF and seizes all of the gold mines and therefore and uses the UAE as
22:01
a jurisdiction to launder that. and we see his brother in particular setting up uh businesses that are now uh listed by the US Treasury and sanctioned um in the UAE to kind of facilitate
22:11
this sort of illicit trade. So there's a few threads there that I want to pick on, but let's just talk about the motive like why is it that the UAE uh remains um this major player in Sudan
Gold
22:23
and and is is funding the RSF. I mean you spoke a little bit about gold and is that the interest?
22:29
The interest is is the mineral wealth. It's one aspect of it. I think the if you look at the
22:34
narrative campaigns and the UA doing a terrible job at the moment in terms of and it's you know you can't I always say from a PR perspective you can't polish a turd. Um you know if you're trying
22:44
to kind of whitewash the RSF it's impossible after the atrocities that were propagated. Um,
22:49
but one of the narratives that the UAE sort of influences and bots are pushing at the moment
22:55
is is one where they're where they're on the one hand they're saying, you know, they're they're fighting the SAF as in as a proxy of the Muslim Brotherhood. That's kind of this, you know, the
23:05
go-to phrase that the U the UAE are using all the time. It's a little bit like the Israeli saying this this guy's Hamas and this guy is Hamas. This is so what the Emirati and their networks do is
23:13
they say this guy's Muslim Brotherhood, this guy, you know, people who are not even Muslim. Um but the narrative in the UAE in Sudan now is that the SAF is a Muslim Brotherhood aligned entity. What
23:22
is true though that there are some networks Islamist networks from the Bashia time that are still within the the SAF sort of um sphere of influence if you will when they support them. But
23:32
to say that Borhan is a Muslim brother or that the SAF is a Muslim Brotherhood entity is just
23:38
factually false. But there is this narrative this value based element of saying we're here because we're fighting the Islamists. Right. I so it's I think it's a it's a it's a pretext but it's one
23:48
that's still considering how obsessed the UAE are with the Muslim Brotherhood or this notion is I mean it's it's a paranoia that is no longer rationally explainable um uh and it has been let
23:59
at absurd because it completely ridicules any sort of uh statement that the Emiratis make.
24:05
It's still one of one aspect that we shouldn't completely disregard. But I would say the most
24:10
important thing in Sudan for them is really uh is geostrategic, geopolitical and geoeconomic in
24:16
nature. So it's about Sudan being this sort of um hub in in in a in a regional system,
24:23
a strategic again a strategic choke point to enter into the Horn of Africa to you know number
24:29
one it's a you know it has access to the Red Sea. it uh you know the port port of Sudan, Port Sudan
24:35
is a very important port and the Emirati even have an MOU to build another port next to it. Um and so that was all part that all came all came um you know all became a part of their policy in
24:48
this interim period from after the revolution to uh to uh you know between the revolution and
24:56
and when when the SAF and the RSF consolidated. Um the the Amiratis wanted access to these logistical
25:03
corridors that link up Sudan with Libya. Again, we have to remember much of the Arab Spring for the
25:08
Emiratis and their counterrevolution starts in in Libya and Libya is the first sort of bridge head
25:14
that they build to get access into Africa. And so that corridor is important. It leads directly into Sudan. It connects Sudan connects into Chad again where the Emiratis have quite a lot of interest.
25:23
But it also links into subsaharan Africa into Uganda. Uh again, Emiratis have a lot of interest. It links into Ethiopia where again the Emiratis have a lot of interest and have been supplying the
25:33
Abi government. Um and it it is another stepping stone from Somalia as well where there's now there
25:40
could be a logistical network between Somalia and Sudan. Um then there are you know oil is
25:45
very important. The Chinese have a major pipeline that goes from the south of Sudan all the way to the Red Sea coast. Um and much of the Dour area in oil wealth is controlled by the Chinese. So
25:57
the Emirati want to be this larger than live sort of um gatekeeper if you will in Sudan of saying if
26:04
the Chinese want to do business there they got to speak to us. Anybody who wants to go into southern Sudan or therefore they have to speak to us because we control the RSF. And that's the
26:12
geopolitical element of it where they're saying we have access to geostrategic real estate and
26:17
resources where anybody who wants to have access to this has to speak to us. And they're kind of trading this and and and the ultimate endgame of this is despite the fact that the entire world
26:27
is against the RSF. I don't think there's anyone who speaks out on behalf of the RSF apart from um apart from the UAE. There's no one who would dare to do that. Right. Some UAE influences. Yes. Well,
26:37
apart from Yeah. Maybe if you're paid for by the UAE or your Emirati, maybe that's what you would do. But nobody really does. Um, but nonetheless, most people have realized that you need to speak
26:47
to the Emirates even if you dis absolutely disagree fundamentally with what they're doing
26:52
uh in Dur because they're in indispensable now. They've made themselves indispensable in this very
26:57
strategically critical area of the world and that is also part of their interest. they want to be,
27:02
you know, they always say you need to call a plus 971, which is their country code, if you
27:08
want anything done in Libya, in Sudan, in Somalia or Yemen. And it's true. They are the biggest,
27:13
they're not the only player, but they're the most important player. Um, in in Vansa, you talked about, you started with the sort of the ideological component and and sometimes we
‘Islamists’
27:22
don't speak enough about this. It seems to me that the UAE is responsible for thwarting any form of
27:28
civilian rule, civilian government across the region, not just in in Sudan. Like what's going
27:33
on there? Does it really believe that uh if if there's genuine civilian rule then there will be
27:39
an Islamist dimension to that? Is that is that the consideration there? Yeah. So the Islamist
27:44
scarecrow or boogeyman is really a catchall phrase to say civil society. They're afraid
27:50
not of Islamist but of civil society. You know, obviously civil society in this part of the world is often mostly Muslim and at times Islamist, if you will. Um, and the Amiratis are scared of
28:02
the Arab street in this respect. Um, and so the fear was that in 2018 2019 during the revolution,
28:09
if you get if you give people the vote, they might vote for parties who are on the Islamist spectrum,
28:14
if you will. And they're uncontrollable. They usually respond to the people. They usually don't revolve around one point of contact. The Emiratis love to have one point of contact, someone they
28:23
can call if they need to solve something like the Haftas of the world. They want something in Libya, you call they call this guy and he can make it happen. Strong men. Yeah, you need a strong man.
28:31
And usually strongman in uniform who thinks hierarchical is preferable to someone who's you know a civilian sort of strongman. So they they're looking for people in uniform who can
28:40
fulfill that strongman rule. I mean the again you mentioned that the UAE has taken a bit of a hit
UAE’s strategy
28:47
uh because of its relationship with the RSF and I think on social media and even on mainstream media there's now very clearly a connection has been drawn between the UAE and and the
28:58
RSF and the atrocities of the RSF of course is really undermining uh the cultural power let's
29:04
say that that Dubai and Abu Dhabi have developed over the last couple of decades. Um, how much do
29:10
you feel there they take that into consideration? Because it just seems to me that they're doubling down on on their deniability, but also on on, you know, they feel that there's more to be gained,
29:21
I suspect, from Hemeti than to, you know, cut to cut those strings. It's interesting, isn't it?
29:28
Um so the UAE have a tendency and I'm writing a book at the moment about strategic culture in this part of the world and there is something about Abu Dhabi strategic culture that needs to be
29:36
understood and it's mostly the strategic culture of Muhammad bin Z. He's a very transactional very Makavelian man someone who comes from the military someone who has a tendency to double down not to
29:46
back down. Sometimes when I hear you I I feel that you're somewhat impressed by him. I am impressed.
29:51
I think no I'm very much impressed if you think of what how they transformed this conventionally
29:56
speaking small state into this larger than life you know center or hub of this massive network
30:04
that very much dictates the terms at least in the Middle East and parts of Africa that is impressive
30:09
I don't think any other Arab state has achieved that um obviously financial wealth is important
30:14
but others have financial wealth I think they found a way to translate their financial wealth into power they that's what strategy is all about. It's about generating influence, but it's very
30:23
machavelian. It's very um you know, it's it's very transactional. No value. It's not value based at
30:30
all. It's all about interest, interest, interest. Um and so, you know, someone like Muhammad bin
30:36
Z looks at Sudan as purely how can I extract interest from for me and Abu Dhabi in it. And so
30:44
the the kind of decision he has to make is whether the interest he's gaining from supporting the RSF by having control of the four strategically relevant trade corridors, access to resources,
30:54
is that worth the um costs of reputational cost of these mo of a mobilized Sudanese diaspora as
31:02
well. I think we shouldn't forget that in in the UK in particular, there's a lot of Sudanese who live here who feel very passionate about what's going on there and they might not support the SAF,
31:11
but they're certainly not supporting the RSF. That is something you cannot underestimate. It drives
31:16
mainstream media uh narrative. Although I do think more should be done and more needs to be done on
31:22
this. Um but this is something now this is now a problem that they cannot ignore anymore. We've got the U the US talking about it, the Europeans talking about it, but so far none of the European
31:32
powers and the United States have actually come out openly pointing the finger at the UAE despite
31:38
the fact the evidence is there, despite the fact they're saying we know who's doing this, but we still don't want to call them out. But I think the UK was the only ones who caught them out in 2024 I
31:48
think last year and that caused a massive uh role and arrow and um you know sort of uh quite a lot
31:54
of um conflict and friction with between London Abu Dhabi. But why don't they do it? Because ultimately the UAE is a very powerful player. Uh it's a player that um has makes strategic
32:05
investments in this country. um is a country that holds some control over our logistics hubs
32:11
um through DP World for example when they invest here. Um so they are a very powerful player and
32:17
um and the UK now is a beggar state in many ways. I mean we we need investments right now and we beggars can't be choosers and you don't want to antagonize a potential major investor in
32:27
your country. It's it's real politic if you will. The same is true for other European countries. The only country that can make a difference is Donald Trump, but is the United States. And
32:35
they themselves at the moment are holding back because they hope that the UAE can provide them with a deal. Right. Because I what I've noticed is I mean there is now a I think they called it
Trump
32:45
a quad. There is a a conversation taking place about Sudan. I think it it broke down recently
32:50
because the UA were were not happy with Egypt's uh position on on Sudan in particular. uh uh Donald
32:57
Trump has appointed an envoy to to Sudan. So there is some movement, some diplomatic movement
33:03
whereas you know in the Biden administration I I I didn't see very much movement at all. So there is something taking place here. I mean is that substantial? Do you think that it will ultimately
33:14
bear some fruits or I mean what why is why is the Trump administration at least seemingly doing
33:20
some action here? No, for Trump, it's all about another, you know, he he he wants headlines for
33:26
himself, positive headlines. He his administration doesn't rely on the formal infrastructure of the
33:32
US government, the state department or defense department. They're trying to do things their own way through their own private networks, through contacts and intermediaries, and they
33:40
have delegated most of the regional statecraft to the Gulf countries anyway. I mean to Saudi to Qatar and in in in the case of Sudan to the UAE because the UAE have been lobbing him saying look
33:50
we we can we can help you bring this to an end and you'll be the one to shine because you take the credit you'll have the whatever 12th 13th war that you can claim you've ended which works
33:59
well for him. Um and obviously the atrocities have been very well documented and nobody can
34:05
ignore it. Trump can't ignore it. Trump has been very public about it during his during the visit of Muhamm Salman to Washington this week where he said you know I want this to stop. Um and the the
34:15
Saudis used quite a lot of pressure on the Trump administration saying you need to make this stop and you also need to hold the Emiratis to account. So Trump is in is under pressure to do something
34:24
but the UA is saying just wait a minute we we'll have to consolidate a little bit of power. We'll have to do a bit of background behind closed doors chatting and then when we get everyone around uh
34:33
the table we will solve this for you. um the Saudi UAE relationship because ideologically they're on
Saudi and UAE
34:38
the same side here. You know, you would imagine that the Saudis what you pointed out there about
34:44
the UAE fought in civilian rule. The Saudis are very much on side there. Uh why is there a rupture
34:51
there when it comes to the when it comes to Sudan? No, for the for the for the Saudis are far more
34:56
risk averse than the Emiratis. I think the Saudis are also far less innovative in their state craft.
35:02
They're very old school in the way they do things. um they would have been very happy with a military dictatorship where the RSF and the SAF worked together because that's at that time in 2019 till
35:12
2023 the UAE and Saudi were quite aligned on this. Um but now it seems like and this is very similar
35:18
to Yemen which was is another point of friction in Saudi Ara and it starts as a joint project
35:25
Saudi UAE and then the UAE start to uh backstep the Saudis and do their own thing at their own
35:31
expense. I think the difference here is that the Saudis do generally want some sort of stability.
35:36
Let's call it authoritarian stability, but they believe in stability. Yes. Um they don't want war
35:41
for war's sake. The Emiratis are quite happy to break some eggs to make an omelette, which is not
35:47
the Saudi approach. Saudis are very riskaverse in that respect. They do want they need to grow. They need development domestically. They can't have another conflict. The Saudis are very uh very
35:55
averse to conflict right now. Um and thereby there there at least for the moment Muhammad Salman had
36:00
a learning curve as well considering where he was after he you know he he he called for the slaughter and and the the murder of Kashugji and you know all the domestic sort of clampdown. I'm
36:10
not saying that has stopped entirely, but there's a bit of a learning curve in at least in foreign and security policy where he said, "Okay, Yemen, we we didn't, you know, we learned our lesson. We
36:19
weren't able to win. Diplomacy is the only way forward. We're willing to sit with everyone, even with the Houthis, to come to some sort of solution, which is pra is pragmatic. So there's
36:27
a 180°ree turn in that respect at least. That sort of pragmatism also means they're willing to to speak to different non-state actors. Um, and the Emiratis are not like this. the, like I said,
36:38
the Emiratis haven't backed down ever. I mean, whether it's in Libya where they where they failed
36:43
to seize the capital, whether it's in Yemen where they didn't uh succeed in in in kind of capturing
36:49
SA, um whether it's in Sudan where they will not be able to capture Hatum or or the rest of Sudan,
36:56
uh they're quite happy with these little enclaves that they carve out for themselves that nobody can seize and that they can defend. And they use this as a bargaining chip. That's not the Saudi way.
37:05
That's not the the Gulf way. the Gulfies want, you know, they they want to maintain sovereignty, territorial integrity of these states. Uh, and so that's where the friction comes from, particularly
37:15
when what the Emiratis are doing comes at the expense of the Saudi position. So in Sudan, it comes very much at the expense of a united Sudan and a a stable Sudan. It comes in Yemen at
37:25
the expense of Saudi interest because the Saudis are the ones who are stuck in the conflict in the north against the Houthis. um why the Emiratis are carving out their own little sphere of influence
37:33
in the south without actually supporting uh the Saudis. And so what's interesting now in Sudan
37:38
over the last couple of weeks, we've seen a lot of the influences, Saudi influences, Saudi discourse becoming very very openly critical of the UAE, which is also a first directly attacking and
37:47
calling the Emiratis out. That shows you that is obviously government sponsored or backed or authorized, if you will. Um but it shows where the Saudis stand on this. They're absolutely upset.
37:57
I mean, you don't think that the UAE believe it that they've overplayed their hand in in Sudan? I mean, just the the amount of anger that that's been generated across the world. Um, I mean,
UAE overplayed their hand?
38:08
potentially that may have a a negative effect on, you know, inward investment possibly or
38:14
on on tourism. um are the you know is the UAE aware of that or conscious of that or you you
38:22
don't think that's really I think they are they're more aware of it and the fact that we saw Gardash um I think two or three weeks ago he made a statement of saying we all make mistakes in
38:30
Sudan was almost an admission of one a very rare admission by the Emirat saying maybe we've been
38:36
wrong which we've rarely heard before um but it doesn't mean they have reversed their policy but
38:41
it seems at least a little bit of an admission I think they're aware of the reputational costs they might be happy, they might be willing to sustain the pressure and the resistance they're
38:49
facing in Europe because they see Europe as equals or even inferiors. Um, if that criticism,
38:55
that pressure came from the US, I think they would change. I think that's that's something they can't can't sustain. I don't think there has been any pressure on investments in the UAE and no
39:05
pressure on tourism in the UAE. Most people are very apolitical anyway. Um, and it's they feel I
39:12
think I see a lot of similarities with the Israeli position as well, right? The Israelis have learned to sustain ongoing pressure and resistance. Um, and you know, despite the fact that the evidence
39:22
shows the Israelis are committing atrocities, they're saying no, it's not happening. And it it you know, it's still I mean, Israel is in the end still a pariah state, but in in most people's
39:32
eyes, but there's still enough people saying, "Okay, yeah, there might be a pariah state where we're happy to support them." So the Emiratis are thinking I think they're overestimating how
39:41
much leverage they have. I think Israel is in a different sort of ship considering that they've been doing this for 40 years. They built their networks for 40 years. The Emiratis have only
39:49
really doing been doing it for not even 20 years. Um but I think they're just saying let's we can
39:54
sustain this for an indefinite period. Yeah. Um the we spoke about this briefly on the last show,
UAE and Israel
40:00
the relationship between the UAE and Israel. um you know that how has that relationship fared over
40:07
the last couple of years of genocide? What is you know how do you uh assess that relationship as it
40:13
as it currently stands? I mean there's not much left of that relationship to be honest. Um and
40:18
that I mean so initi the Abraham Accords what's the number one reason they the Amiratis engage
40:23
in the Abram Accords is they wanted out of jail card in the United States and they're using the Abra and it's been extremely successful in that. It was never about Palestine. It wasn't even about
40:31
Israel. It wasn't like the Emirati is saying, "Oh, we love the Israelis." It was really just a way of getting influence in the west in pro-Israel networks. Um, and in that respect, I think it has
40:39
delivered. It continues to deliver and hence they will never jeopardize this or, you know, put it into question. Although they have used it publicly at least of saying if you know annexation of the
40:49
West Bank, the formal annexation we should say because the informal one is taking place at the moment, but the the former one would be a red line that we you know we will not tolerate. So that was
40:58
a and that came towards the end of well I don't know if we're at the end of the war yet but at least before just before we had this breakthrough in in Gaza diplomatically they've been saying we
41:08
put this on the line. Um they're under immense pressure domestically. Um I think especially people in the northern Emirates and also in Dubai are you know very public vocal about what
41:18
the Israelis have been doing. They've never used this to question their own government or question the Abram of course because that would be uh not allowed in terms of civil societal discourse. Um
41:26
but they've been calling out the Israelis. So Abu Dhabi had to respond to that. They had to, you know, open the valve a little bit to release some of that public pressure. Um and they're
41:36
quite happy now that there's less and less public focus on Gaza. Um and I think that's that's true.
41:42
Um but that relationship continues. But what we've seen since the 7th of October is that the Emiratis have stopped putting more money into Israel. So the investments have stopped. Um although some
41:52
investments obviously very sizable ones remain in the country. M um they haven't gone up full 180 and they wouldn't uh but they basically froze the the the relationship where it was and and why
Emiratis on Palestine
42:04
was why is that I mean what what's the what's the because of course you know when we look at
42:09
um again these are all anecdotes but videos of of people wearing you know Palestine shirts at the
42:14
airport are told to cover up or someone wearing a kofia are told you know either arrested or or
42:20
or you know told to not show such an obvious sign of Palestinian report uh that there is an overt
42:27
antipalestine uh sentiment that's coming at least from the authorities. So explain you know that
42:34
with the freezing of of you know anti-Palestine it's quite what is what is clear from a lot of
42:42
leaked sort of um US diplomatic cables MBZ has always you know talked about the Palestinian issue
42:48
in a derogative way he's not a big fan right but overall the Amiratis do side generally with the
42:55
Palestinians not with the Israelis apart from some influencers who are paid to become Zionist I mean there are two or three sort of accounts that have gone to Israel and becoming suddenly promoters of
43:04
Israel. Um but except for you know outside of that Emiratis are not pro- Israel. They generally sight
43:10
with the Palestinians and there lies in there lies the problem because the Emiratis are so scared of
43:15
political mobilization domestically that someone who comes into their country with a badge of pro Palestine or Kafir or flag is potentially ringing support around a cause that the government doesn't
43:26
control and that is a cause that could potentially run against government policy when it comes to the Abram Accords. I think it's this obsession about the Palestinian cause being a mobilizing tool that
43:35
could be used against the regime, which I don't think it would, but they see it as a potential threat against the regime, means that it has to be you, they have to clamp down on it wherever
43:44
it starts. And why is the UAE so obsessed about uh civil society organizations across the West?
Civil society threat?
43:51
Um you know there is now a very heavy call in the United States to ban the Muslim Brotherhood and
43:56
you know and to ban organizations like and care and you know these are very bas are very you know
44:03
uh um that like Islamic organizations that work within the community and do charity work. Um there
44:10
was a poll I think that was recently published in France which seemed to indicate that uh the
44:15
a large section of of um of Muslim civil society were Muslim Brotherhood supporters and a poll was
44:22
uh supported by and paid for by the UAE and you know so and in Britain of course you've got heavy
44:28
lobbying uh in in you know in terms of the British political establishment against some organizations
44:35
here who they connect and who they claim are too heavily connected to to the brotherhood and and of
44:41
course this is just a claim to to to try to sort of curry favor in these capitals like what's going on there? What is it about uh western Muslims that really irks I suppose it's not just western
44:53
Muslims. So if you're scared of civil society in general and any civil society is a potential
44:58
threat to your regime. Yeah. um any civil society that goes into this societal and political space,
45:04
the Amiris are quite happy with, you know, having people chat and talk about sports or entertainment and sort of things that are outside the political realm. They're not a threat to the regime. You
45:13
talk about societal issues or political issues. Um whether you use Islam for that or not doesn't
45:18
really matter for them, but that's a space that the state has to control, that Abu Dhabi has to control. The mosque is a mobilizing tool that nobody can control. Um and hence the mosque is has
45:29
always been for the Emirati since 20101 at least a major threat because that's where the Arab Spring started. That's where the protest started. So you have to clamp down on this. The Muslim Brotherhood
45:38
is has become a sort of catchall phrase to basically tarnish the reputation of every any
45:45
single Muslim civil societal group from you know charities to you whatever education to say okay
45:51
these guys Muslim Brotherhood equals terrorism. Uh it's a broad brush. I think in 2014 they
45:57
were fairly successful with you injecting that discourse into into the CVE debate in this country
46:03
um in the civil countering violent extremism one. But I think it has run its course. Most people don't uh respond to it anymore also because the the Israelis have been using the Muslim
46:13
Brotherhood trope against Muslim civil society. They see Muslim civil society equally as a threat. So they have been using it, abusing it, especially when they said you're Hamas and this person is
46:23
Hamas. We're all Hamas. They're all Hamas. Um, the Emirati are a little bit like this as well, but it becomes almost, you know, it's it's a joke now where everyone is now suddenly a Muslim
46:31
brother. I mean, they've been there's been this scandal in 2023 where the Emirati allegedly paid a
46:37
um a firm somewhere in Switzerland and whatnot to to tarnish the reputation of journalists and and and academics and and civil societal leaders as being Muslim brothers. And many of them weren't
46:47
even Muslim. um you know and had a lifestyle that was certainly not in keeping with the more you know socially conservative part of the Muslim Brotherhood. So it's irrelevant now. It has the
46:56
Muslim Brotherhood is an organization that existed in Egypt as the Muslim Brotherhood. And when you
47:01
ask them about it because I would make the claim that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has been degraded. It no longer exists. It's not a threat to the regime anymore. Um networks exist of people
47:10
who might be intellectually affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. They might exist anywhere. Um but does that make them Muslim brothers? And and why is that even a problem? The narrative that the
47:19
Emiratists have is they use this one element of the Muslim Brotherhood which is the um they they
47:25
completely ignore Hassan Albana in these sort of da based part of of the Muslim Brotherhood and go directly into the takiri sort of approach that Kutub advocated for. So and there basically
47:37
saying Kutub is a terrorist all of the jihadists go back to Kutub. So Kutub was a Muslim brother. So basically the Muslim brotherhood is linked to ISIS and al-Qaeda. It's a quite of an intellectual
47:46
split that they're making there which is a kind of vague has been debunked by by academics and by by
47:53
theorists and by Islamic scholars. And so it's it's they're preaching that to their own echo
47:58
chamber. The Israeli networks are quite happy to pick it up because it serves their narrative as well. But it doesn't really have a lot of traction. uh on our in our last conversation
Whitewashing atrocities
48:08
uh we spoke very again it was very briefly about uh the way in which uh the Abu Dhabi weaponizes
48:16
religion it's not just an anti- relligion there is a weaponization of in particular Sufism you
48:22
know and and a lot of the people in the comments said well where's the proof of that where's the evidence of that and I don't know if you've got I mean you may not want to comment on individuals
48:31
but Abdullah bin Ba is someone that at least I've come across who, you know, who runs or at least
48:36
is is is um um very much spearhead in this sort of idea that uh Abu Dhabi and uh that the UAE is
48:45
a is a bastion of tolerance and peace across the world. C can you speak to that? Like what what is
48:51
uh how useful are these actors in whitewashing I suppose um you know the UAE's atrocities abroad?
49:01
Now there's so if you look at the the fatwa council in the UAE and those people who are there they usually propagate a quietest Islam. Yeah. Quietest in the way as that there they're saying
49:12
you know let the ruler get on with politics and societal affairs. We are there we talk only about
49:17
religious affairs and theology which is separate from the state. This clear separation. The idea
49:22
of the wal I think we discussed last time. Yeah. Um this this is a powerful tool because you can
49:28
basically tell people stay out of politics because you can be a very good Muslim and not talk about
49:33
politics and societal issues. Um and we give you this is this is the kind of religious theological
49:39
legitimacy to to do so and you're basically it's a tool to demobilize civil society and
49:45
also legitimize the suppression of civil society and by the way not just Muslim civil society any
49:50
sort of civil society. Um and it's a very powerful tool and you know uh I don't think Sufis per se
49:56
obviously they don't want to be instrumentalized in that way but Sufism has been instrumentalized by the Emirati to kind of create that narrative um of of pushing back and then what is more I
50:06
don't know if we talked about it last time but what is more problematic is the Matali Matab
50:12
um so the Matali you know come out it's not even a Matab it's a it's a sort of very small school of
50:18
uh of of originally coming from Saudi Arabia and and they are very very radical quietest Sufis
50:26
where they're saying you know we actually we have to blindly follow the the the lord of the land
50:32
whoever that might be whether it's the regime in Saudi or in in the UAE or Khalifa in Libya
50:38
or whatnot and blindly following you're creating basically a Muslim a dedicated group of Muslims
50:45
who follow the leader um blindly into battle this even when the Muslim leader is committing
50:50
atrocities and goes against uh you know any sort of Islamic value. Um and they're fundamentalist in
50:57
that way and why they become so they they've they've appeared in Libya in particular in the in the postrevolutionary uh environment in eastern Libya. They've become some of them the
51:06
pritorian guard if you will of of um and they've basically said okay you're Islamist you're Muslim
51:15
you're looking for Muslim mobilization to make sense of the political or social political atrocities around you we'll give you a great sort of narrative for that and this is
51:24
your narrative you can mobilize as Muslims but you're doing this bllightly following the lord of the land which in your case is khalifa and so it's become a tool to legitimize and enable
51:35
uh repression and enable these sort of political military strongmen. One final question for you
Pushback from Emiratis?
51:40
Andreas Creek. I mean do you feel that because you speak very openly against uh the Emiratis and
51:46
what they do in you know these these places last the last conversation we had you talked about the access of secessionists and and just this network that they've created across the world. I mean have
51:57
you had any push back from the Emirati? Like do you feel is it is there a heat on you for for
52:03
um for raising raising obvious I'm I'm quite happy to be challenged on on on any of that
52:09
especially you know in on social media and so on you get you get commentary uh you know people
52:14
you mostly these are the kind of pro- regime bots and trolls that don't really have any analytical
52:19
ammunition to really counter any of that. Um what is fascinating it's it's not about tarnishing the
52:26
the Amiratis. I mean like I said I have quite a lot of uh admiration for how they did it. It's
52:31
quite fascinating as a case study and as a scholar who looks at international relations and state craft and strategy. It's an immensely powerful and interesting case study. Um the question is
52:42
and I I what I do understand here as well is why the Amiratis are doing it and it serves their national interest. I think any government should be advancing their national interest. But
52:51
what I don't understand is that the Emiratis are doing it even when there is a resistance
52:56
that they don't have the sort of flexibility, the pragmatism to adjust their course when they
53:01
see they've gone wrong and admitting that they've gone wrong. Like I said, you could make the claim the countries have uh have, you know, had that sort of epiphany as well during their during
53:11
the Arab Spring. They were supporting a variety of different non-state actors. They realized it didn't go anywhere. They backed down. They even had changed their government and you know had a
53:18
new amir coming in clean sheet changing their stake learning their lesson and moving on. The Saudis like said also learned their lesson in Yemen realizing it didn't go anywhere. NBS
53:29
learned I think learned some of the lessons of what happened of the Kashukji killing and murder and the fallout of that and again adjusted cause with the Amiratis they've never done it. They've
53:38
never adjusted their cause because they think they can sustain it. And what I don't understand is here is a country that has developed immense power and influence in the world. Why are they
53:46
not using it for something good? Why are they not using their indispensable role in Libya, in Yemen, in Sudan, in Somalia, to actually work for a constructive uh multi, you know, for for a
53:58
for for a solution constructively that works for everyone, for locals, most importantly, obviously,
54:04
uh but also get the backing of the international community. um and not always push back when you're being called out and uh obviously the attack thing especially you know when people are being attacked
54:14
oh you're Muslim Brotherhood because you say this or you know you're financed by this country or that country because you're criticizing us instead of having the maturity of engaging in a discourse
54:23
um because I think there's quite a lot to learn and the artists can be proud of their leadership in some respect in terms of what they have achieved and how they generate power and influence
54:31
um but they need to be also be made aware of where they've gone wrong and the problem is a lot of the scholarship is too scared because the MROS are extremely coercive in that way right they
54:39
use any form of uh you know putting pressure on you on the institution on you know in the public
54:45
domain as well um where you know I think once you get to a point where that pressure is mounting a
54:51
lot of people backing down and saying you know what's what's in it for me I've been looking at the UEE now for the last you know over a decade and you know it's a fascinating case study and I
55:01
will continue looking at into it but unfortunately a lot of that scholarship who looks at the UEE has moved away from it because they're too scared to say something wrong. So they're looking at
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the the fuzzy uh you know uh bits of of what is what the UAE are doing without actually looking
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at their intellectual philosophical thinking but not looking at how they do it. And that's I think the aspect that most people shy away from because in the formal domain the UAE as
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I said use their formal uh organizations usually for for good ends most of the time but it's the
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informal networks under the table that are now coming ever more to the surface that need to be studied as well. Grace Greek thank you so much. Thank you so much for your time today. Thank you
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for having me. Thank you. Asalam alaikum. Now, you've reached the end of this show, and the
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