Ep 286. - Why Tehran Might Outlast Washington | Dr Andreas Krieg
Dr Andreas Krieg joins us in discussion as events unfold rapidly following the unprovoked and illegitimate attack on Iran. We examine the assassination of senior Iranian leaders, Tehran’s retaliation against military and civilian targets in Israel and key Arab states, and the escalating strikes on sites such as the US airbase in Doha. Are we witnessing the start of a prolonged war of attrition between Iran, the US and Israel? Are their tactics sustainable? And does Washington even have a coherent strategy?
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Transcript - This is an automated transcript and may not reflect the actual conversation
Introductory Words
0:02
Dr. Andreas Creek, welcome back to the Thinking Muslim. Thanks for having me back. It's wonderful to have you with us. Now, we are talking on Monday, Monday evening, and of course, events
0:11
are unfolding at a very rapid pace at the moment. Um, on Saturday, the United States and Israel
0:17
conducted an unprovoked and illegitimate attack on Iran. Uh, we've seen the assassination of the
0:23
country's supreme leader. Many of its civilian and military leaders have also been assassinated.
0:28
Uh we've also seen Iran's retaliation uh which has hit military and civilian targets uh both
0:35
in Israel but also in key Arab countries. Doha for example has seen attacks not only on the American
0:43
American base there but uh which is the largest US base of course in the Middle East. Uh but also
0:50
we've seen uh drone attacks on its liqufied gas installations today and I want to talk to you
0:56
about that. Now I really want to understand the tactics and strategies of all sides in particular whether Iran, America and Israel possess this the resilience to be able to see this war of attrition
1:08
which seems like it's becoming uh through to its very end. So I I want to sort of understand from
1:13
your perspective you know who's currently got the upper hand here who's got the advantage
1:19
when it comes to this if any when it comes to this conflict. Now, I would like to remind my viewers,
1:25
please do contribute to these podcasts by becoming a member. Without your help, we cannot produce the programs we do. Follow the link on the screen or in the pinned comments. Dr.
Unprovoked Attack on Iran - Why Now?
1:34
Andreas, let's start with the unprovoked attack on Iran. Why now? Multitude of different reasons.
1:42
Donald Trump probably doesn't know exactly why he's doing it. Um I would say I think we have a very very amateurish US administration at least when it comes to the issue of Iran very clear that
1:55
they have an issue with the nuclear program that that has been an issue I mean since Trump in his first term ripped uh the JCPOA the joint what was it stand what did it stand for the joint
2:06
comprehensive I don't even know what it stands for the nuclear deal they called it and you know it it was working it contained Iran Iran was compliant it was certified to be compliant and
2:16
he ripped it apart and left nothing in its place and Iran then went uh into full mode of enrichment
2:23
going way beyond the uh the threshold of what they were supposed to be doing and obviously they have
2:31
invested heavily into their missile defense and missile offense as well. Um and over the last you
2:39
know couple of years it became clear that Iran is pivoting away towards the east. uh and thereby is
2:46
saying you know we're not interested in any deal with any western country anymore. So that that's kind of the context in which Trump made these decisions. Um so ultimately it's about the nuclear
2:55
program um where we still don't know whether Iran wanted to have a nuclear weapon or not but they certainly took the right steps in the direction to build one which was alarming. Uh second issue
3:05
was the ballistic missile program which at least for the Israelis is a is a national security issue but also for a lot of Gulf states there was an unease about having this massive um this massive
3:16
stockpile of missiles in Iran that could be used against anyone. And the third issue was obviously the access of resistance which has been degraded by Israel over the last couple of years since
3:25
uh since the 7th of October um which was operating as a network kind of across the entire region. And
3:31
so against this backdrop, we've been seeing over the last two months a quite a lot of activism
3:36
on the side of the Trump administration to coercively force the Iranians to surrender
3:42
uh their nuclear program, surrender their ballistic missile program uh and do something about um about the axis of resistance. And there was this element already existed during June last
3:53
year when you know Israel went to war. Yeah. uh there again in early 2025 the Trump administration
3:59
invested into a diplomatic sort of road map in trying to see whether you could have a new deal
4:05
a better deal than the old nuclear deal. Um and then the Israelis were the ones who upended it you know literally taking action that then forced the Americans to not just leave the negotiation table
4:15
but support Israel in its war against Iran. Um, and then at the end of that war, which was kind
4:21
of concluded by an Iranian attack on Qatar, the country is kind of translated at this moment into
4:27
a solution, a diplomatic off-ramp. Um, but that off-ramp was a ceasefire. It was never
4:33
really translated into a long-term diplomatic pathway to a deal because America and Trump in
4:39
particular lost sight because there's obviously so many things he's doing and he doesn't have the strategic patience to see these things through. And the end of 25, we're seeing this reemerging
4:50
this issue about the nuclear deal and can we actually get a deal uh with the Iranians. And the Iranians initially weren't too keen uh to get involved, but then the the gradual buildup first
5:01
the rhetoric of Trump and then the buildup of this Amada, quite an sort of a massive force that was
5:07
assembled across the Middle East that kind of put pressure on the Iranians to say, "Actually, we're quite sincere now. We do want to talk." And so Oman in particular took the lead, but
5:15
other Gulf states to countries to Saudis, Turks, Egypt, Egyptians, everyone kind of got involved,
5:21
telling the Trump administration, look, war is a terrible idea. We'll drag the whole region into a mass confrontation that nobody can control. So why don't we find a solution? The Iranians are willing
5:31
to to this time around make concessions. And it quite clear. And if you listen to the commentary
5:37
by the the foreign minister of Oman who was leading the negotiations, he made this interview
5:42
on Friday night knowing that possibly the next day something was going to happen. And he he said he was appealing to JD Vans and to the Americans saying, "Look, we're quite close to a deal. We can
5:52
have a deal. It's a better deal than what you had last time. It's quite clear they're agreeing to a lot of terms they wouldn't agree to last time around." Um, but they're not talking about the
6:00
missile program. The idea was though in the Gulf was you kind of build a consensus around the issue
6:06
of uh the nuclear deal and then you build on this to kind of create a a follow-up deal on ballistic
6:12
missiles and so on and so forth. Um and for a long time actually the American mediators uh and
6:17
negotiators Kushner and Witkov chief of them um were quite interested in committing to a nuclear
6:23
deal and then it became clear that the Israelis obviously were not happy with it. They weren't happy with a nuclear deal and they weren't happy with a deal that would leave the missile program
6:33
um basically out of sight, out of reach. And this was a closing window for the Israelis. Um that's I
6:39
think key to understand. This was a closing window for the Israelis to say if we want to strike Iran, we want to change the regime, degrade the regime and destroy their missile program,
6:47
we have to do it now because once you have a deal that that ship will sail and so hence there was a
6:53
lot of pressure over the last two three weeks through Apac, through the Israel lobby and is pro-Israel networks in Washington on the Trump administration and pro-Israel uh lawmakers in in
7:03
in the United States to actually put pressure on Trump saying you have to take action now because the what the Iranians are offering is not enough because they don't want to talk about missiles.
7:18
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8:17
Visit btml. us/thinking Muslim to learn more and give how much of it was really about uh Iran's
8:25
nuclear capabilities because as you said the Omani foreign minister said very clearly that Iran had
8:31
committed uh to completely ridden itself of its nuclear enrichment plants uh and technology. Um
8:40
many commentators have speculated that it really wasn't about uh nuclear uh its nuclear potential
8:47
nuclear capability. It really was uh the American and and to a larger degree the Israelis who are
8:54
hellbent on uh on conducting this particular war to degrade uh the Iranian state and possibly
9:01
to degrade the coherency of the of of Iran as a sovereign state. No, that that element of regime
9:08
change has come in late December, early January when we've seen these mass protests in Iran. Uh obviously possibly tens of thousands of people were killed, slaughtered by the regime. Uh which
9:19
you know we you know you have to call out as well. Um and so it's you know we're not saying it's a
9:24
legitimate state, a legitimate regime. What they did was legitimate. Not at all. Um but you can't
9:29
just go in and undermine the sovereignty of a state and just get rid of the regime because you don't like them. And I do think that this was a pretext. I don't think anyone in Washington in
9:38
the Trump administration has a genuine concern for the people of Iran. Uh, in the same way I don't think the Israelis have any sincere concern for the Iranian people. They couldn't
9:47
care less. But it serves their overall agenda of trying to degrade trying to degrade regimes
9:53
and creating weak countries, weak states in the region. And so that was part of that agenda. Um,
10:00
now Trump has used the regime change narrative uh in his speech, but he's gone all over the place.
10:06
I mean then we had different officials in the administration saying different things. Today, Hacksth was saying, "No, it's not regime change. We're trying to degrade." Um, then we have leaks
10:16
from the US intelligence and the Pentagon saying, "It's unlikely that we can achieve regime change
10:21
by air power and remote standoff weaponry." Um, so a lot of different messaging messages coming out
10:27
uh from Washington. And then you have Netanyahu who says, "No, regime change. It's just around the corner because people are mobilizing. All we have to do now is basically we kick in the door
10:35
and the regime will collapse." Um, we haven't seen that so far. I do I personally doubt this is that
10:41
this will be possible without boots on the ground. Right. Okay. Because how much do you believe that the Iranians do want a offramp here? Um the Omanis have said that the Iranians are willing to talk
Are Iran Achieving their Goals
10:53
even at this late stage. I mean do you believe that Iran is achieving what it wanted to achieve
11:00
in this response to uh the Israeli American aggression? uh or do you feel that Iran is in
11:07
a in a fairly weak state at the moment? It's a complex question. I I don't think the end state
11:13
of this current conflict will be dictated by war. I think it will be negotiated deal of sorts. Yeah,
11:21
I do believe the regime will survive. It might be still called the Islamic Republic, but it's probably going to be far less Islamic and far less of a republic. It's probably going
11:31
to be more of a military dictatorship run by the IRGC without a theocratic sort of um figure hat as we had with the Supreme Leader. Um but it will probably survive
11:42
um even in a weaker degraded state and then you will have to strike a deal with that new regime.
11:48
And Trump said, "Oh, that's what I'm going to do. I'm going to kill these people because I don't like them. They're all baddies. And then I'm going to strike a deal with whoever is left and then we
11:56
can we can just return to business as usual." And it's quite clear it's now the second time around
12:01
where the Iranians have come to the negotiation table obviously June 2025 and now again and each
12:07
single time the Israelis and this time with the support of the Americans have really literally uh you know bombed the the the mediation team uh and killed a lot of the senior leaders. There's
12:16
no way that Iran will just come back to the negotiation table under pressure under duress and say okay hands up high we're surrendering we take your dictate. I think it's quite clear that the
12:26
Iranians will fight it out. They're also showing now that they're, you know, they've gone, if you look at Iran since the 7th of October, they were they were really defined by strategic paralysis,
12:36
right? There wasn't a lot going on on the on the ground. They were hesitant to get involved, but they needed to get involved. It was mostly rhetoric. Then they they said, "Okay,
12:43
Hezbollah is going to get involved." But Hzbollah didn't really do anything. And when they did, it was half-hearted. And Israel was on the offensive. they were really living that cult of the offensive
12:52
going out and and you know like a bull in a china shop going out and just going and and dictating
12:57
the terms on the ground. So escalation dominance since the 7th of October was in the hands of the
13:03
Israelis and and Iran was always responding to it. I think what they've done now is they've said from
13:09
the beginning the Iranian regime said look there will be an aim of decapitation. We can talk about whether decapitation works. I I don't think it works in a network state like Iran. And it's a
13:19
state that has always been built around a network defense or mosaic defense where defense is being
13:24
delegated to the local level. So in this kind of state, the Iranians have said, "Okay, we're going
13:29
to be attacked. We are giving a target list to our local commanders um to our missile commanders,
13:35
drone commanders and they will basically run through that target list across the GCC uh
13:41
even if they have no contact with the command and control system at at at the core of the Islamic
13:47
Republic. And this is basically what we're seeing happening now. We saw this happening immediately
13:52
after Iran Israel and the United States attacked. The Iranians immediately went on the offensive,
13:58
dictating terms, striking wave after wave GCC, different GCC countries. Initially,
14:03
it was targeting, they were saying military installations, US military installations. But obviously, the target list has now widened to such an extent that they're hitting civilian
14:12
infrastructure, ports, logistics infrastructure, en energy infrastructure, uh, structures, hotels,
14:18
and and and basically civilians, uh, at large. And this was a predefined list that you think that local nodes had prior to this conflict beginning plus a lot and this is again got
14:29
loads of fog of war at the moment right we're 72 hours into this war intelligence the intelligence
14:35
picture is very um messy and blurry but there are some reports that suggest that some of the
14:40
strikes on on onto eastern Saudi didn't actually come from Iran they might have come from proxies
14:46
within Iraq so obviously the Iranians have also given authority to the Hajel Shabi in Iraq to take
14:52
action. They've given authority to Hezbollah to strike and they started getting engaged yesterday. There is an allegation that it was actually Hezbollah missiles that struck the RAF,
15:01
the UK base in Cyprus. Um not confirmed, but what it shows is here you've got a network state like
15:08
Iran that immediately goes and delegates even as the core is being degraded and killed. And that's
15:14
a very different tactic to what you would see from an authoritarian leadership. authoritarian leadership which is extremely hierarchical. You take the the the head off and everything else
15:22
will collapse. Um what we see here is Iran is organized more like an insurgency state. It's
15:27
like an insurgency group. You can't decapitate it. They they have an inbuilt resilience and that will
15:34
mean they will fight and they they're in it for the long game. And so if you ask me whether Iran
15:39
is now on the defensive and whether they've been weakened, they've certainly been weakened. They've certainly been degraded. But their capability to inflict damage and pain on the Gulf States,
15:48
but also on Israel um and on the Americans um has not been diminished, at least as of now. I mean,
15:55
it's claimed that Iran has 2,000 long range and and short range ballistic missiles, and it's got
16:01
a range of pretty impressive drone drones that it can use to to to uh quite severe effect as we saw
16:08
with the attack on the Doha LNG uh plants. Um uh do you feel that uh Iran has longevity there
Iran and US Military - Discussions on Longevity
16:18
when it comes to its military advantage? It can actually keep this going uh for many weeks if not
16:24
months. Well, months is you know I don't think wars today in the way they're being fought are certainly the US government doesn't have the the breadth uh the logistical sort of supply
16:35
the supply chain that they need. They don't have the political will. I think the American public and lawmakers and Congress will not allow Trump to go month and month in this war. That's definitely
16:45
not we're not they're not there is no permissible environment permissive environment for Trump to go
16:50
for an Iraq 2.0 and the Iranians know that they the Iranians know that the this is an air power
16:57
remote weaponry-ledd operation with no boots on the ground. um that in itself has limitations of
17:03
what you can achieve and you already the Americans making it clear from the beginning is like yeah we kind of want a regime change but we don't want to put boots on the ground and we kind of want
17:10
to go in and out quickly degrade a little bit and and then we can declare victory that's not
17:16
how warfare works and certainly the Iranians have been into this in this insurgency mode since 1979
17:21
they've been preparing for this they've been preparing certainly since June last year for a return to war and hence we've seen you know while in in June 25 we saw paralysis in the early hours,
17:33
the first 24 hours in Iran. We didn't see any of that paralysis in the first hours uh on Saturday. Uh and which shows that the Mosaic Defense is is up and running. Their supply chain
17:43
of missiles obviously will deplete over time and hence they are carefully sending missiles.
17:48
They're not sending everything at once. It's a little bit here and there because to kind of keep the Americans and the Gulfies in particular off balance is just shoot one wave of a few drones
17:57
and a few missiles here and there every couple of hours to keep them going. The problem that most people don't understand is if at the moment up until now the Gulfies have used TH and Patriot
18:08
air defense systems which have very very expensive intercepting missiles. They cost millions. because
18:14
one and a half $3 million a p a a pop and they're shooting down drones that are built very cheaply.
18:20
These these shahid drones they have a basically they sound like a lawn mower if you hear them coming like a a small I don't know if it's a diesel engine or something like that. Um very
18:29
cheap to to produce fairly easy to intercept but every time you need to send a missile up
18:35
you're wasting a million and a half dollars. And you're thinking okay that's fine because they're they're very rich countries the Gulf States. The problem isn't just the financial side of things,
18:42
but that we are in an immense shortage at the moment of munitions. Anyway, we've been fighting a war indirectly through Ukraine with Russia, and that has depleted
18:52
our supply chains and our stock piles, uh, American stockpiles, NATO stockpiles. And so,
18:57
there isn't just enough on the market to just buy more missiles. And so, that is over time is going
19:03
to put pressure on the air defense systems. And we're seeing some of that happening already. So, Iran keep can keep this going for quite some time. and they they have a long breath and if America
19:12
is unable to completely destroy the the missile launch capability or the drone launch capability
19:18
then we'll probably see this going I mean for for weeks Iran can keep this going for weeks and so we're now seeing that the Gulf States are moving into a more offensive posture instead of just
19:27
saying we're relying on our air defense systems they're now delegating a lot of it to fighter jets attacking incoming projectiles much earlier before they even hit or come close to their urban
19:37
centers but that is also sort temporary slope because you're actually dragg you're running the risk of getting dragged into direct attacks onto Iranian soil even if you don't penetrate Iranian
19:48
airspace and so this is kind of what Israel wants to achieve right Israel wants to achieve a situation where the Gulf states are being sucked into this war and are being forced to support what
19:58
is essentially an Israeli engineered offensive operation against Iran I want to come back to the
20:04
Arab states and and the strategy of or the tactic of attacking the Arab states in a in a second. But
20:10
I just want to come back to an earlier point you made about the Trump administration. It does seem like there is a split within the administration. JD Vance is talking about very limited operation.
Coherency in Trumps Administration
20:20
Uh Donald Trump spoke of regime change which seems like a far more longerterm prospect although today
20:27
he was moving that it it's not going to be as as long and as uh as deliberate as uh he made
20:35
out at the very beginning. uh Pete Hexf was was discussing, you know, his line was was completely
20:40
different. So there's an incoherency there. I mean, do you really believe that the American administration with all of its capacity and capability uh really just does not have uh that
20:51
level of um coherency when it comes to formulating strategy in under this administration? Absolutely
20:59
right. The problem isn't the US um capacity to do it. It's not the US administration. It's not the
21:06
civil service. It's not the military. Obviously, vastly well equipped. The problem is a very small
21:11
group of people on the very top, most of them reality TV stars or people like Hacksath who used
21:18
to be an anchor for Fox News who are not only not trained in this sort of state craft and warfare.
21:25
Yeah. But they are overly confident in their in their abilities. It's like having in the UK,
21:31
you know, having people from Love Island run our administration. It wouldn't work. It's very
21:36
entertaining to watch, but it's it's certainly not I haven't watched it, I'm afraid. Neither have I, but it's entertaining. I think it would be entertaining to have these people run our
21:44
government. Um, but it would be a train crash. And particularly, we're talking about the lives of people, livelihoods of people in the region, millions of people. Um, there isn't an in-house
21:54
strategic capability within this administration. There's a lot of ideology and there is a lot of
21:59
um assumptions and grand strategic narratives but very little in terms of translating that
22:04
into feasible, attainable, acceptable, sustainable um outcomes. Right? This is what strategy is all
22:11
about. Strategy is about how you use everything at your disposal, all the means available to generate power and influence. And Trump has got it right sometimes. I think Venezuela was a fairly
22:21
successful approach because it was easy in, easy out. uh and it it was a very hierarchical system
22:28
with very limited objectives. It was clear what these objectives were on Iran. The objectives are not you know clear also because it's not a Trump war. It's an Israeli war. It serves Israeli
22:40
uh interest. And I think the big problem that Trump faces now is he's fighting an Israeli first
22:45
war with an America first administration. So you have a a massive gap um and and I think a growing
22:53
um you know gap as well between the mega crowd the America make America great again America first crowd and the new conservatives who are still in the administ partially in the
23:02
administration administration like Marco Rubio um or in lawmakers such as Lindsey Graeme for example
23:08
who longstanding pro-Israel neoonservatives who basically swallow any pill that the Israelis
23:14
give them and they're still there as well and they certainly won this one. This argument was won by the neoonservatives. And the problem for Trump now is that he's getting sucked into a a
23:25
regime change war and he could become a regime change president, which is something he always
23:30
campaigned on. He was criticizing the Clintons. He was criticizing Obama. He was criticizing Biden.
23:36
And he his ticket was all about I'm the peace president. If you go back to tweets from JD Vents, I think from 2024, he says, you know, we you know, there's no more regime change.
23:44
We're learning from Iraq. and now they're feeling like, "Oh my god, we're getting dragged into this prolonged conflict." The the other problem is if they're now going to stop because they're saying,
23:53
"We cannot achieve this very quickly." You end up in a situation where um where you leave things
24:01
half finished and that would be the worst of all worlds. I mean, the worst case nightmare for the
24:06
Gulf States is a scenario where the Americans lose interest. They realize they can't achieve more degradation. They withdraw. they seek an offram to sign some sort of deal um but then
24:15
they leave the regime weakened and that could then leave lead to maybe mass protest that the regime
24:21
cannot control uh and then it could lead to some long-term civil war. Mind you Syria is a similar
24:26
case if you look at the Syrian case um it kind of was left in a limbo. Initially the Gulf states,
24:32
Qatar, Saudi um were supporting that position and then gradually they were forced to withdraw that
24:38
support but then you kind of left an opposition there that was too strong uh to fail and to be
24:46
annihilated but too weak to actually gain ground and and top of the regime and that led to you know
24:51
what 13 years of of civil war or longer. So, uh, we don't want to get to that state. And that's
24:57
kind of the nightmare scenario. And Trump does not do long-term strategy. It's about it's all
25:03
about ratings. It's about what you can sell to the public. And he's got a midterm election coming up. So, that's going to be a lot of pressure on him to sell this to the American public. Recently,
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27:12
Well, until now we've we've we've spoken about the Iranian network state and its ability to
Intelligence from Israel - Agility of Iran
27:19
uh to be agile when it comes to uh this attack, this unprecedented and illegal attack on its territory. Uh however, um what has surprised me is just how much
27:29
intelligence the Israelis have had about or have about um Iranian officials. I mean the
27:36
the the assassination murder really of of the Supreme Leader Ali Hame is an example of that,
27:42
right? Um has that surprised you as to how much uh the Israelis and the Americans have really
27:48
they've got a granular understanding of of the the real time placement of many of these officials. It
27:56
surprised me this time around. It didn't surprise me in June uh because obviously for years the the Israelis have put massive millions and millions of dollars into acquiring and building networks,
28:06
orchestrating them, finding uh you know building sleeper cells and all that sort of stuff in in Iran, informance networks. But after the war in June, a lot of these people obviously were
28:17
discovered. Um the cover was blown. There was massive repression by the regime against these sort of networks. And I thought they probably would have been able to find most of the moles.
28:26
uh it's now clear that this is not the case. But it also shows how much grievance there is within
28:32
Iran. How much the people are fed up and that's not just you know seculars or lefties or you know
28:38
it's across the spectrum of society of people saying this regime needs to go because it's not delivering for us anymore. It's not you know it's it's it's people who used to cheer for the
28:46
regime who no longer do so. It's middle class, lower class, upper class um you know it's from
28:51
it's rural areas, urban areas. It's really a broad spectrum. And if we say that, you know, if you're being very generous, I'd say probably only 30% of the population who still somewhat stand behind
29:00
that regime. And that has, you know, if you're now Israel, if you're America or any other state, it gives you 70% of people are deeply agrieved. Then we've seen the mass slaughter of people,
29:09
mostly young people in in January by the regime over a few days actually, you know, up to 30,000,
29:14
maybe even more than 30,000 people were killed. You know, you see the images of in the morgs where people are piling up um and dead bodies. What do you think that does to to a society? Everyone
29:24
knows someone who was killed by the regime. So if someone now comes around and says, "Do you want to help us get rid of the regime?" They will probably find people to do it, including people within the
29:32
IRGC, including people within the bar siege, which is the kind of uh you know, the the the repressive
29:38
part of the RGC, the the kind of plain clo who organized on the on the on the local level. Um
29:44
but then there is another aspect as well. It's a it's a it's a multithnic state, Iran. Um there are
29:50
grievances within certain secessionist groups in Iran. There are grievances of Afghan for Afghans
29:55
who live there as secondass citizens who've been mistreated, maltreated, who don't have a status in
30:01
the country who, you know, for $100 would do any kind of job. And what you need in a network is
30:06
just some guy who stands somewhere says, "Okay, target X, target Y is leaving the house today."
30:12
um and uh you know reporting that back and that gives you and you have hundreds of these kind
30:18
of people and that gives you a full intelligence picture. Then you've got people on the inside as well who you who you bribed and and won over. Um so it's not too difficult to do. And then there's
30:27
obviously all the cyber technology that they have to penetrate phones and track people. Um,
30:32
and so it shouldn't be surprising, but it's still surprising how precise they were and how
30:38
quickly they were able to eliminate the targets on Saturday. And um, the Israeli objectives and
Israeli Objectives - US Objectives
30:45
the Israelis seem to have a different objective that of the Trump administration. What do you
30:50
understand to be Netanyahu's aims when it comes to this operation with Iran? Well, I mean, it's
30:57
it's for him it's Israel first. Obviously, it's his it's, you know, it's about Israeli national security interest. And primarily what Israel wants to achieve is um make incapacitating Iran
31:08
um incapacitating Iran to no longer be able to build and use ballistic missiles. It's making
31:16
sure that they can no longer financially support the axis of resistance, especially
31:21
um and then leaving it a you know, to achieve that Israel doesn't really need much. It doesn't need a
31:27
new regime. It doesn't need a democratic regime. It doesn't need Bahawi coming in and creating a constitutional monarchy. They don't care about this. Instability in Iran is great for Israel. Um,
31:37
an incapacitated civil, you know, regime consumed by domestic civil war would be great because, you
31:44
know, as long as there's no missile program, as long as the air defense systems are all destroyed, Israel can come in when as it pleases with impunity to strike targets as they will,
31:53
as they do, for example, Lebanon, right? They come in, they eliminate a target and go back no harm to to to Israeli fighter planes. That's what they want to achieve. And that doesn't, you know,
32:04
that can be a halfbaked operation. That can be a one that leads to actual regime change. But
32:10
why would you? Because regime change costs money. And after all, I think we shouldn't stop kidding ourselves that the vast majority of Iranians who want the regime gone and want gone do they don't
32:22
want to become a porn in an Israeli sort of um you know in Israeled regional order. That's a complete
32:29
misperception. So can we turn to the tactic of um bombing Arab neighboring Arab states? Of course,
32:37
the idea initially was to uh target American bases in these countries in Dha, in Qatar, in Bahrain,
32:45
uh in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, in UAE of course and elsewhere. uh but that has as you've as you've
32:54
described that has broadened to civilian targets or civilian infrastructure and in the case of the
33:00
UAE even even hotels have been hit and and you know these are civilian targets and and actually
33:05
people have been killed you who are who are civilians um how do you assess that tactic like
33:11
is it a because of course commentators have argued that it's to put pressure on these Arab states
33:18
uh who do not uh this level of intrusion upon their territory and in turn these Arab states are
33:25
going to lobby the Americans to make this a short conflict. Do you buy that logic? Obviously, it's a
33:31
very flawed logic, but it's a logic. I I do think that's the logic behind it. I think it's about compelling the Gulf States, putting pressure, you know, unsurmountable pressure, pressure they can't
33:41
sustain to make them compel or pressure Trump to stop this war. Um and that has been happening. I
33:49
mean the Emiratis, the Saudis, the countries, all of the Gulf States have made very clear to the Americans over the last 72 hours that this is an unsustainable situation. America can't really
33:57
help them um because they already preoccupied with that very misconstrued operation to change
34:03
the regime and degrade capabilities, but they don't also have the capacity to then also defend
34:08
effectively defend the Gulf States. So to to for the most part, Gulf States are left to their own devices. Um and hence why we now have the UK and France and even Germany saying that they're coming
34:18
to the aid and rescue of the GCC states. Um but the the Iranian regimes I think what is mostly
34:26
flawed about this logic is that you're actually putting you're inflicting so much pain on the Gulf States because you're now striking the center of gravity essentially of their business model.
34:36
Right? They are all rentier economies. uh in Kata for example Russla fun in the north is you know
34:42
is is the biggest LG plant in the world um it supplies a lot of the gas for the UK as well I
34:49
think above 8 to 10% uh of of what we import comes from that gas field in the UK some people say 40%
34:56
of of of households use their gas from that g from that gas field so this is is immensely significant
35:03
uh for global energy markets um obviously Saudi Arabia the biggest oil producer in the Well, we've seen also targeting of their infrastructure today. Um, now we see the cutery infrastructure
35:13
has gone offline today. So, we have no LG coming onto the market. We also have the straight of HMU not closed but effectively closed because then these tankers even if you are able to fill
35:23
them up, they can't really go out uh through the straight of Hamus to actually ship that ship that
35:28
um hydrocarbon or energy elsewhere. Um and so you're hurting the very, you know, the very
35:34
um center of gravity of what keeps these countries alive and afloat. And yes, they do have a lot of
35:40
reserves, but this is painful. This is shocking for the Gulf States. This is unprecedented even
35:46
for Kuwait. I mean, Kuwait obviously sustained the invasion in 1990 by Iraq. This is certainly a
35:51
national trauma for Kuwait, but none of the other Gulf states have sustained similar traumas. So that is going to be a national trauma. I think we are now talking about effectively the third
36:00
Gulf War and it's far more devastating for the GCC states than any anything else they've seen
36:06
in their relatively young history. Um and also it is because you know that we've seen strikes on uh at least attempted strikes on on water uh desalination plans another very very important
36:17
backbone critical national infrastructure in Qatar we've seen strikes on Dubai airport Kuwait city airport we've seen strikes on Doha airport that were intercepted I mean this is critical
36:27
infrastructure for these Gulf states because mind you these Gulf states what do they want to achieve they want to be hubs in these global networks right flow in in commodity flows capital financial
36:37
flows data flows is PE people flows. I mean, if you look at their their airlines, they're key hubs
36:42
in in the global network. And if you they need stability and connectivity and what Iran is now
36:47
effectively doing is degrading that connectivity and undermining their HAP status and undermining
36:53
that stability and that really shakes uh the stability of these countries to their core. Uh
36:59
and that is something that I don't think certainly Qatar didn't expect considering how important Qatar has been as a mediator for the Iranians. Um and then after all I mean most I think what I find
37:09
most surprising is that they also struck Oman uh you know to Salala and also Dumport critical
37:15
infrastructure for them after all Oman has done all the you know sort of flak that Oman has gotten
37:21
from the US and others because of their mediation role and their you know alleged proximity to the
37:27
lash seems like they're lashing out. Oh no I think it's a spray and prey sort of approach right? It's like shooting in all directions. Um, and you know, we always talk about, I said before, Israel was
37:37
acting like a bull in the China shop. I think that's Iran is acting the same way. And so what you end up with if you're in the GCC is you're kind of stuck between these two radical elements.
37:47
One theocracy in in Iran and then that this ethnationalistic state with theratic tendencies in
37:54
Israel. Both of them uh obviously doing whatever it takes to survive and having quite an arsenal
37:59
to do that. And both of them not really interested or at least not framing stability in the same way that the Gulf states do. I mean, I heard you say uh on a Middle East conversation, I think it was
38:10
uh very recently, it was yesterday possibly uh that prior to this conflict um the Arab states
38:18
saw Israel as a greater threat. Maybe barring the UAE, but most of the Arab states saw Israel as a
Credentials of Washing Post
38:24
greater threat than the Iranians. But of course, we've heard Washington Post this morning or
38:29
yesterday. Uh they revealed or at least suggested that the Saudis together with Israel were lobbying
38:36
heavily in the week prior to Saturday prior to these attacks and and the Saudis wanted uh a a
38:44
war with Iran. I mean, how credible do you think that story is? I absolutely I don't think that
38:49
story in the Washington Post is at all credible. If you speak to interlocators, if you speak to Saudis on the ground, officials, they're all denying it vehemently, publicly and privately. Um,
39:00
none of their actions since uh Saturday suggest that they have any interest in escalating this further. Quite the contrary, they've been trying to contain the Emiratis in the country, saying,
39:09
you know, we're helping you out, but let's not take any steps that will lead us down a path of escalation that we cannot return from. Um, so it makes absolutely no sense. And I I I I I think
39:20
what we need to bear in mind when it comes to the Washington Post is that they fire the entire Middle East team, right? I'm wondering if it's CHP that's actually writing most of their coverage. Um
39:28
and I'm wondering who in in Washington is still there to do a good journalism. This is certainly a report that most analysts don't find credible. I certainly don't find it credible. Um because
39:37
it just doesn't add up within with what we've heard and seen over the last couple of months. Um but in going back to your point about Iran or Israel, which one is the bigger threat? It was
39:47
always clear for the Gulf states that both of them are a threat. For most of them, it always said, you know, we have a problem with with Israel. Um, and Palestine was always something that
39:55
was in the back of the minds of most Golfies. And Iran was always the threat against which they were wargaming basically. And what happened now over the last year is that all of these worst fears
40:05
have come to fruition where, you know, Israel is striking with impunity, also striking the Gulf, you know, hitting Qatar directly, but you also have Iran hitting Qatar directly and now
40:15
hitting all the other Gulf states. And if you're sitting in Qatar for example, you've been hit by uh you know three rounds of wars with or three rounds of attacks in in in in a matter of eight
40:26
months although you trying to be the mediator and brokering uh deals between these different parties and those very parties then strike you. Um so it it is it really challenges their belief in and
40:37
their faith in the international rules-based order as well as intermediation and and dialogue which
40:43
is what most of the Gulf states have believed in. I I think for the UAE and and Bahrain they've
40:49
always had a very different approach to for for domestic reasons. Obviously the the Emirati always had an issue with the with Iran because they seized these islands uh during independence
40:59
during the Emirati independence never given them back. Um the Bahrainis have a problem with their Shia majority on the ground of which you know many of them affiliate with Iran. But even then after
41:10
the attack on Qatar um by Israel in September 25 it you know a lot of goofies were saying not only
41:17
are we siding with Qatar on this but actually now was quite clear that Israel is the most disruptive
US Fighter Jets Downed in Kuwait - Analysis
41:23
destructive force in this region because obviously Iran has been degraded and true Iran has been
41:28
degraded but obviously they still show that they have that immense capability to pay to to hurt and inflict pain and I think the the the events of the last 70 or two hours will basically
41:39
bring all these terrible traumas and fears back of saying actually Iran is the worst of our
41:45
enemies or at least on par with Israel, right? Um I mean indulge my slightly social media conspiracy
41:52
theorist. Uh today there was the downing of three uh fighter jets in Kuwait, American fighter jets,
42:00
and it was blamed on friendly fire. Um I mean how credible is is is that? Again, I I can only
42:08
speculate at this point because we don't have any uh solid knowledge. But if you think first
42:14
of all these Gulf States, their air defenses have been trained on their American products. They've
42:20
been trained by American trainers and they've been trained with and alongside American fighter jets.
42:26
Um you would think that obviously mistakes aren't being made, but you're not downing three of them.
42:32
Um, also these are three American planes and they're being downed fairly close to the border
42:37
between uh Kuwait and and Iran. So, it could have been coming from really from both sides. I don't
42:44
think I mean there I'm not I'm not sure if it's a failsafe switch on these air defense systems but
42:49
effectively for them to overwrite all their you know all the sort of um sort of steps that are
42:57
that are in in the way that you have to go through in order to press fire and take down a jet and
43:02
then mistaken that jet for an Iranian one when the Iranians actually only uh this afternoon started
43:08
using fighter jets offensively. I mean, up until now, the Iranians have used ballistic missiles and drones. To think that this was an Iranian one, and they probably would have come from a different
43:16
direction, I don't know. Uh, I have no evidence for that. But it's it it sounds suspicious. And
43:21
equally, I think the Trump administration has a tendency to tell halftruth or misinformation
43:27
or disinformation in order to cover up their own mess. It because it's not a good look. And then you have these social media posts from Kuwaitis who are picking up those those parachuted
43:37
um um pilots in the desert today. I mean that is kind of, you know, it's it has an an aftertaste.
43:44
Let's put it that way. If you were American, it doesn't look like you're the greatest fighting force in the world. Yeah, it's a Somali 1994 Somalia syndrome. Um also um uh Aramco was was hit
43:58
in Saudi Arabia and uh the Iranians or at least Iranian journalists have have said that this it
44:04
was a force flag operation. It was probably done by the Israelis. I know we're in the fog of war, but can you speculate like is there an in is there a benefit for the Iranians to attack
44:14
Saudi oil installations? Well, is there a benefit in attacking any of the civilian infrastructure?
44:21
um you know the the attacks on I mean we've seen some of the attacks and they've been verified on
44:26
Qatar on Bahrain on the UAE on Audabi Dubai where that you cannot rationally explain um there is
44:33
obviously you know there's always this idea of Kuibon who who benefits from that um hitting the
44:38
oil infrastructure in Saudi is clearly crossing a red line but I don't think there are any red lines anymore for the Iranian regime they are now in full survival mode it's existential it
44:47
is existential and so it it fits with the pattern of their behavior. Although the Saudis are now
44:52
saying this was actually not a projectile directly hitting it. It was a an intercepted projectile
44:57
that fell onto onto their infrastructure. We don't know. Um point being is and this is
45:03
another important point where some Iranians were saying, "Oh, the problem isn't the the you know, the problem isn't the drone and our firing the drones. The problem is that they're buildings
45:11
in the way uh of the targets that we're actually trying to hit. We we didn't intend to hit them."
45:16
The problem is if you if you operate such crappy sort of technology that the Iranians are operating
45:22
in densely populated civilian areas um then this in itself is is highly irresponsible and is a war
45:30
crime uh as as as blunt as that. And so that that has to be called out and there is no excuse for
45:35
the Iranians. But we should go back to the point that I tried to make earlier about the network state. The fact is and this is very uncommon. Um, so if you think about most of the militaries are
45:46
pyramids, they're hierarchies, right? Top heavy and then they go they come basically come down. Uh, it's it's it's it's a clear stratification. Um, you take basically the top down out and the
45:57
bottom doesn't know what to do anymore. That's kind of the socialist way. And most Arab militaries are still, you know, constructed as a socialist sort of hierarchy. The Iranians
46:07
are the polar opposite. the hat truckies, you know, horizontally or uh horizontally organized
46:13
revolving around the hub of the IGC leadership of supreme leader but delegate most of the
46:18
stuff is being delegated out. It's delegated to non-state actors like in the axis of resistance or delegated to local organizations boss siege or IGC um offshoots who operate the missiles
46:29
and the drones and they're doing it without any central command. What we have to realize now is
46:34
that we are very likely in a situation where a lot of the local activity on the tactical level, basically people who shoot the missiles and and the drones are no longer necessarily in contact
46:44
with the with with the core of the leadership. Um it's very similar to what we've seen in happening
46:51
in Lebanon with Hezbollah in 2024. They've taken out the strategic leadership in Nasella, but then
46:57
the local cells were still operating because they operated independently. The danger of this is they
47:03
now basically maneuver quite crappy um technology but still very painful, hurtful and devastating
47:10
technology when they hit a target. Um and they might just fire even if the Iranian foreign
47:16
minister goes on TV and says, "No, we we didn't do it and we didn't want to do it. We don't intend to strike the energy infrastructure, but he's not in control." And you know, the government was always
47:25
somewhat a parallel infrastructure to the IRGC. I mean, they don't report it to that government. Um
47:30
but I think there is a very serious um possibility that this is now a network state uh that is
47:38
basically going into mosaic defense which is kind of completely unhinged and very difficult to
47:44
control and reign in. Uh can I pivot to China? Um China of course has uh lost out um first in access
47:54
to Venezuelan oil and now access to Iranian oil. I think China imported probably most of Iran's crude
48:01
oil after the sanctions regime came into place by the Trump administration and even prior to that. U so China um if I'm not mistaken both um Venezuela and and Iran contributed to something
Crude Oil - Venezuela, Iran and China
48:13
like 17% uh last year of China's crude oil uh mix. Um I know we don't it's hard to ascribe sort of
48:23
strategic thinking to this administration but do you believe that at least one of the evidently
48:29
uh one of the aims of this administration is to is is to erode China's energy supply uh as
48:37
part of its sort of strategic competition with this mega state. Yeah. No, absolutely. I I think
48:43
this is it's not necessarily just China's energy supplies. China was hit today more than it was hit by you know by events on Saturday right uh 25% of their LG imports come from the Qatar now Qatar
48:56
stops shipping LG gas that will have immediate impact on on energy security in China and its
49:02
economy that's devastating and China has a massive interest in a making sure that the state of Hamus
49:07
stays open uh and b that um people keep on pumping oil and gas and that then being delivered out
49:13
um and so they have they're they're very badly hit by events today. Um there is a bigger theme
49:20
in there if you speak to people in the sort of remitt of the Trump administration who have that
49:26
idea that the number one concern for them really is from a from a geo economic point of view is
49:32
that the stability of the petro dollar. So most of the oil business is cleared in US dollars,
49:38
right? And that makes the dollar such a potent currency. Venezuela and obviously Iran do not
49:44
clear their transactions in dollars. They try not to. Uh and there's a bigger now bigger push by a
49:51
lot of countries in the global south and the east to say let's use yuan or use a different currency to clear these transactions that massively weakens and threatens the hegemony of the petro dollar.
50:01
Uh, and I think that that was certainly part of the consideration of of why the the the Americans
50:07
went into Venezuela and that certainly could be another side uh objective of of of going
50:13
after the Iranian regime because clearly Iran is a resistance insurgency state that doesn't want to
50:19
comply with a western centric US-centric uh global international or economic order and have had deal
50:26
dealings with the Chinese and the Russians. But that's economics and it's quite clear now for the Chinese, for the Russians, this is about economics. They don't care about the Islamic
50:34
Republic. They don't care about the regime. They've done absolutely nothing to support them uh in and and and in stabilizing them because they also themselves are thinking, okay, they
50:42
are basically an energy supplier. The Russians for the Russians, the Iranians are a competitor. So I think Russia in the short term is a clear benefactor of current the current situation
50:50
disruption because the Chinese need to get their energy elsewhere. they're likely going to go to Russia if there are any spare capacities available because they can't go uh to Iran. So Russia is a
51:00
key benefactor of this this war right now. Um and that's kind of from a UK perspective problematic
51:06
because we're trying to weaken Russia. Clearly the Trump administration doesn't really care. um they care about China and as I said I think China is now being implicated in the current
51:17
pressure uh over gas and closing the straight of Hermuz but haven't done absolutely nothing
51:22
yet effectively to change the situation despite despite a couple of phone calls and why do you think that is I mean why has China shown so much restraint firstly over Venezuela and now it seems
Why has China shown Restraint?
51:32
like over Iran because I think China wants to have a deal with the United States and they're not trying to antagonize Washington further than they have to really and also So what you know there's
51:41
Napoleon that once said if your enemy is making a mistake don't don't stop them don't interfere and
51:46
I mean America is getting into one quire after the other. I would say the greatest um mistake that
51:53
the United States have ever made is the war in Iraq in 2003. I think nothing has diminished and
51:59
destroyed US hijgemony and US unilateralism in the world than this war and the war in Afghanistan.
52:06
Uh it has bankrupted the state. It has polarized the public. It has destroyed political stability.
52:13
All the problems that we all the problems that we see in America today can be traced back to events
52:19
in Iraq in 2003. I think it was the single most devastating foreign policy decision in US history.
52:25
And now we're seeing a Trump administration that was going to restrain itself and focus on the Western Hemisphere and delegating out uh America first getting sucked back into the Middle
52:35
East because mostly due to Israel and so that is something that the Chinese must love because
52:42
what's greater than not only are you consuming bandwidth because a lot of the carrier strike
52:47
capability had to be pulled away from the Pacific to be pulled away from other areas into into this
52:53
part of the world. a lot of capacity is now being tied down and China can go on doing what it wants
52:58
to do and you know it's doing so in in in the developing world in Africa and South America while
53:03
the United States are nowhere to be seen because their capacity is quite limited and they're so
53:09
focused on this issue now and that might occupy them for quite some some time um so if I was China
53:15
I would just sit and wait because let's see what what other mistakes Trump can make. Great. Um,
53:20
prior to this conflict, there was a discussion. I mean, it was Netanyahu who talked about the Sunni access, you know, this development of uh a uh a network of of states that are now uh far more
53:32
skeptical of of Israel if not anti-Israel uh and uh far more in in tune with sort of the forces of
53:40
integration within the region. And you know these aren't just Arab states ofQatar and and of course Saudi Arabia was a new entrant to this so-called Sunni Access but also you you've got Pakistan and
The Sunni Axis Credibility
53:52
Malaysia and Turkey that were mooted as part of this sort of tapestry of states that are that are
53:58
coming together and converging uh uh you know as maybe Iranian power declines in the region or at
54:05
least Iranian power seemed like it was declining in the region and there is a greater skepticism uh
54:12
if not if not worse towards Israel and its sort of voracious ambitions in in the in the region. Um I
54:20
mean how credible do you think that Sunni access is in in reality? The big question today was and
54:27
someone from Pakistan was asking me journalist was asking me what do you think with this deal in place now Saudi is being around they have that defense corporation agreement with Pakistan and
54:36
Saudi is clearly under attack. Does this now mean that the the Pakistanis have to deliver pilots and
54:42
aircraft to fight Iran? Certainly not something Pakistan wants to do and clearly not doing. Um
54:47
so is it really an axis? Um is it an alliance? I don't see it. There's certainly an alignment uh
54:54
in terms of it's negative. It's ne it's a negative integration more than a positive integration. It's
54:59
what they want ra what they don't want rather than what they want. uh and they're all opposed to an Israeli centric order that is being you know beefed up with the support of the UAE for example
55:11
or of Abu Dhabi. That's something that they do oppose. Uh Iran, India is also part of this under
55:17
Modi you know having a very close relationship intellectually as well with uh with Tel Aviv and
55:23
also with Abu Dhabi. Um but then there is this counter axis let's call it that. Um but it's
55:29
not an alliance uh that that seems to be pushing back against it. But then if it comes to what they
55:34
actually want, how they're going to organize it, they're wildly different countries with wildly different ambitions. And I think they have overall probably some ideological alignment also
55:44
in terms of Islam obviously. Um and and but then again when it comes to implementation and doing
55:50
things together, I haven't seen any of this yet. I haven't seen anything tangible where I'm seeing, you know, the question can be asked now about, you know, Iran attacking uh Qatar, for example.
55:59
there is a defense cooperation agreement between Turkey and Kasa. Didn't see the Turks coming to their rescue. Um and so you know we have to be very careful if if push comes to to shove. I mean
56:11
how much are the Turks, the Pakistanis, the outer the non-Arab entities Malaysia actually doing in
56:17
supporting their their Gulf neighbors or or Gulf partners as it were? I don't think they're doing very much. And so Netanyao obviously I think it's a scarecrow that Netanyahu has to create
56:27
to kind of build that narrative of you know he always needs to it's always everything Israel does is it always needs the significant other the threat against which we need to mobilize and it's
56:36
something that not just Netanyahu you've seen Bennett and other using others using this domestically to to rally support but it's it's not really existent apart from paper. So,
56:46
as we close this interview, uh I just want to get your predictions on how you think this is going to pan out. Like what what do you think the next few days, the next few weeks looks like uh in this
56:56
sort of tense conflict really between Israel of America on the one hand and and the Iranians on
57:02
the other? Like how do you do you believe that? I' I've heard you say and you've said it on this podcast, but it it seems attritional now. It seems like, you know, it's it's about who's going to
57:11
blink first. Um the Iranian regime is far more uh far more resilient than maybe some give it credit
57:18
for. Um how do you see things going? No, it is a game about time and resilience and is as you say
57:25
is who blinks first. But it's it time is I think on Iran's side. Uh I do think the the amada that
57:33
Trump has um built is is kind of hamstrung. It doesn't have the strategic depth that it requires.
57:40
doesn't have the the operational freedom that other alliances had or other partnerships that
57:45
the US relied upon even in Iraq in 2003. The fact that so far as of today the US is not allowed to
57:52
use the airspace and air bases in the Gulf that might change although I don't think it will but it might change. Um but as of now they don't have that. So they need to rely on two area
58:01
strike groups and basically Israel to launch all these strikes into a vast massive country like
58:07
Iran with 90 million people. um it is challenging without boots on the ground. So I don't think the
58:13
Americans can sustain this indefinitely. I would give it 10 days, maybe two weeks for the Americans to sustain it, after which they'll have issues in keeping the current operational tempo that they're
58:23
in at the moment. Um equally the the Israelis there isn't a tangible outcome of this. It's
58:30
not like regime change is not something you can just achieve like this. Especially regime change is not just about destroying something. It's about building something. and neither Israel nor America
58:38
has the capacity or the will to build anything in in Iran. So, we're basically left with a uh
58:44
with a vacuum potentially, but at the moment, the Islamic Republic still stands. Um, and I think it
58:50
will survive this and it will live on. Uh, what we need is an is an offramp. It will be a diplomatic
58:56
solution to this. It will be one where the the Americans realize they can't sustain it anymore. It will be pressure from the Gulf saying we can't sustain it anymore. um we we don't want to sustain
59:06
it anymore. Um but both sides have to come up with their own victory narrative. Victory is not about
59:13
something tangible. It's not what you can actually prove on paper. It's a narrative, right? And if if that narrative works for your constituency, then that's all that matters. So you the US Trump
59:23
has to build a narrative that works for his MAGA constituency of saying we were victorious. Uh you
59:29
know, we won and it was not it was costefficient. Uh the same is true for the Iranians. They have
59:35
to tell their own people that they've won, that they've achieved their objectives. And despite the fact that there was some destruction, they certainly gave the Americans a bloody nose or the
59:45
Gulf States. And at the moment because you know that escalation dominance doesn't lie just with
59:51
Israel and the US. The fact that the Gulf the Gulf states are so vulnerable to um to strikes from
59:58
Iran um means that Iran retains a degree of that dominance of that escalation dominance that makes
1:00:04
them look strong. That's something they can sell to their own constituency. They certainly are not looking defeated as of today. Uh and I don't think they will be. And so we need to engineer a a you
1:00:14
know ripeness as it were. You know if if there is ripeness in the conflict where both sides realize
1:00:20
actually fighting is too costly now we need an offramp and offramp is better than continuing this
1:00:25
attrition. Um that's when it will happen. We're not at this point yet and it requires mediators
1:00:30
like Qatar and Oman to you know put their full weight behind that effort despite the fact that they're being bombed and that's certainly true for Qatar. They have to now step up again trying to
1:00:39
build an offramp, trying to build relationships and a back channel while they're being targeted
1:00:44
and their critical national infrastructure by the Iranians. It's not an easy thing to do, but that's what is required to translate this into into an outcome. But I think war will have to run
1:00:54
its course for a couple of more days, possibly week or maybe two weeks. Uh Dr. Andreas, you said
US Airbases in Arab States
1:01:01
something really interesting there. I want to pick up on because um uh one of the justifications that
1:01:07
uh the Iranians use for targeting uh these Arab countries is that these Arab countries are used
1:01:14
as a base against uh against them as a base to to fire rockets and to to to logistics against
1:01:21
them. Your point there is which hasn't been given enough airtime I suspect on on mainstream media.
1:01:26
Your point there is that actually they don't at this moment these bases these army bases at these
1:01:33
US bases in the Arab states are off limits when it comes to this conflict with Iran. Is that right?
1:01:39
So we haven't seen some of them were hit um on the periphery certainly in Saudi but they are
1:01:46
not US bases they are sovereign local bases with American components and international components.
1:01:51
So alluded obviously being the biggest one in Qatar is an is a country base with an American component but there are also Brits other NATO countries operating from it. Um and so any
1:02:01
destruction on it is a destruction of country material and infrastructure. Same any strike
1:02:07
on Prince Fal air base in Saudi is a strike in the destruction of Saudi asset. The same for the
1:02:14
uh Kond de la which is the French uh navy base in Abu Dhabi is owned by the Emirati. It's sovereign
1:02:21
Emirati territory. But are those bases being used at this moment? No. Because and then that's the key point that all the Gulf states have made despite all the misinformation that allegedly
1:02:30
some Gulf states were lobbying for a war. They didn't. They lobbied for the opposite. They say we don't want this war. It's going to be destructive because everyone in the Gulf knew that a cornet
1:02:40
Iran would respond the way that they're responding right now. So really wanted to avoid this. And so hitting these bases has nothing to do with the war effort. This is about pressuring and inflicting
1:02:50
pain on Pulov partners who the last couple of years have been very very good to Iran. Uh and
1:02:56
obviously we've moved on from that because as I said we're now targeting civilian infrastructures and civilians. There is absolutely no legal justification to do this. And if you're rightly
1:03:06
calling out the Israelis for the atrocities and the genocide in Gaza and hitting uh civilians, you also need to call out the Iranians for hitting civilians in the Gulf. Dr. Andreas Creek,
1:03:15
I think this has been a fascinating interview. Thank you so much for your time today. Thank you for being on. Asalam alaikum. Now, you've reached the end of this show, and the fact
1:03:23
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1:03:34
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1:03:43
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